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ABSTRACT
Design is a powerful instrument by which the world is forged to satisfy
the needs of mankind. As the awareness and pursuit of sustainability in-
creases, we have seen the transition from \design for needs" to \design for
environment". Design for the Environment (DfE) requires manufacturers to
focus on conserving and reusing resources, minimizing waste, and reducing
hazard during a design process. DfE includes, but not limited to Design
for Recovery and Benign by Design. Manufacturers are facing the challenge
and opportunity of incorporating DfE into their businesses. Eco-conscious
product design is critical for the success of businesses, and, therefore, has
been an important research focus. This dissertation presents a design ap-
proach to help manufacturers maximize prots through optimal eco-conscious
product design, and to seek insights for policy makers and managers into
inducing product design for the environment. The focus of this dissertation
is the interaction between product design for the environment with market
segmentation, inter-divisional coordination, and regulatory policies.
This dissertation presents two studies on Design for Recovery. The rst
study analyzes the eects of remanufacturable product design on market
segmentation and trade-in prices. By identifying the system and market
parameters under which it is optimal for a manufacturer to design a remanu-
facturable product, the study demonstrates that entering a remanufactured-
goods market in and of itself does not necessarily translate into environmental
friendliness. In addition, this study develops and compares several measures
of environmental eciency, and concludes that emissions per revenue can
serve as the best proxy for emissions as a metric for measuring overall
environmental stewardship.
The second study investigates the impact of decentralization of manu-
facturing and remanufacturing operations within a rm on product design,
pricing, and protability, and seeks inter-divisional incentive mechanism to
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achieve rm-wide coordination. This study shows that decentralization and
divisional conict not only result in lower rm prot and product sales,
but also create a hurdle for remanufacturable product design. Thus, an
inter-divisional incentive mechanism is suggested to facilitate coordination
between two prot-maximizing divisions. The study signies a two-part
coordination scheme (a transfer price and a xed lump sum), through which a
decentralized rm can achieve rst-best total prot and production quantity;
in addition, the manufacturing division is incentivized to design new products
to be remanufacturable.
The last study focuses on Benign by Design. In this essay, an innova-
tive pharmaceutical company decides whether to adopt green pharmacy in
response to the regulatory policy of the pharmaceutical stewardship and/or
patent term extension, as well as the competition from a generic company.
One the one hand, the patent term extension can encourage the innovative
company to invest in green pharmacy, and the regulator can induce green
pharmacy with short extended term when market competition is intensive.
On the other hand, a pharmaceutical company will neither go green nor bear
all the compliance cost in the presence of the take-back regulation because the
compliance cost is traditionally independent of the choice of green pharmacy.
Results show that although adding the take-back regulation on top of the
patent term extension generally reduces rm prot and requires a longer
term extension, such combined policy can excel the single policy of patent
term extension under certain circumstances. In addition, a modied take-
back policy that associates compliance cost with the rm's choice of green
pharmacy is better than the patent term extension when the competition
intensity is relatively high.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
\Rethinking the future: It is a profound challenge, at the end of an era of
cheap oil and materials to rethink and redesign how we produce and consume;
to reshape how we live and work, or even to imagine the jobs that will be
needed for transition."
{ Dame Ellen Patricia MacArthur.
1.1 Design for Recovery and Benign by Design
Design is one of the most powerful, inspiring, and enlightening instrument by
which the world is forged to satisfy the needs of mankind. As the awareness
and pursuit of sustainability increases, manufacturers are faced with the
challenge and opportunity of conducting green businesses, which drives the
transition from a \design for needs" to a \design for environment". Design
for the Environment (DfE) is \a design process that must be considered
for conserving and reusing the earth's scarce resources; where energy and
material consumption is optimized, minimal waste is generated and output
waste streams from any process can be used as the raw materials of another"
(Billatos and Basaly 1997). According to United Nations Economic and
Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA 2014), one of the central
concepts of DfE is the design for reuse or disposal. Product design is the
beginning of the life of a product, and it occupies great importance in terms
of environmental impact of the product from cradle (raw materials) to its
grave (recovery or disposal).
In end-of-life recovery, part of unwanted products become useful compo-
nents of other products (Fitzgerald et al. 2007). End-of-life recovery can
be achieved by various means, such as reuse, reconditioning, refurbishing,
remanufacturing, and recycling. Reuse and reconditioning require very few
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reprocessing operations; reuse involves almost no value-adding treatments
while reconditioning requires minor value-adding treatments of cleaning, lu-
bricating, or polishing. Refurbishing and remanufacturing both include re-
placement of used parts; a remanufactured product is built with upgraded
parts while a refurbished product is built with parts that maintain the
original specications (Kwak 2012). Recycling is the simplest but the least
resource-ecient form of recovery. The unwanted products are usually de-
formed so that raw materials can be extracted to produce dierent products.
Among these ve forms of recovery, remanufacturing and refurbishing rely
heavily on the ease of inspection, cleaning, and disassembly (Sundin and
Bras 2005). It is evident that the diculties in inspection, cleaning, and
disassembly can only be lowered or removed if products are designed for
remanufacturing and refurbishing. Therefore, Chapter 2 and 3 of this disser-
tation mainly focus on the design for remanufacturing.
End-of-life recovery is protable when the residual value of unwanted
products are high. If the residual value is small, unwanted products are
disposed rather than recovered. The process of disposal generates negative
environmental impacts by potentially consuming energy, releasing emissions,
and contaminating surface and waters. Although eorts have been made to
reduce such impacts through end-of-pipe-control approach, it is always better
to prevent waste through benign design than to treat or clean up waste
afterwards. For example, green chemistry emphasizes the design of safer
chemicals (minimize the toxicity of chemical products), design for degrada-
tion (chemicals break down easily and do not persist in the environment), and
design for energy eciency (minimize the energy requirements of chemical
processes) (Anastas and Warner 1998). Similarly, green pharmacy is the
design of pharmaceutical products and processes that eliminates or reduces
the use and generation of hazardous substances (EEA 2010). To achieve green
chemistry and green pharmacy, design for benignity is key. Thus, Chapter 4
studies several issues concerning a \benign-by-design" approach.
1.2 Motives for DfE
The transition from a \design for needs" to a \design for environment"
can be traced back to the early 1970s (Madge 1993). Today, Design for
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the Environment (DfE), along with Green Design (GD), Environmentally
Conscious Design (ECD) and EcoDesign, is becoming a common practice in
many manufacturing and service industries (Giudice et al. 2006). Economic
protability and environmental legislations are, among others, the key drivers
for DfE.
Protability is the ultimate motivation for DfE, enabling manufacturers
to control cost, charge green premium and expand market. In many cases,
remanufacturing operations can be less expensive and more environmentally
friendly than manufacturing operations for manufacturers (Wu 2012). For
example, a remanufactured alternator oers 50% cost saving and 60-70%
energy and material consumption as compared to a new product (Fatimah
et al. 2013). However, products that are not designed to be easily remanu-
factured could result in very high costs, which makes remanufacturing barely
protable (Sundin 2001, Kerr and Ryan 2001, Franke et al. 2006).
Not only does DfE help manufacturers to lower cost, it also allows compa-
nies to segment customers and practice price dierentiation. Bhattacharya
and Sen (2003, 2004) pointed out that customers tend to establish strong and
committed relationship with companies and products that \help them satisfy
one or more important self-denitional needs". Surveys and studies indicate
that some customers (usually with more psychological benets obtained from
purchasing a sustainable item) are willing to pay a green premium on eco-safe
products (Cremer and Thisse 1999, Chen 2001, Sengupta 2012). As a result,
DfE helps transform the end-of-life operations from a \cost center" to a new
\revenue center" (Guide Jr and Van Wassenhove 2009).
Moreover, DfE creates a bigger pie for manufacturers as businesses and
market opportunities expand. For example, oering remanufactured prod-
ucts is an approach that can attract new end-customers by expanding product
lines to include less expensive alternative. BMW Exchange Part oers re-
manufactured components at a price 30-50% cheaper than new counterparts
(Thierry et al. 1995). By selling recovered products at a low price, manufac-
turers can attract consumers who would otherwise not purchase (Debo et al.
2005). Meanwhile, according to Cone Corporate Citizenship Study (2002),
84% Americans reported that they would switch brands to one associated
with a good cause, given similar price and quality. Therefore, manufacturers
can employ DfE to maintain its market share or gain a larger share. The
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), who promotes the Design for
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the Environment Program, also demonstrates this possible boundary:
\Companies that have invested in safer chemistry and earned the (EPA
Design for the Environment) label have entered an expanding marketplace
for sustainable products. These companies can look forward to growing
their businesses and adding green jobs to the economy. Participants in
the green marketplace include major retailers, such as Wal-Mart, Safeway,
Home Depot, and Target, which have given special status to Design for the
Environment-labeled products, and government purchasers who are increas-
ingly specifying the Design for the Environment label in their purchasing
requirements."
{ EPA Design for the Environment (http://www.epa.gov/dfe/faqs.html)
Environmental legislation has also been identied as a motivator for \de-
sign for environment". Environmental legislation inuences product design
in various ways. First, regulations, such as the Restriction of Hazardous
Substances (RoHS) Directive and recycled-content mandates, instigate de-
sign changes by prohibiting or restricting the use of some substances (Tof-
fel 2003). Second, take-back requirements, such as Waste Electrical and
Electronic Equipment (WEEE) Directive and End of Life Vehicle (ELV)
Directive, motivate manufacturers to modify product design such that end-
of-life product recovery becomes protable or end-of-life product disposal
becomes easy and safe. This can be achieved, for example, by adopting easy-
disassembly or ready-recycling product and process design (Toel 2004). A
list of Product Stewardship and Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR),
also called \Producer Takeback", can be found at http://www.calrecycle.
ca.gov/epr/PolicyLaw/default.htm#World. Third, legislation on landll
taxes, energy taxes, recycling subsidies and emissions trading encourages
manufacturers to design or redesign products and process in order to reduce
the consumption of energy and materials, or to minimize pollution and waste
(Calcott and Walls 2000, 2005, Plambeck and Wang 2009).
1.3 Barriers to DfE
Although the transition from a \design for needs" to a \design for en-
vironment" was initiated more than four decades ago, many managerial
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decisions fail to follow the paradigms of sustainability (Flannery and May
2000, Seitz 2007). As a case in point, although Caterpillar undertook both
manufacturing and remanufacturing operations, its engine design priorities
were still largely governed by the needs of the manufacturing process (Stahel
1995). There are three types of barriers to the growth of DfE: (1) high cost,
(2) perceived value, and (3) cannibalization and competition.
In order to take advantage of the cost savings, manufacturers have to
design and produce products to be refurbishable or remanufacturable, which
could require costly materials and advanced technology (Lee and Bony 2008).
The cost saving from DfE may not always justify the additional expenses
on materials and technology. Moreover, original equipment manufacturers
(OEMs) need to pay higher prices for take-back operations and face strong
variations in quality, quantity and time of returned products (Guide Jr
and Van Wassenhove 2001), which can make DfE unattractive. DfE meets
extreme obstacle when the residual value of end-of-life products is nominal
and the environmental legislation to encourage responsible behavior is not
available.
DfE relies on the market demand and protability. Recovered products
may not be well received by consumers because these products are associated
with lower quality as compared to new products (Guide Jr and Li 2010). Con-
sequently, a consumer's willingness-to-pay (WTP) for a recovered product is
generally less than the WTP for a new counterpart, which drives down both
demand and prot of DfE. Furthermore, customers are not always strategic
in the sense that they do not consider life cycle costs of products (Gray and
Charter 2007). DfE may result in higher price but allows easy replacement
of parts and components, which could be benecial to the consumers, in the
long run. Customers, however, may only compare the current price without
taking into account the future benets.
The potential for cannibalization and competition is another major barrier
that prevents manufacturers to implement DfE. From one point of view,
selling refurbished or remanufactured products could cause extensive canni-
balization to the new products, hence impeding the protability (Thomas
2003, Ferguson and Toktay 2006, Atasu et al. 2008). In such a case, manu-
facturers would rather not invest in designing products to be refurbishable or
remanufacturable. From another point of view, even if OEM do not tap into
remanufactured-goods markets by themselves, third-party remanufacturers,
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who only target at the secondary markets, could collect, recover and resell
used products (Ferguson and Toktay 2006, Oraiopoulos et al. 2012). The
external competition from recovered products may drive OEMs to `clean the
market' so that independents do not have access to cores (Seitz 2007). Even
worse, OEMs will eliminate the secondary market by deliberately designing
products that are exceedingly dicult to take apart and recover. Gell (2008)
reported that toner cartridge OEMs deter remanufacturers by using anti
reuse devices (ARUDs) such as sonic welding and unnecessary adhesive tapes,
techniques that restrict toner cartridges to being either single-cycle or short-
life.
1.4 The Objective and the Plan
The principal goals of this dissertation are: (1) to explore the relationship
among Design for the Environment (DfE), protability and environment,
and (2) to develop and examine mechanisms that facilitate DfE. Improving
the adopting of DfE is only achievable by understanding the economic and
environmental implications of DfE. However, such implications have not been
clear, which hinders the application of DfE. Also, as discussed in Section 1.3,
barriers to both Design for Recovery and Design for Benignity widely exist,
and questions still linger over how to induce DfE. Thus, the contribution
of the work is two-fold. On the one hand, this dissertation provides clear
understanding of Design for the Environment by integrating the perspectives
on protability and environment. On the other hand, this dissertation seeks
insights for regulators and managers on how to incent manufacturers or
design decision makers to implement DfE.
This dissertation consists of three essays, each modeling a product design
problem within a certain operations management context. In general, Figure
1.1 describes the connections among three essays.
Chapter 2 analyzes the eects of remanufacturable product design on
market segmentation and trade-in prices by studying a two-stage prot-
maximization problem in which a price-setting manufacturer can choose
whether or not to open a remanufactured-goods market for its product. By
identifying the condition under which it is optimal for a manufacturer to
design a remanufacturable product, the study demonstrates that entering a
6
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Figure 1.1: Connections among Three Essays
remanufactured-goods market in and of itself does not necessarily translate
into environmental friendliness. Meanwhile, external restrictions imposed
on total greenhouse gas emissions draw criticism in their own right because
they risk stiing growth or reducing overall consumer welfare. Given these
trade-os, this study, therefore, develops and compares several measures
of environmental eciency, and concludes that emissions per revenue can
serve as the best proxy for emissions as a metric for measuring overall
environmental stewardship.
Chapter 3 investigates the impact of decentralization of manufacturing
and remanufacturing operations within a rm on product design, pricing,
and protability, and seek inter-divisional incentive mechanism to achieve
rm-wide coordination. Specically, a supply chain includes a retailer and a
rm consisting of two divisions. Within the rm, one division is responsible
for designing and manufacturing new products while the other division is
responsible for remanufacturing operation. This study shows that decen-
tralization and divisional conict not only results in lower rm prot and
product sales, but also creates a hurdle for remanufacturable product design.
Thus, in this study, an inter-divisional incentive mechanism is suggested to
facilitate coordination between two prot-maximizing divisions. It can be
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demonstrated that through a two-part coordination scheme (a transfer price
and a xed lump sum), a decentralized rm can achieve rst-best total prot
and product quantity; additionally, the manufacturing division is incentivized
to design new products to be remanufacturable.
Chapter 4 focuses on the impact of the pharmaceutical take-back regula-
tion and patent extension on the choice of green design by pharmaceutical
companies. In this essay, an innovative pharmaceutical company faces price-
dependent demand and decides whether to adopt green pharmacy in response
to the regulatory policy on pharmaceutical stewardship and/or patent ex-
tension as well as the competition from a generic company. The pharma-
ceutical company incurs a xed cost to choose green pharmacy. The study
demonstrates that the innovative company may pursue green pharmacy in
the presence of the take-back regulation but will never voluntarily do so in the
presence of the take-back regulation. From the regulator's perspective, it can
induce green pharmacy with short extended term when market competition
is intensive. In addition, adding the take-back regulation on top of the patent
term extension excels the patent term extension when the compliance cost is
relatively small, the xed investment cost and the collection rate are relatively
large, the competition is either nominal or suciently intensive, and the
environmental issue is rather urgent. Lastly, a modied take-back policy
that associates compliance cost with the rm's choice of green pharmacy is
superior to the patent extension when the competition intensity is relatively
high.
Chapter 5 draws conclusions and contains a summary of the contributions
of the work. Also, it describes the limitations and lists several possible
extensions and several ways forward.
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CHAPTER 2
EFFECTS OF REMANUFACTURABLE
PRODUCT DESIGN ON MARKET
SEGMENTATION AND THE
ENVIRONMENT
\Why do we send valuable items like aluminium and food waste to landll
when we can turn them into new cans and renewable energy? Why use more
resources than we need to in manufacturing? We must now work together to
build a zero waste nation - where we reduce the resources we use, reuse and
recycle all that we can and only landll things that have absolutely no other
use."
{ Hilary James Wedgwood Benn.
2.1 Introduction
The demand for remanufactured products has grown tremendously in recent
years. According to United States International Trade Commission (USITC)
estimates, the U.S. market for remanufactured goods increased by 15 percent
from $36.0 billion in 2009 to $41.5 billion in 2011, and the value of U.S. reman-
ufactured production grew by 15 percent to at least $43.0 billion during that
same period, thus supporting 180,000 full-time U.S. jobs and contributing
to $11.7 billion U.S. exports (USITC 2012). Accordingly, a growing number
of manufacturers are actively engaging in remanufacturing, many of which
oer trade-in programs to promote sales of upgraded products, use collected
used products for remanufacturing, and maintain sucient control over the
entire product life cycle (Li et al. 2011). As a case in point, Oracle makes
available its Upgrade Advantage Program (UAP) to the users of its servers,
storage systems, and select components. This program provides trade-in
discounts toward new Oracle hardware when customers return qualied used
equipment, which includes both originally new and remanufactured products.
Meanwhile, Oracle's Remanufactured Products Program targets customers
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who require same-as-new quality and warranty products but can aord only
reduced prices. Oracle currently oers over 70 items across 11 dierent
product lines on its factory remanufactured products listing, with list prices
ranging from $250 to $220,000 per unit (Oracle 2013). Moreover, through
these programs, Oracle has secured exclusive control over its remanufactured-
goods market for itself and its partner (Oraiopoulos et al. 2012) and it has
boosted sales of new products as well.
For many manufacturers, oering remanufactured products is an approach
that not only can attract new end-customers by expanding product lines to
include less expensive alternatives, but also can help protect the environment
by consuming fewer resources and by reducing overall carbon emissions. For
instance, the Bosch eXchange workshop is a program that replaces faulty
vehicle parts with certied remanufactured parts, at a price that is between
30 and 40 percent lower than the price of new parts. But, in addition, this
program also has resulted in Bosch emitting 23,000 fewer metric tons of CO2
in 2009 because it remanufactured 2.5 million parts in lieu of manufacturing
them anew (Bosch 2010). Similarly, Cummins' remanufacturing business,
also known as ReCon, reclaimed 50 million pounds of product in 2012 and
avoided 200 million pounds of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by oering
1,000 components and 2,000 engine part numbers as alternatives to their
new-product counterparts (Cummins 2012).
Despite these documented benets of remanufacturing, many manufac-
turers have yet to embrace the idea of tapping into remanufactured-goods
markets (Ferguson 2010). Indeed, as Ferguson (2010) reports, Hauser and
Lund estimated in 2008 that only 6% of over 2000 remanufacturing rms in
their database were original equipment manufacturers (OEMs). And from
2009 to 2011, only 2% among total sales of all manufactured products by
U.S. rms in seven remanufacturing-intensive sectors was estimated to be
remanufactured goods (USITC 2012). One major reason why manufacturers
have been reluctant to introduce remanufacturing operations is the apprehen-
sion that the sale of remanufactured products would cannibalize their new
product oerings (Atasu et al. 2010). But, in addition, other technical and
management issues include uncertainty in the quantity, quality and timing of
returned products (Guide Jr 2000; Toktay et al. 2004; Clottey et al. 2012),
high core and labor costs and lack of skilled workers (USITC 2012), and
possible theft of intellectual property (Martin et al. 2010).
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As highlighted above, there are trade-os involved in a manufacturer's
decision to open a remanufactured-goods market for its product. Thus, the
decision is a function of the system and market parameters. Therefore, in
this chapter, the following research questions are addressed: Under what
conditions should a manufacturer expand its product line to include making a
remanufactured good available to its market? Moreover, if the manufacturer
does enter into remanufacturing, then what should be the optimal trade-
in program? What would be the resulting return rate through the trade-
in program? Regardless, what would be the optimal market segmentation
strategy and what would be the environmental implications of that strategy?
To answer these questions, this chapter develops and studies a two-stage
prot-maximization problem in which a price-setting manufacturer can choose
whether or not to open a remanufactured-goods market for its product by
designing its product either to be remanufacturable or non-remanufacturable,
respectively. If the manufacturer designs its product to be remanufacturable,
then it also must determine its optimal pricing strategy, which involves a
price for selling new products in the rst period, a trade-in allowance for
new products returned after the rst period in exchange for either a new or
remanufactured product in the second period, a price for selling new products
in the second period, and a price for selling remanufactured products in
the second period. If the manufacturer instead designs its product to be
non-remanufacturable, then it still must determine its corresponding opti-
mal pricing strategy, but in this case the optimal pricing strategy requires
specication only of rst and second period prices of new products.
Given this modeling construct, we explore and draw implications from the
optimal market segmentation policies. Upon doing so, we nd that it is
optimal for a manufacturer to design a remanufacturable product (and thus
open a remanufactured-goods market for its products) when the value-added
from remanufacturing is relatively high but product durability is relatively
low and innovation is nominal. In many cases, however, we nd that it is not
optimal for the manufacturer to design its product to be remanufacturable,
which helps validate to some extent the documented evidence indicating
the reluctance of so many manufacturers to enter the remanufactured-goods
market.
In addition, we nd that the optimal trade-in program is such that the
return rate could be low, depending on the problem parameters. In par-
11
ticular, we nd that when the production cost of a non-remanufacturable
product is high but the remanufacturing cost is low, the manufacturer designs
its new products to be remanufacturable but then limits the incentive for
customers to return those products in exchange for a new or remanufactured
replacement by virtue of oering a relatively low trade-in price. In addition,
under such circumstances, not only is a small fraction of products returned
through the trade-in program, but also is only a small fraction of those
returns then remanufactured. Hence, under such circumstances, the return
rate and the remanufacturing rate of returned products are low.
Thus, we emphasize that entering a remanufactured-goods market in and of
itself does not necessarily translate into environmental friendliness. Despite
the fact that the negative environmental impact of a given unit of a reman-
ufactured product is usually less than that of a new one, a low price for re-
manufactured products could attract demand from consumers who otherwise
would not purchase new products at higher prices. This demand increase in
remanufactured products thus would mean that additional resources may be
consumed to fulll customer demand, thereby potentially resulting in a more
damaging environmental impact overall (e.g., more GHG emissions). Mean-
while, restrictions imposed on GHG emissions draw criticism in their own
right because they risk stiing growth or reducing overall consumer welfare.
Given these trade-os, we therefore develop and compare several measures
of environmental eciency that take into consideration both environmental
issues and economic performance or social welfare. Among these measures,
we conclude that a manufacturer that remanufactures its products generally
produces lower GHG emissions per dollar of revenue than a manufacturer
that does not remanufacture. In fact, manufacturers such as Apple (2013),
Cummins (2012) and Dell (2013) have been measuring their environmental
performance using such an eciency ratio.
Chapter 2 is organized as follows. Related literature is reviewed in Section
2.2. Section 2.3 formulates the model and provides structural results, and
detailed analysis is provided in Section 2.4 to identify the optimal design de-
cision, market segmentation, return rate and remanufacturing rate. We then
investigate and compare several environmental impact measures in Section
2.5. A summary of the ndings, implications, and limitations are in Section
2.6.
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2.2 Relation to Literature
A large number of studies in recent years have focused on the strategic, tacti-
cal, and operational issues of remanufacturing, as comprehensively reviewed
by Guide Jr and Van Wassenhove (2009) and by Souza (2013). Among this
literature, several themes have emerged to establish why and how OEMs
voluntarily enter remanufacturing markets including, but not limited to, the
following reasons: to enhance prot opportunities (Toel 2004), to better
manage demand (Ferrer and Swaminathan 2006, 2010), to help segment
consumer markets (Debo et al. 2005, Atasu et al. 2008) and to mitigate
the eects of external remanufacturing competition (Majumder and Groen-
evelt 2001, Ferguson and Toktay 2006) while prudently managing potential
cannibalization within its own product line (Moorthy 1984, Guide Jr and
Li 2010). We contribute to this literature by endogenizing the decision to
design for remanufacturability (i.e., whether or not to design a product that
can be remanufactured). In doing so, we incorporate a cost trade-o by
recognizing that producing a remanufacturable product is usually more costly
than producing a non-remanufacturable product, but that is in exchange
for potential savings when the product is remanufactured. Meanwhile, we
endogenize the trade-in price, which serves as both an incentive for customers
to return used products and as a lever for the manufacturer to further segment
the market.
We also contribute to the remanufacturing literature that investigates
trade-in programs and their implications for pricing and discounting strate-
gies. Along this theme, Oraiopoulos et al. (2012) and Agrawal et al. (2008)
consider the role of a trade-in program in facilitating product returns (for re-
manufacturing) and in providing a lever to segment vertical markets through
price. Ray et al. (2005) study the trade-in strategy for remanufacturing
products by considering both durability and the age of products. They nd
that if the trade-in allowance is age-independent, then the trade-in allowance
rst increases in durability but after a certain threshold, it starts decreasing.
They conclude that a rm should oer the maximum trade-in allowance when
products are of medium durability. Moreover, with an optimized trade-in
program, some customers carry back used products for resale value and others
may continue using their products for another period. In a related vein,
return rates can be modeled exogenously because manufacturers often must
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comply with laws and regulations such as the Waste Electrical and Electronic
Equipment (WEEE) Directive, which species a minimum percentage of e-
waste that needs to be collected by manufacturers. However, rms can
actually benet from actively controlling the return rate of used products
(Guide Jr 2000, 2001). Atasu and Souza (2013) show that the optimal
recovery rate (i.e., the return rate multiplied by the fraction of returned
products that are recovered) can be zero or positive but the rm never chooses
high product quality or price when the rate is endogenous. We relax their
assumption that the return rate is independent of prices and instead model
it as the proportion of new products sold in the rst period that are later
returned by customers who maximize their surplus. Hence, our return rate
is related to customer utility from new, used and remanufactured products,
to the retail prices of new and remanufactured products as well as to the
trade-in price. Furthermore, we then examine the remanufacturing rate,
which we dene as the proportion of returned products that are eventually
remanufactured by the manufacturer.
Although environmental performance can be positively correlated to nan-
cial performance (Klassen and McLaughlin 1996, Corbett and Klassen 2006),
these two metrics often lead to conict for manufacturers (Kleindorfer et al.
2005). Moreover, environmentally responsible practices such as leasing and
product recovery are not necessarily superior to no-leasing or no-recovery
scenarios (Agrawal et al. 2012, Atasu and Souza 2013). As to remanufac-
turing, Gu et al. (2012) show that the presumed environmental eciency of
remanufactured products could be compromised if either the ratio of per-
unit environmental impact associated with remanufactured or new products
is high, or the remanufacturing cost is high. The studies mentioned above
limit their discussion by using aggregated measure of environmental impact.
A common belief is that environmental regulations based on such a measure
erode competitiveness (Porter and van der Linde 1995). Hence, we contribute
to the literature by dening and evaluating dierent environmental eciency
measures that relate them to other outcomes such as prot, revenue or social
welfare.
This study is most closely related to Oraiopoulos et al. (2012), who explore
the conditions under which an OEM should allow or restrict the opening of
a secondary market for remanufactured products operated by third-party
entrants and how such decisions and trade-in prices are aected by the
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relicensing fee. By examining combined eects of inherent product durability,
added value of remanufacturing process, innovation and cost, they show
that when consumers' willingness to pay for a remanufactured product is
suciently high compared to inherent product durability, it is not optimal for
the OEM to eliminate the secondary market because cannibalization eects
are outweighed by relicensing revenue and resale value eects. This study
diers from their work in several ways. First, product design is endogenous
to our model, that is, our manufacturer decides whether or not to design
its new products to be remanufacturable. If the manufacturer chooses a
remanufacturable design, a higher production cost of new products incurs
to the rm due to R&D expenses and additional resource consumption.
Second, we consider the manufacturer to be a price-setter for both new
and remanufactured products. Under this assumption, we therefore have
no relicensing fee, but instead introduce a new consumer type, namely con-
sumers who buy a new product in the rst period and replace it with a
remanufactured product in the second period. Third, this study emphasizes
the environmental implications of an optimal strategy.
2.3 Assumptions and Models
2.3.1 Modeling Framework
Manufacturer. We consider a two-period, prot-maximization problem for
a price-setting manufacturer. The manufacturer makes design decision k at
the beginning of the time horizon, where k = 0 denotes a non-remanufacturable
design (in which case new products are non-remanufacturable) and k = 1
denotes a remanufacturable design (in which case new products are remanu-
facturable). In the rst period, the manufacturer determines the price p1
at which new products are sold in the period. In the second period, if
k = 0, then the manufacturer only determines the price p2 at which new
products are sold in the period; however, if k = 1, then the manufacturer
determines the prices p2 and pr at which new and remanufactured products
are respectively sold in the period. Meanwhile, if k = 1, then the manufac-
turer also determines the trade-in allowance s for buyers who return a used
product to buy either a new or a remanufactured one in the second period.
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Only returned products may be remanufactured and therefore the number of
remanufactured products cannot exceed the number of products returned.
The production cost of a new product depends on the design decision k. We
assume that the unit cost to produce a new non-remanufacturable product
(dened by k = 0) and a new remanufacturable product (dened by k = 1)
is c0 and c1, respectively, where c1  c0 reects the increased complexity
required to make a product remanufacturable (Subramanian 2012). The
unit cost to remanufacture a product is cr. We assume cr < c0 because the
per-unit remanufacturing cost can be as low as 40 to 65 percent less than
that of its new products (Ginsburg 2001).
Consumers. Willingness-to-pay (WTP)  for a new product in the rst
period is heterogeneous and uniformly distributed in the interval [0; 1], with
market size normalized to 1. We assume  to be independent of k since
a consumer's sustainability considerations are normally separate from the
attribute of the products themselves (Galbreth and Ghosh 2013). We call
a customer with WTP equal to  a customer of type . Consistent with
Oraiopoulos et al. (2012), we make the following ve assumptions: First, we
assume that the new product in the second period (if oered) is an upgraded
version of the one produced and sold in the rst period, characterized by
innovation factor , where   1. Thus, if a consumer is willing to pay 
for the new product in the rst period, then her WTP for an upgraded new
product in the second period is   . Second, we assume that a new product
in the rst period depreciates with use and is characterized by durability
factor , where  < 1. Thus, if the customer's WTP is  for a new product
in the rst period, then her valuation associated with keeping the product in
the second period is   . Third, we assume that a consumer's WTP for a
remanufactured product is less than her WTP for a new product. Thus,
if a consumer is willing to pay  for a new product in the rst period,
then her WTP for a remanufactured product in the second period is r  ,
where remanufacturing valuation factor r 2 (0; 1). Fourth, we assume that
remanufacturing improves the condition of a used product. Thus, r > .
Fifth, we assume that the one-period utility from an upgraded product is
less than the combined utility from a new product bought in the rst period
and used for two periods. Thus,  < 1 + .
If a new product is remanufacturable (k = 1), then a customer purchases
at most one new unit in each period. If the customer makes a purchase in
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the rst period, then in the second period, she can either trade it in for a
new product (segment nn), trade it in for a remanufactured product if one is
available (segment nr) or keep it and thereby exit the market (segment nu). If
the customer does not make a purchase in the rst period, then in the second
period, she can either buy a new product (segment on), buy a remanufactured
product if available (segment or), or remain out of the market altogether
(segment oo). Therefore, in principle, there exist six customer segments
distinguished by dierent customer buying strategies for the two periods.
We use \customer segment" and \customer strategy" interchangeably unless
otherwise distinguished.
Consumers are strategic in the sense that they make purchase decisions
based on the total consumer surplus associated with both periods, which we
dene as the product valuations net of trade-in price s (if applicable) minus
the product prices p1; p2 and pr, as applicable. Thus, like Oraiopoulos et al.
(2012), we essentially assume that consumers know the trade-in program
as well as the price list for both periods before making decisions. Note
that consumers who otherwise would have a negative consumer surplus do
not make any purchases (segment oo). We denote segment size by d with
a subscript to refer to the segment, e.g., dnn denotes the size of customer
segment nn. Therefore, we have dnn + dnr + dnu + don + dor + doo = 1.
For parsimony, we assume that used products cannot be directly traded
between customers. If a new product is non-remanufacturable (k = 0),
then the market segmentation is analogous except that k = 0 means that
dnr = dor = 0 by denition. Table 2.1 summarizes the total consumer surplus
associated with each strategy for a customer of type , given p1; p2; pr and
s, as applicable for a given k. In Table 2.1, note that because  > r
by assumption, a consumer belonging to segment nn has a higher WTP 
for a new product than a consumer belonging to segment nr (denoted by
nn  nr). More broadly, by virtue of the ve WTP assumptions itemized
at the beginning of this subsection, we have nn  nr  nu  on  or.
Thus, the customer segmentation orderings implicit in Table 2.1 (and in
Table 2.2 later) hold true for any given pricing scheme p1; p2; pr and s.
Prot-maximization Problem: Let k be the manufacturer's total
prot over the two periods, given design decision k. If new products are
designed to be non-remanufacturable (k = 0), then the manufacturer's prob-
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Table 2.1: Consumer Surplus of Each Strategy for Consumers of Type 
Strategy 1st Period 2nd Period Consumer Surplus S ()
nn buy new buy new (   p1) + s+ (    p2)
nr buy new buy remanufactured (   p1) + s+ (r   pr)
nu buy new continue to use (   p1) +  
on inactive buy new     p2
or inactive buy remanufactured r   pr
oo inactive inactive 0
lem is
0 = max
p1;p2
(p1   c0)  (dnn + dnu) + (p2   c0)  (dnn + don) (2.1)
s:t: dnn + dnu + don  1
dnn; dnu; don  0
p1; p2  0
Alternatively, if new products are designed to be remanufacturable (k = 1),
then the manufacturer's problem becomes
1 = max
p1;p2;pr;s
(p1   c1)  (dnn + dnr + dnu) + (p2   c1)  (dnn + don)
+ (pr   cr)  (dnr + dor)  s  (dnn + dnr) (2.2)
s:t: dor  dnn
dnn + dnr + dnu + don + dor  1
dnn; dnr; dnu; don; dor  0
p1; p2; pr; s  0
where dor  dnn is true because the number of units remanufactured can-
not exceed the number of units returned, i.e., dnr + dor  dnn + dnr or,
equivalently, dor  dnn. Design decision k is determined by maximizing
 = max f0;1g and the corresponding optimal decisions are denoted as
k; p1; p

2; p

r and s
.
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2.3.2 Solution Procedure
For any given product design, we use Table 2.1 to obtain the indierence
point  between any pair of customer segments such that a customer of
type  is indierent between two strategies, and under the assumption that
0 <  < r < 1 <  < 1 + , we produce Table 2.2 accordingly. In Table
2.2, customers with WTP above the indierence point  in a cell belong to
the customer segment of the corresponding row and those with WTP below
the indierence point  belong to the customer segment of the corresponding
column. If the indierence point  is greater than or equal to one (less than
or equal to zero), then it means that all customers prefer the strategy of
the corresponding column (row) to the strategy of the corresponding row
(column). We therefore can derive the size of each segment by comparing
these indierence points. For example, if products are remanufacturable,
then Table 2.2(a) establishes that, for a customer to choose strategy nr, her
WTP  must satisfy
 2

max

pr   s
r    ;
p1   p2 + pr   s
1 + r    ; p1   s;
p1 + pr   s
1 + r
; 0

;
min

p2   pr
  r ; 1

(2.3)
In other words, if k = 1, then for a customer to choose strategy nr, that strat-
egy must yield a higher consumer surplus than would strategies nu; on; or; oo.
As per the \nr" row of Table 2.2(a), this would be true if
  max

pr   s
r    ;
p1   p2 + pr   s
1 + r    ; p1   s;
p1 + pr   s
1 + r

: (2.4)
Meanwhile, for the customer to choose strategy nr, that strategy also must
yield a higher consumer surplus than would strategy nn, which would be true
if   p2 pr
 r , as per the \nr" column of Table 2.2(a). Note that  2 [0; 1],
thus Equation 2.3 follows. Given (2.3), then, the size of customer segment
nr is
dnr = max

0;min

p2   pr
  r ; 1

 
max

pr   s
r    ;
p1   p2 + pr   s
1 + r    ; p1   s;
p1 + pr   s
1 + r
; 0

(2.5)
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Table 2.2: Indierence Point  for Any Pair of Strategies
(a) Remanufacturable Design
k = 1 nr nu on or oo
nn p2 pr
 r
p2 s
  p1   s
p1+p2 pr s
1+ r
p1+p2 s
1+
nr pr s
r 
p1 p2+pr s
1+r  p1   s
p1+pr s
1+r
nu p1 p2
1+ 
p1 pr
1+ r
p1
1+
on p2 pr
 r
p2

or pr
r
(b) Non-remanufacturable Design
k = 0 nu on oo
nn p2
  p1
p1+p2
1+
nu p1 p2
1+ 
p1
1+
on p2

Notice, therefore, that segment nr does not exist if and only if min
n
p2 pr
 r ; 1
o

max
n
pr s
r  ;
p1 p2+pr s
1+r  ; p1 s; p1+pr s1+r ; 0
o
. Notice, therefore, that segment nr
does not exist if and only if min
n
p2 pr
 r ; 1
o
 max
n
pr s
r  ;
p1 p2+pr s
1+r  ; p1  
s; p1+pr s
1+r
; 0
o
. The size of all other customer segments, for a given value of
k, can be derived in the same fashion. Technical supplement for details on
how to derive the size of each segment is available upon request.
Let M=(sgn(dnn), sgn(dnr), sgn(dnu), sgn(don), sgn(dor)) denote a spec-
ied market conguration, where sgn(x) = 1 if x > 0 and sgn(x) = 0 if
x  0. Thus, for example,M=(1,1,0,0,0) represents the market conguration
in which some customers buy new products in the rst period and then
trade them in for either new or remanufactured products in the second
period (dnn; dnr > 0) but no customer exits the market after the rst period
or enters it in the second period (dnu = don = dor = 0). Given this
denition of M, note that k = 0 if and only if M=(*,0,*,*,0), where *
can be 0 or 1; all other congurations correspond to k = 1. In principle,
there are 25   1 = 31 non-trivial possible market congurations of which
7 are associated with non-remanufacturable design (k = 0) and 24 are
associated with remanufacturable design (k = 1). However, the following
two propositions establish that certain congurations cannot exist in an
optimal solution, thus eliminating them from consideration. The proofs of
both propositions are provided in Appendix A.
Proposition 2.3.1 Given any product specication and market condition
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(c0, c1, cr, ,  and r), the following are true:
(i) dor > 0) dnn > 0, i.e., M=(0,*,*,*,1) does not exist, where * can be
0 or 1.
(ii) dnr > 0 ) don = 0 and don > 0 ) dnr = 0, i.e., M=(*,1,*,1,*) does
not exist, where * can be 0 or 1.
(iii) dnr = dnu = don = dor = 0 ) dnn = 0, i.e., M=(1,0,0,0,0) does not
exist.
Intuitively, Proposition 2.3.1(i) is a result of the fact that the manufacturer
cannot remanufacture more products than are returned (dor  dnn). Accord-
ing to the proof of Proposition 2.3.1(ii), the existence of segment on eectively
requires that p1  s (the price of new products in the rst period net of their
trade-in value) must be relatively large while p2   pr, the price dierence of
new and remanufactured products in the second period, must be relatively
small, which in turns makes it irrational to buy a new product in the rst
period and then trade it in for a remanufactured product because p1  s+ pr
is relatively large. Similarly, for segment nr to exist, p1 s must be relatively
small and p2   pr must be relatively large, in which case there would be no
demand for new products in the second period because p2 is relatively large.
The proof of Proposition 2.3.1(iii) indicates that if products are designed to
be non-remanufacturable (k = 0) and if there exist customers who makes
purchases in both periods, then it means that p1 must be suciently low
so as to entice some other customers to purchase new products in the rst
period without then purchasing anew in the second period, thus rendering
it impossible to sell products only to customers with the highest valuation
(segment nn).
In all, Proposition 2.3.1 eliminates 15 of the 31 theoretically possible
market congurations from consideration. Next, Proposition 2.3.2 eliminates
2 more of the remaining 16.
Proposition 2.3.2 Given any product specication and market condition
(c0, c1, cr, ,  and r), the following are true:
(i) It is more protable to oer only new products in the rst period (dnu >
0 and dnn = dnr = don = dor = 0) than it is to oer only new products in the
second period (don > 0 and dnn = dnr = dnu = dor = 0), i.e., M=(0,0,1,0,0)
dominates M=(0,0,0,1,0).
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(ii) If new products are non-remanufacturable (dnr = dor = 0), then it is
more protable to oer new products for one-time purchase only in the rst
period (dnu > 0 and dnn = don = 0) than it is to oer new products for
one-time purchase in either the rst period or the second period (dnu; don > 0
and dnn = 0), i.e., M=(0,0,1,0,0) dominates M=(0,0,1,1,0).
To help explain Proposition 2.3.2(i), note that the assumption 1 +  > 
suggests that if a manufacturer oers only new products, either in the rst
period or in the second period, then it should be optimal to produce and sell
the products earlier rather than later, everything else being equal. In other
words, if innovation is not sucient, then it does the rm no benet to delay
the introduction of a new product for a minor update. Moreover in such a
case, new products will be non-remanufacturable because the rm will not
remanufacture them. In a similar vein, Proposition 2.3.2(ii) is a byproduct
of product cannibalization in our two-period model. In particular, if the
manufacturer oers new products that are non-remanufacturable in both
periods, then some customers will prefer to buy new products in the rst
period rather than to buy in the second period. Note the unit prot of
selling one new product in the second period is usually smaller than the unit
prot of selling one in the rst period that can be used in both periods (see
proof for details). Consequently, the manufacturer prefers to price products
such that customers will only make purchases in the rst period rather than
in the second.
Although Propositions 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 analytically eliminate all but 14
possible market congurations from the search for the optimal solutions to
(2.1) and (2.2), we nd that we need to rely on a numerical search routine to
complete the optimization over the remaining feasible set of congurations.
To that end, we condition the remaining search on the dierent feasible
market congurations. In particular, for any given feasible market congu-
ration, we numerically solve either (2.1) or (2.2), as applicable, by applying
the Matlab build-in quadratic programming function quadprog. We then
compare the prot associated with each of the resulting solutions (one for
each feasible market conguration) to obtain the optimal solution k; p1; p

2; p

r
and s for any given parameter set. (See Technical Supplement for algorithm
details and justication.) Finally, we repeat this process for an exhaustive
set of input parameters to populate a comprehensive database of solutions
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Table 2.3: Parameter Ranges for Numerical Study
Parameter Increment (I) Min Max
c0 0:1
 I 1  I
c1 0:1
 g0 1  I
cr 0:1
 I c0   I
 0:1 1 2  3 I
 0:1   1 + I 1  2 I
r 0:1
  + I 1  I
* we choose increment I = 0:005 in the cases when more than one parameters are
xed.
to the manufacturer's maximization problem. Table 2.3 summarizes the
specic parameter ranges used in the process for which we solved the rm's
optimization problem. Given Table 2.3, the total number of parameter
combinations (c0; c1; cr; ; ; r) using an increment I = 0:1 for all parameters
is 18,720. However, in addition, we solved another approximately 36,000
instances by applying a smaller increment I = 0:005. Thus our analysis
below is based on solutions to approximately 54,000 instances of the problem.
2.4 Analysis
In this section, we compile and explore the database of optimal designs
and market congurations as well as the corresponding optimal prots and
return rates produced by the numerical optimization routine applied to the
comprehensive set of problem instances as described above. To set the stage,
we note rst that, although 14 possible market congurations survive the
elimination procedure implied by Propositions 2.3.1 and 2.3.2, we nd that
seven of those that remain never appear in our database of optimal solutions.
Thus, we nd that, of the 31 non-trivial possible market congurations that
can exist in principle, only eight remain as potentially optimal for a given set
of problem parameters taken from Table 2.3. We label these 8 congurations
as M1 through M8, and we provide each of their specications in Table 2.4.
From Table 2.4, note that M1, M2 and M3 each have dnr = dor = 0, which
implies that k = 0 when any one of these congurations is optimal; and M4
to M8 each of have either or both dnr > 0 or dor > 0, which implies that
k = 1 when any one of these congurations is optimal.
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Table 2.4: Taxonomy of Optimal Solution
k k = 0 k = 1
Mkt Conf. M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8
dnn + + + + +
dnr + + + +
dnu + + + + + +
don +
dor + +
Notes:+ means the segment size is positive; blank cell means the segment size is
zero.
2.4.1 Optimal Market Segmentation
We rst investigate the eects of exogenous parameters (production cost c0
and c1, remanufacturing cost cr, innovation factor , durability factor  and
remanufacturing factor r) on the size of each customer segment in an optimal
solution, as depicted in Figures 2.1 and 2.2. In Figure 2.1, we use base values
of c0 = 0:5; c1 = 0:55 and cr = 0:2 and explain the eect of varying c0; c1 and
cr on the optimal customer segmentation. In Figure 2.2 we repeat this by
varying parameters ;  and r.
We nd that the cost parameters c0; c1 and cr have an indirect impact on
consumer behavior. In particular, the cost structure rst aects the manu-
facturer's optimal design and market conguration, which in turn inuences
the size of various customer segments (see Figure 2.1). If the production cost
of non-remanufacturable products c0 is low relative to c1, the manufacturer
designs its products to be non-remanufacturable (i.e., k = 0). Intuitively,
this is true because the cost premium of making the product remanufac-
turable is signicant. Therefore, segment nr and or exist only when c0 is
relatively large (see Figure 2.1(a)). On the contrary, as shown in Figures
2.1(b) and 2.1(c), if the production cost of remanufacturable products c1 is
close to c0 or the remanufacturing cost cr is low, the manufacturer designs
its products to be remanufacturable, which makes sense because, then, the
manufacturer can reap the added value of remanufacturing without incurring
much additional cost. As a result, customers buy remanufactured products
when c1 or cr is relatively low. Moreover, the lower is cr, the more are the
customers who buy remanufactured products (i.e., the larger is segment nr)
and the fewer are the customers who buy new products (i.e., the smaller
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Figure 2.1: Customer Segments ( = 1:25,  = 0:4 and r = 0:8)
is segment nn). Intuitively, a lower cr allows the manufacturer to lower the
price of remanufactured products. Interestingly, however, the size of segment
or also increases as cr increases (see Figure 2.1(c)). This is because some
customers who otherwise would choose strategy nr when cr is small switch
to strategy or when cr is large, which results in a higher pr and a lower
s. Nevertheless, as a whole, the overall sale of remanufactured products
reduces as cr increases (see Figure 2.1(c)). In a similar vein, the overall
sale of remanufactured products initially increases as c1 increases because
some customers who otherwise would choose strategy nn when c1 is small
switch to purchase remanufactured products in the second period when c1
(and, correspondingly p1 and p2) grow larger. Eventually, however, if c1 is
suciently large, then the manufacturer's optimal design becomes k = 0
in which case segments nr and or necessarily disappear altogether because
remanufactured products are not available.
Looking next at Figure 2.2, we nd that when innovation factor  increases,
more customers buy new products in both periods (i.e., dnn increases), but
fewer customers buy remanufactured products (i.e., dnr + dor decreases).
This is because customers are willing to pay more for upgraded products
when  is larger. Interestingly, however, we nd that although the overall
demand for remanufactured products (dnr + dor) decreases in , the size of
segment or increases in . Intuitively, this happens because, as  increases,
the manufacturer can provide less incentive to attract previous buyers (i.e.,
provide smaller s), which enables it to reduce its price for remanufactured
products (i.e., reduce pr) to expand segment or. Similarly, a larger durability
factor  means that more customers nd it optimal to continue using the old
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Figure 2.2: Customer Segments (c0 = 0:5; c1 = 0:55 and cr = 0:2)
Table 2.5: Characterization of the Optimal Solution (c0 = 0:5, cr = 0:2,
 = 1:25)
Mkt Conf. M1 M2 M3 M4* M5* M6* M7* M8*
Fig 2.3(a) c1 = 0:50 (%) 0.0 0.0 7.0 64.4 0.0 27.2 1.4 0.0 100%
Fig 2.3(b) c1 = 0:55 (%) 0.0 34.0 40.1 2.1 0.0 23.5 0.3 0.0 100%
Fig 2.3(c) c1 = 0:60 (%) 0.0 45.9 45.4 0.0 0.0 8.7 0.0 0.0 100%
Notes: * indicates market congurations corresponding to k = 1. Each row
represents the percentage of cases (varying  and r) for which the given market
conguration constitutes the optimal solution for given c1.
product in the second period (i.e., dnu increases), while fewer customers buy
upgraded or remanufactured products (i.e., dnn, dnr and dor all decrease). In
general, r produces the mirror eect that cr produces as shown in Figure
2.2(c). In particular, as r increases, while dnr increases and dnu decreases;
and the progressions of dor and dnn are monotonically decreasing as long as
k = 1.
2.4.2 Optimal Product Design
As seen from Figure 2.2, the manufacturer tends to design a non-remanufacturable
product (k = 0) when product durability  is relatively large or reman-
ufacturing valuation factor r is relatively small. We next examine more
closely the eect of these two parameters on the optimal product design.
Toward that end, Figure 2.3 illustrates the optimal product design and
market congurations as functions of (; r) space for various values of c1,
given that c0 = 0:5; cr = 0:2 and  = 1:25. Each solid curve in the gure
represents the threshold above which k = 1.
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Figure 2.3: Optimal Product Design and Market Congurations (c0 = 0:5,
cr = 0:2,  = 1:25)
Notes: The southeast area is outside the bounds of discussion because  < r. In
each plot, k = 1 when (; r) lies above the bold solid curve and k = 0 when
(; r) lies below the bold solid curve.
As Figure 2.3 illustrates, it is optimal to design new products to be reman-
ufacturable (k = 1) only when the product durability  is suciently low
and the remanufacturing valuation factor r is suciently high. Moreover,
the higher is the cost to produce remanufacturable products c1, the more
dramatic is this eect. Hence, it is optimal for the manufacturer to produce
remanufacturable products not only when a customer's WTP is high for
a remanufactured product and low for a used product, but also when the
production cost is suciently low to justify the endeavor. Intuitively, if
new products were to provide relatively high utility in the second period, as
compared to remanufactured products, then it would be dicult for the man-
ufacturer to attract customers to the remanufactured products in the second
period. Indeed, notice from Figure 2.3 that although it is predominately
optimal for the manufacturer to design a remanufacturable product when
there is no cost premium associated with that decision (i.e., when c1 = c0),
if c1 is even just 10%-15% higher than c0; the product design threshold moves
northwest rapidly, thus leaving a much smaller region in which k = 1. To
quantify this observation, we probe deeper using Table 2.5. In Table 2.5,
we specify as percentages the optimal market conguration areas depicted
in Figure 2.3. For example, in reference to Figure 2.3(a), of all the problem
instances derived from Table 2.5 by setting c1 = 0:5 (and c0 = 0:5, cr = 0:2,
 = 1:25), but varying  and r, market conguration M3 is optimal for only
7% (whereas M4 is optimal for 64.4%, M6 is optimal for 27.2%, and M7 is
optimal for 1.4%). Given Table 2.5, then, note that as c1 increases from 0.50
to 0.55 to 0.60, the corresponding percentage of problem instances for which
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Figure 2.4: Maximum Threshold of c1 for a Remanufacturable Design
k = 1 (M4-M8) decreases rapidly, but at a decreasing rate, from 93% to
25.9% to 8.7%.
To further relate the above observation to optimal design, we next nd
the upper bound of c1 beyond which the manufacturer chooses not to design
a remanufacturable product. Figure 2.4 depicts this threshold as a function
of various problem parameters. In Figure 2.4, values of c1 below a given
threshold function correspond to k = 1 and values above the threshold
function correspond to k = 0. Intuitively, when customers are willing to
pay more for a remanufactured product (i.e., the larger is r) or when the
remanufacturing cost is lower (i.e., the smaller is cr), the manufacturer will
continue to design and produce remanufacturable products at higher costs
(i.e., at higher values of c1). However, it is interesting to note from Figure
2.4(a) that the remanufacturable design threshold of c1 is not a monotone
function of product durability . To help explain this observation, it is useful
to examine the corresponding optimal market conguration when k = 0.
In doing so, we nd that when  is small, the prot associated with selling
new products in both periods is higher than that associated with selling
new products only in the rst period because customers who keep using
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old products do not pay a large premium for product durability. But, if
new products are available in both periods when customers also have the
option to continue using used products, then any increase in  essentially
intensies product cannibalization. As a result, when  is small and increases,
the manufacturer will choose to remanufacture even for increased costs c1
associated with doing so. In contrast, segment nu is suciently lucrative to
deter the manufacturer from selling new products in the second period, in
which case, any increase in  essentially means that the manufacturer can
charge a higher price for new products and generate higher prots without
worrying about product cannibalization. Consequently, when  is large and
increases, the manufacturer, ceteris paribus, requires a lower c1 to justify
remanufacturing.
2.4.3 Optimal Return and Remanufacturing Rates
Environmental laws such as the Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment
(WEEE) Directive requires its member states to recollect a specic percent
of e-waste put on their markets (WEEE Directive, 2012). Nevertheless,
manufacturers recollect used products not only to comply with laws and
regulations, but also to remanufacture them to boost economic success. In
our model setting, the return rate is determined by the trade-in allowance s.
Hence, in this section, we study the implied return rate corresponding to the
manufacturer's optimal product design and market segmentation strategy.
However, the return rate in and of itself is not necessarily the same as the
remanufacturing rate, meaning that not all returned products are necessarily
remanufactured upon their return. Hence, in this section, we also study the
resulting remanufacturing rate associated with the manufacturer's optimal
strategy.
2.4.3.1 Return Rate
We dene return rate (r) as the proportion of new products sold in the rst
period that are later recollected by the manufacturer, that is,
r =
dnn + dnr
dnn + dnr + dnu
29
Table 2.6: Return Rate when k = 1
Opt Mkt Conf. r < 0:5 0:5  r < 1 r = 1 Subtotal
M4 22.8% 23.0% 0% 45.8%
M5 1.2% 2.3% 0% 3.5%
M6 0% 0% 19.3% 19.3%
M7 1.2% 4.8% 0% 6.0%
M8 0% 0% 25.4% 25.4%
Total 25.2% 30.1% 44.7% 100%
Because r 2 (0; 1] if new products are remanufacturable (i.e. if k = 1)
and r = 0 if (and only if) new products are non-remanufacturable (i.e. if
k = 0), we restrict our discussion only to cases in which new products
are remanufacturable. In other words, we focus here on the cases from
Sections 2.4.1-2.4.2 in which the optimal market conguration is a member
of the set fM4, M5, M6, M7, M8g. Table 2.6 aggregates and summarizes
the return rates associated with those cases. As Table 2.6 highlights, if the
manufacturer designs its product to be remanufacturable, then it is optimal
for the manufacturer to set s such that all rst-period customers return the
product (i.e., r = 1) in only 44.7% of the corresponding solutions. Note that
r = 1 means that no customer who makes a purchase in the rst period keeps
the product for further use in the second period (i.e., r = 1 ) dnu = 0).
Thus, r = 1 corresponds to cases in which either market conguration M6
or M8 is optimal. Alternatively, if for any given set of parameters, either
M4, M5, or M7 is the optimal conguration, then it means that r < 1. For
these cases, given that r < 1, Table 2.6 further identies whether or not r is
especially low. There are two reasons why the optimal market conguration
can be such that r is especially low. On the one hand, r can be low if
a suciently large portion of the consumer market values continued use of
products enough relative to their trade-in value not to make it worth the
trade. This is reected in Table 6 by the case in which M7 is the optimal
conguration. On the other hand, r can be low if it is optimal for the
manufacturer to design its trade-in program primarily as a mechanism to
ne tune the segmentation of its markets through its pricing tactics. This
is reected in Table 2.6 by the cases in which M4 and M5 are the optimal
congurations.
To probe deeper, consider Figure 2.5, which depicts how the return rate
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r, as well as and the associated trade-in price s required to induce that
return rate, change as selected parameters change. As Figure 2.5(a) shows,
both r and s generally increase as r increases. This basically reects the
fact that, the higher is r, the more prot the manufacturer can gain from
remanufactured products and, thus, the more incentive the manufacturer has
to increase its trade-in price so that it can recollect enough used products
to suciently endow its remanufacturing operation. However, as  increases,
r actually decreases despite increases in s. The intuition is as follows. The
higher is , the more a consumer values ownership of a previous purchase
relative to a replacement purchase, regardless of whether that replacement
would be new or remanufactured. Hence, the higher is , the higher the
trade-in price needs to be to stimulate any returns, but, at the same time,
the less willing are consumers to respond to that incentive. Conversely,
Figure 2.5(b) indicates that r generally increases, while s generally decreases,
with increases in . Intuitively, if  is relatively large, then it means that
consumers are more willing to buy new products in the second period, thus
they are willing to trade-in previous purchases without deterrence from a
relatively lower s. Nevertheless, as Figure 2.5(c) illustrates, r and s both grow
comparatively larger when a high c0 is coupled with a small cr. Intuitively, in
such a scenario, the potential benet of cost savings (i.e., c0  cr) dominates
the potential negative eect of product cannibalization; hence, it is protable
to recollect more used products for remanufacturing and that requires a
relatively larger s to fuel the process.
2.4.3.2 Remanufacturing Rate
Although the return rate r eectively reveals how much incentive a manufac-
turer provides consumers through its trade-in price s to return used products
for replacement purchases, not all recollected products will necessarily be
remanufactured, particularly if the manufacturer uses its trade-in program
simply as a way to more nely segment its market through pricing tactics.
Therefore, it is important also to examine the remanufacturing rate (rm),
which we dene as the proportion of returned products that are actually
remanufactured. That is,
rm =
dnr + dor
dnn + dnr
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Figure 2.5: Return Rate and Minimum s
Notes: Pattern areas represent when it is optimal for the manufacturer to design
and produce remanufactured products.
By denition, rm 2 (0; 1] and is only valid if k = 1. If rm = 1, then it
means that the manufacturer recollects used products solely for the purpose
of remanufacturing rather than for the purpose of ne-tuning its market
segmentation. According to Table 2.7, we nd that rm = 1 in more than half
of the optimal solutions corresponding to k = 1 (58.4%). On the contrary,
we also nd that rm < 0:5 in more than one third of optimal solutions
corresponding to k = 1 (37.5%). It is these cases, in particular, that suggest
that it very well could be in the manufacturer's interest to use its trade-in
program not for the purpose of endowing its remanufacturing process, per se,
but rather for the purpose of stimulating repurchases of new products while
reducing the cannibalization of those repurchases. As Table 2.7 illustrates,
this occurs when M4 or M5 is the optimal market conguration. Indeed,
according to Table 2.7, M5 is especially likely to be associated with a low
rm. Intuitively, this is true because M5 is optimal when  is relatively small,
which signies that remanufactured products intensively cannibalize the sale
of new products, when c1 is close to c0, which signies that the cost of oering
a trade-in program is low, and when cr is large, which signies that the cost
of producing remanufactured products is high.
Given Table 2.7, Figure 2.6 further illustrates how rm changes as se-
lected parameters change. Like the return rate r, and for analogous reasons,
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Table 2.7: Remanufacturing Rate when k = 1
Opt Mkt Conf. rm < 0:5 0:5  rm < 1 rm = 1 Subtotal
M4 32.9% 2.1% 10.8% 45.8%
M5 3.5% 0.0% 0% 3.5%
M6 1.1% 2.0% 16.2% 19.3%
M7 0% 0% 6.0% 6.0%
M8 0% 0% 25.4% 25.4%
Total 37.5% 4.1% 58.4% 100%
the remanufacturing rate rm increases in r and decreases in  (see Figure
2.6(a)). However, unlike the return rate r, the remanufacturing rate rm
generally decreases in  (see Figure 2.6(b)). This is true because, when
 is relatively large, it means that customers prefer upgraded products to
remanufactured products, thus a remanufacturable product design primarily
serves the purpose of more nely segmenting the market, and this drives rm
down. Nevertheless, Figure 2.6(b) also suggests that rm generally increases
as c1 increases. This is true because, as c1 increases, it becomes more
costly for the manufacturer to produce remanufacturable products. As a
result, the manufacturer will choose a remanufacturable product design only
if it is protable to sell remanufactured products, which drives rm up. By
comparing Figure 2.6(c) to 2.5(c), we nd that although the manufacturer
recollects more than half of the products it sells in the rst period when
c0 and cr are both high (Figure 2.5 (c)), the manufacturer actually reman-
ufactures less than 10% of those recollected units (Figure 2.6 (c)). This
is because when the cost of producing non-remanufacturable products c0 is
high, switching to a remanufacturable design does not signicantly increase
the associated production cost (i.e., c1   c0 is relatively small) but it does
enable the manufacturer to extract additional value by further segmenting its
market through its trade-in program. However, because of the relatively high
remanufacturing cost cr, it is not protable to remanufacture the recollected
products. As a result, although r is suciently large, rm is nevertheless close
to zero.
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Figure 2.6: Remanufacturing Rate
Notes: Pattern areas represent when it is optimal for the manufacturer to design
and produce remanufactured products.
2.5 Environmental Impact
Among other reasons, return rates in general, and remanufacturing rates
in particular, are important because they serve as useful metrics that help
gauge how a manufacturer's product design aects its environmental impact.
However, metrics for assessing environmental impact have yet to be stan-
dardized. For example, whereas the EPA focuses on establishing standards
that essentially limit the emissions released through per-unit consumption
(United States Environmental Protection Agency 2012), the EU Emissions
Trading System (EU ETS) focuses on establishing standards that essentially
limit the emissions released during production (EU ETS 2012). Moreover,
regardless of laws and regulations, manufacturers sometimes adopt their
own environmental performance metrics for internal control. For example,
one such metric, adopted by Apple Inc., is emissions per revenue (Apple
2013). Accordingly, in this section, we assess the environmental impact of
the manufacturer's optimal product design and market segmentation strategy
from Section 2.4 by considering its performance across several commonly
applied metrics introduced by government or industry. Toward that end, we
compare the manufacturer's optimal product design k 2 f0; 1g from Section
2.4 to the environmentally friendly design kef 2 f0; 1g associated with a
given environmental impact metric, where the denition of kef depends on
the specic metric ef under consideration. For example, if ef(k) denotes
the specic metric under consideration such that the lower is ef(k) the more
environmentally friendly is the product design, then we say that kef = 1 if
and only if ef (k = 1)  ef (k = 0). For each environmental impact measure
ef that we consider in this section, we compare k to kef for each of the 18,720
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problem instances dened by Table 2.3 when using the increment I = 0:1;
and for any given problem instance and specied value of k, we assume that
the manufacturer chooses the optimal market segmentation conditioned on
that value of k.
Within this context, we compare k and kef across the comprehensive
set of problem instances to assess the extent to which a manufacturer's
remanufacturable product design (whether optimal or not) will be environ-
mentally friendly (i.e., kef = 1), on the one hand, and the extent to which a
manufacturer's optimal product design is consistent with the environmentally
friendly design (i.e., k = kef ), on the other hand, for dierent denitions
of environmental impact metric ef . Moreover, we compare and contrast
these assessments across the various denitions of ef to ascertain the virtues
associated with adopting or imposing any particular metric over another. We
begin by establishing the notion of total emissions within the context of our
model.
2.5.1 Emissions
Given that one of the most acknowledged environmental impact metrics is
total emissions, we model emissions in a similar spirit as Agrawal et al. (2012),
Atasu and Souza (2013) and Gu et al. (2012). In particular, we assume
that the emissions of producing one unit of new product is ep, the emissions
associated with remanufacturing (if applicable) and with consuming a unit of
product is er and ec, respectively, and the emissions associated with disposing
the remains of a unit of product is ed. Given this construct and the sizes of all
customer segments (dnn; dnr; dnu; don and dor), the total emissions of produc-
ing new products is ep (2  dnn + dnr + dnu + don) and the total emissions of
producing remanufactured products is er (dnr + dor). Correspondingly, the
total emissions associated with the consumption of those new and reman-
ufactured products is ec (2  dnn + 2  dnr + dnu + don + dor). Note that all
products originally produced are eventually disposed, however the sources
of disposal are twofold: on the one hand, consumers dispose the products in
their possession at the end of the second period (dnn+dnr+dnu+don+dor), but
they do not dispose any products at the end of the rst period because, at that
time, they either keep the product for another period of use or they return
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Table 2.8: k vs. kEI : Comparison of Prot and Emissions
E = 0:2 kEI = 0 kEI = 1
k = 1 15.1% 4.0%
k = 0 12.5% 68.4%
E = 0:5 kEI = 0 kEI = 1
k = 1 17.3% 1.9%
k = 0 16.5% 64.3%
E = 0:8 kEI = 0 kEI = 1
k = 1 19.0% 0.2%
k = 0 20.0% 60.8%
the product to the manufacturer for a trade-in allowance toward the purchase
of a dierent one. On the other hand, the manufacturer disposes products
at the end of the rst period that it recollects from returns but does not
remanufacture (dnn+dnr (dnr + dor) = dnn dor). Accordingly, the emissions
associated with disposing product remains is ed (2  dnn + dnr + dnu + don).
Thus, all told, the total emissions for a given product design EI (k) is as
follows
EI (k) = 2e1  dnn + (e1 + e2)  dnr + e1  dnu + e1  don + e2  dor (2.6)
where e1 = ep + ec + ed and e2 = er + ec denote the life-cycle emissions per-
unit (EPU) of a new and a remanufactured product, respectively, and e2 < e1
to reect that remanufacturing is inherently environmentally ecient in the
sense that remanufacturing a unit of product is more environmentally friendly
than disposing a unit of product and then manufacturing a new one in its
place (i.e., er < ed+ ep). This inherent eciency, however, could potentially
fuel an associated downside in the form of Jevons Paradox or the Rebound
Eect (Owen 2010; Small and Van Dender 2007). The essence of these
paradoxical phenomena is as follows: if technological advances enhance the
eciency of production, then prots would rise and investment in capacity
expansion would occur as a result, thus driving prices down and pushing
consumption higher (Goldberg 1998). Therefore, the end eect very well
could be a higher total energy consumption than that before the eciency
improvements. Accordingly, we focus attention on total emissions EI (k)
rather than EPU.
Given (2.6), let kEI be dened such that kEI = 1 if and only if EI(k =
1)  EI(k = 0) so that kEI 2 f0; 1g denotes the product design that is more
environmentally friendly in terms of total emissions. Then, by comparing k
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and kEI for each of the 18,720 problem instances from Table 2.3, we obtain
Table 2.8, where each subtable corresponds to a dierent value of E := e2
e1
.
According to Table 2.8, for example, if E = 0:5, then it means that although
a remanufacturable product design is environmentally friendly (kEI = 1)
in 66.20% of the 18,720 problem instances considered, that design is also
optimal (k = kEI = 1) in only 1.86% of the 18,720 instances.
We make several observations from Table 2.8. First, although a remanu-
facturable product design generally results in lower emissions as compared
to a non-remanufacturable product design (in the sense that kEI = 1 in
approximately 60%-70% of the problem instances), a remanufacturable prod-
uct design in and of itself is not necessarily synonymous with environmental
friendliness (in the sense that kEI = 0 in approximately 30%-40% of the
problem instances). Second, by and large, the optimal product design k
is not particularly environmentally friendly in terms of total emissions (in
the sense that k 6= kEI in approximately 79%-83% of the the problem
instances). Third, as E increases, although the proportion of cases for which
k = 0 6= kEI decreases, the proportion for which k = 1 6= kEI increases.
Thus, all told, Table 2.8 suggests that maximizing prot typically comes at
the expense of increased total emissions. And by extrapolation, this means
that one potential drawback of a purely regulatory approach to limiting total
emissions is that it could force manufacturers to reduce its production level to
the point that it fails to meet customer needs (James 1994). For this reason,
government and industry alike often consider metrics of emissions eciency
in lieu of total emissions, where emissions eciency accounts for the economic
benets generated in exchange for a unit of emissions. In other words, as
an alternative to total emissions, environmental impact can be measured by
Emissions
Economic Benefits
, where Economic Benets can refer either to manufacturer
benets (such as revenue or prot) or to societal benets (such as consumer
surplus or social welfare). Accordingly, we next introduce four such measures
before proceeding to assess their relative signicance in Section 2.5.2.
Emissions Per Revenue (ER). ER is an important environmental e-
ciency metric that manufacturers not only strive to reduce, but also publish
voluntarily to communicate their environmental stewarding. See, for exam-
ple, Apple (2013), Cummins (2012) and Dell (2013). Introduced by Klassen
and McLaughlin (1996), ER gauges environmental impact by comparing a
manufacturer's total emissions associated with the sales of its products to the
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total revenue derived from those sales. Thus, in our context, ER (k) = EI(k)
R(k)
,
where
R (k) =
8>>>><>>>>:
p1 (dnn + dnr + dnu) + p2 (dnn + don) + pr (dnr + dor)  s (dnn + dnr)
k = 1
p1 (dnn + dnu) + p2 (dnn + don)
k = 0
(2.7)
Accordingly, let kER be dened such that kER = 1 if and only if ER (k = 1) 
ER (k = 0) so that kER 2 f0; 1g denotes the product design that is more
environmentally friendly in terms of the emissions per revenue eciency ratio.
Emissions Per Prot (EP). EP is a related environmental eciency
metric that focuses on value added in lieu of total revenue (see, for example,
Bosch 2012). Specically, in our context, EP (k) = EI(k)
k
, where k is given
by (2.1) and (2.2), depending on whether k = 0 or k = 1, respectively.
Accordingly, let kEP be dened such that kEP = 1 if and only if EP (k = 1) 
EP (k = 0) so that kEP 2 f0; 1g denotes the product design that is more
environmentally friendly in terms of the emissions per prot eciency ratio.
Emissions Per Consumer Surplus (EC). EC is an environmental
eciency metric that relates emissions to the net economic benets derived
directly from the consumption rather than the sales of the manufacturer's
products. Given that overregulation of reuse and recycling rates has been
shown to have potentially deleterious eects on consumer surplus under
certain circumstances (Karakayali et al. 2012), EC has particular relevance
to social planners. In our context, EC (k) = EI(k)
CS(k)
, where CS (k) is derived
in detail in Appendix A. Accordingly, let kEC be dened such that kEC = 1
if and only if EC (k = 1)  EC (k = 0) so that kEC 2 f0; 1g denotes the
product design that is more environmentally friendly in terms of the emissions
per consumer surplus eciency ratio.
Emissions Per Social Welfare (EW). EW is an environmental e-
ciency metric similar to EC except that it relates emissions to the combined
net economic benets derived from both the consumption and the sales of the
manufacturer's products ( Orsdemir et al. 2014). In our context, EW (k) =
EI(k)
SW (k)
, where SW (k) is derived in detail in Appendix A. Accordingly, let kEW
be dened such that kEW = 1 if and only if EW (k = 1)  EW (k = 0) so
that kEW 2 f0; 1g denotes the product design that is more environmentally
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Table 2.9: Environmental Eciency Metrics
E = 0:5
kEI kER kEP
0 1 0 1 0 1
k = 1 17.27% 1.86% 11.56% 7.57% 9.61% 9.52%
k = 0 16.53% 64.34% 17.86% 63.01% 77.06% 3.81%
Total 33.80% 66.20% 29.42% 70.58% 86.67% 13.33%
E = 0:5
kEC kEW
0 1 0 1
k = 1 15.68% 3.45% 16.05% 3.08%
k = 0 80.27% 0.60% 24.72% 56.15%
Total 95.95% 4.05% 40.77% 59.23%
friendly in terms of the emissions per consumer surplus eciency ratio.
2.5.2 Assessment of Environmental Impact and Optimal
Product Design
In this section, to assess the relative merits of the various environmental
eciency metrics and their potential signicance to industry and government,
we systematically compare k to kef for the four ef ratios dened in Section
2.5.1 in the same spirit that we compared k to kEI in Table 2.8. Toward
that end, we focus on the same 18,720 problem instances previously compiled,
and we present our results in Table 2.9 for the representative case in which
E = 0:5. Recall that, for any given metric ef (k), kef = 1 if and only if
ef (k = 1)  ef (k = 0). Thus, in this section, if kef = x for metric ef , then
we say that x is the product design that is more environmentally friendly in
terms of ef .
According to Table 2.9, EP is the environmental eciency metric that is
most consistent with a manufacturer's optimal product design in the sense
that k = kef is true for the highest percentage of problem instance (86.58%)
when ef = EP as compared to when ef 2 fER,EC,EWg. This can be
explained intuitively because EP (k) includes prot in its denominator, which
means that, everything else being equal, EP decreases as prot increases. In
this sense, environmental eciency metric EP is particularly well aligned with
prot maximization, thus it stands to reason that k = kEP would be true as
a general rule. By contrast, it is the closely related environmental eciency
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metric ER that is most aligned with the reduction of total emissions in the
sense that the percentage of problem instances in which kEI = 1 (66.20%) is
closer in magnitude to the percentage of problem instances in which kER = 1
(70.58%) than it is to the percentage of problem instances in which kef = 1
for ef 2 fEP,EC,EWg. Indeed, the percentage of cases for which kef = 1 is
greatest for ef = ER among all environmental impact measures ef consid-
ered here. Intuitively, this makes sense because a production cost premium
is required to produce a unit of a remanufacturable product as compared to
producing a unit of a non-remanufacturable product (i.e., c1 > c0), which in
turn means that k = 1 typically corresponds to a higher associated per-unit
revenue as compared to k = 0, everything else being equal. Correspondingly,
ER(k = 1) typically will be lower than ER (k = 0) because ER (k) is a
metric that explicitly includes revenue in its denominator.
On the opposite end the spectrum relative to ER, environmental eciency
metric EC results in the lowest percentage of cases in which kef = 1 among all
environmental impact measures ef considered here. In particular, kEC = 1
in only 4.05% of the problem instances (as compared to kER = 1 in 70.58%
of problem instances). Nevertheless, given that metric EC includes consumer
surplus, as opposed to manufacturer surplus in its denominator, and given
that it is natural for consumer surplus to decrease when the breadth of a
product line increases, it makes sense that, everything else being equal, the
consumer surplus associated with k = 1 typically would be lower than the
consumer surplus associated with k = 0 because, in our context, k = 0
reects a lower product line breadth as compared to k = 1. By comparison,
environmental eciency metric EW appears to be similar to metric ER in
the sense that, like metric ER, metric EW is predominately aligned with
the reduction of total emissions as measured by EI. In particular, according
to Table 9, kEW = 1 for a percentage of problem instances (59.23%) that is
relatively close in magnitude to the percentage of problem instances for which
kEI = 1 (66.20%). Nevertheless, unlike metric ER, metric EW is unlikely to
gain wide-spread adoption in practice because of the computational diculty
associated with measuring social welfare accurately.
Thus, all told, we conclude that among the four available environmental
eciency ratios dened in Section 2.5.1, ER can serve as the best proxy for
EI as a metric for measuring overall environmental stewardship. In addition,
interestingly, k = kER in a higher percentage of cases (25.43%) than k =
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kEI (18.39%). Thus, this helps explain in part why some manufacturers
might be more inclined to publish their overall environmental stewarding
performance with respect to ER in lieu of publishing their performance with
respect to EI.
2.6 Conclusion
Introducing a remanufacturable product to its market not only increases a
manufacturer's prots by attracting a new customer segment to its product
oerings, but also provides spillover benets to the environment by con-
suming less resources. Yet, despite these noted benets of remanufactur-
ing, many manufacturers have yet to expand their operations to enter the
remanufactured-goods industry. Therefore, in this chapter, we analyze this
apparent dichotomy by formulating and studying a remanufacturable design
problem when consumers are vertically heterogeneous with respect to their
willingness to pay. Toward that end, we develop a stylized economic model
in which a price-setting manufacturer can choose whether or not to enter
into remanufacturing by designing its product to be either remanufacturable
or non-remanufacturable, respectively, and then designing a corresponding
pricing policy and trade-in program accordingly. Given this construct, we
specically explore and draw implications from the market segmentation
strategy that results. Upon doing so, we nd that as a general rule of
thumb it is optimal for a manufacturer to design a remanufacturable product
when the value-added from remanufacturing is relatively high, when product
durability is relatively low, and when innovation is nominal. In a similar
vein, remanufacturability typically is justied when the production cost of
a remanufacturable product is comparatively low relative to the production
cost of a non-remanufacturable product or when the cost to remanufacture a
returned product is relatively low. Otherwise, however, it is not optimal for
the manufacturer to design a remanufacturable product, which helps explain
in part the documented evidence that reects some manufacturer reluctance
to expand into the remanufactured-goods industry.
In addition, we nd that a remanufacturable product design is not syn-
onymous with high return and remanufacturing rates. Indeed, we nd that
even if it is optimal for the manufacturer to design a remanufacturable
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product and to establish a trade-in program to induce a high return rate,
a high level of remanufacturing activity is not a foregone conclusion. A high
return rate but low remanufacturing rate would be the case, for example,
if the production cost of a remanufacturable product is low while product
innovation is high. This phenomenon suggests that regulating return rates in
the name of environmental stewardship could potentially result in ineective
or even counterproductive policy. In a similar vein, we nd that despite
remanufacturing's inherent environmental benets per unit of production,
its associated countereect is an increase in overall production volume to
meet demand from an expanded market. Moreover, we nd that, as a result,
the manufacturer's increased prot potential very well could come at the
net expense of environmental deterioration because of increased total GHG
emissions. Thus, regulatory restrictions focused solely on overall emission
totals run the risk of a social cost if they essentially force manufacturers to
reduce production levels to the point at which they cannot aordably meet
customer needs. Nevertheless, if environmental cost eciency is taken into
account, which in this context means emissions produced per unit of economic
benet extracted in return for the manufacturer, society, or both, then we nd
a happy middle ground. In particular, we nd that the eciency ratio ER
(emissions per revenue) is a metric that can serve as an especially good proxy
for monitoring and controlling environmentally responsible manufacturing
operations.
We note that our results and insights are based in part on the modeling
stipulation that the manufacturer allows its trade-in allowance for a returned
product to be applied toward the purchase of either a new or a remanufac-
tured product. Nevertheless, we also considered as a modeling extension
if, instead, the manufacturer restricted trade-ins to be applied only toward
the purchase of a new product (but not a remanufactured one). For this
extension, we found that, by and large, our qualitative results and insights
continue to apply. However, one notable dierence is that the resulting
optimal market segmentation strategy would be such that sales of reman-
ufactured products would decrease and thus, cannibalization actually would
decrease, thereby leading to an increase in the overall sales of new products
(relative to the baseline situation in which trade-ins may be applied toward
the purchase of either new or remanufactured products). Yet, interestingly,
the manufacturer's prot would decrease as a result. One explanation of this
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somewhat counterintuitive implication is as follows: When trade-ins are not
restricted such that they may be applied either toward the purchase of a
new product or toward the purchase of a remanufactured product, some con-
sumers who otherwise would opt for continued use of a previously purchased
product over trading in that used product for a new product become willing
to trade in the used product for a less expensive (but, often, more protable)
remanufactured product. In fact, given that remanufactured product sales
often contribute as much as two-to-three times more earnings before interest
and taxes than new product sales contribute (Giuntini 2008), the prots
generated from the increase in the sales of remanufactured products more
than oset the opportunity cost of losing prots from the cannibalization of
new product sales.
In closing, we acknowledge the following limitations of our two-period
model. First, it implicitly assumes that the manufacturer commits in the
rst period to a set of prices for the second period, which by denition means
that our model does not account for the possibility of time inconsistency. In a
similar vein, our model does not explicitly account for discounting of second
period prots or utilities. In principle, both of these limitations could be
addressed by reformulating the two-period model studied here as an innite-
horizon steady state model. Although we would expect that with such a
reformulation many of our qualitative results will continue to hold, we also
would expect quantitative dierences to emerge. Thus, we view this direction
as a potentially viable path for continued and extended research.
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CHAPTER 3
THE INTER-DIVISIONAL
COORDINATION OF MANUFACTURING
AND REMANUFACTURING OPERATIONS
IN A CLOSED-LOOP SUPPLY CHAIN
\If there's reason for hope, it lies in man's occasional binges of cooperation.
To save our planet, we'll need that kind of heroic eort, in which all types of
people join forces for the common good."
{ George A. Meyer.
3.1 Introduction
Remanufacturing has become a signicant, albeit largely hidden industry
worldwide. The economic value of U.S. remanufactured production was over
US$43 billion in 2011 (U.S. International Trade Commission 2012). The Ellen
MacArthur Foundation and McKinsey & Company (2014) estimate that the
net material cost savings of recycling, reuse and remanufacturing in relevant
fast-moving consumer goods sectors could reach US$700 billion annually at
the global level.
A manufacturing rm can undertake remanufacturing in-house (e.g., Robert
Bosch Tool, Black & Decker, and General Electric Transportation), by con-
tracting with suppliers (e.g., Hewlett-Packard), or using a mix of both in-
house and contracting (e.g., Pitney-Bowes) (Martin et al. 2010). Some
manufacturing rms choose in-house remanufacturing to maintain sucient
control over the entire product life cycle and mitigate the eects of external
remanufacturing competition (Majumder and Groenevelt 2001, Ferguson and
Toktay 2006, Li et al. 2011), because consumers are willing to pay more
for the remanufactured products made by the original manufacturing rms
or authorized contractors than by the third parties (Subramanian 2012).
Manufacturing rms that undertake in-house remanufacturing typically have
separate divisions to produce new and remanufactured products (Toktay and
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Wei 2011). For instance, Caterpillar established a remanufacturing division
which had over $2 billion in sales in 2007 and has grown into a global leader in
remanufacturing with 17 remanufacturing facilities in 7 countries (Ferguson
and Souza 2010, Caterpillar 2012).
Despite the popularity and protability of remanufacturing, the actual
practice of such form of recovery is still very limited. From 2009 to 2011,
remanufactured goods only accounts for 2% total sales of all manufactured
products by US rms (USITC 2012) and remanufacturing just accounted
for 1% of UK manufacturing sector turnover in 2011 (Lavery et al. 2013).
Lavery et al. (2013) estimated that the full potential value of remanufacturing
in UK could amount to US$9-13 billion for the three key remanufacturing
sectors (electrical, electronic and optical products; machinery and equipment;
transport equipment).
This research is motivated by the inter-divisional coordination issues faced
by a Fortune 500 manufacturing company that has both manufacturing and
remanufacturing operations. The two operations are conducted in dedicated
in-house facilities and managed by new and remanufacturing divisions, re-
spectively. Both new and remanufactured products reach customers through
authorized dealers. Dealers are price-takers, which means that they sell new
and remanufactured products at the prices dictated by the rm. Customers
can return worn or broken products to the dealers who either 1) rebuild
parts if products can be functional with easy parts replacement and cleaning,
2) send products to the remanufacturing facility if sophisticated repair and
replacement work is required, or 3) dispose of products if they are seriously
worn or damaged. Products returned to the remanufacturing facility will be
processed to reattain an \as-new" or even better condition; some returns will
be disposed of if remanufacturing is not cost-eective. Figure 3.1 depicts the
forward and reverse ow of the products and parts in the rm we studied.
Although the company has been engaged in remanufacturing for decades,
the remanufacturing operation still receives little support, according to the
manager we interviewed. To be specic, on the one hand, the existing pricing
policy of the rm is to price both new and remanufactured products at
the same level, making remanufactured products barely attractive to the
customers (one exception is when a model is discontinued, and hence the
remanufactured counterpart becomes the only choice). On the other hand,
the remanufacturing division has very little control over the product design
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Figure 3.1: The Forward and Reverse Product Flow of the Studied Firm
that is normally incorporated into the manufacturing process. However, a
remanufacturable product design may not be in the best interest of the man-
ufacturing division for two primary reasons: 1) the manufacturing division
is concerned with the remanufacturing operations because of the potential
product cannibalization, meaning that the sales of lower-priced remanufac-
tured products can steal from the sales of new products (Atasu et al. 2010); 2)
the additional cost required to make new products remanufacturable prevents
the manufacturing division from choosing a remanufacturable product design.
Although it is not surprising to observe rm ineciency based on the above
discussion, it is still not clear as to what extent the divisional conict between
the manufacturing and remanufacturing divisions result in eciency losses
in terms of rm prots, product sales and product design change.
As an important observation from this case, a major obstacle to remanufac-
turing, albeit seldom discussed, is that the manufacturing division, who is re-
sponsible for the design decisions, is prone to choosing a non-remanufacturable
product design to avoid product competition from the remanufacturing di-
vision as well as the additional cost associated with a remanufacturable
product design. However, a remanufacturable product design is not always as
harmful as it appears to the manufacturing division. In fact, remanufacturing
operations can benet the manufacturing division if the prot from the
remanufactured products can be reallocated between the two divisions so
that both divisions can reap an increase in prot. To achieve such a win-win
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situation, it is crucial for any rm that has potential intra-organizational
conicts to develop incentive alignment to coordinate the two divisions (Le-
breton, 2007). Although many studies on cooperative optimization in a serial
supply chain with independent rms currently exist, few have investigated
independent agents within the rm that is involved in remanufacturing. A
notable exception is Toktay and Wei (2011) who proposed a transfer pricing
scheme that coordinates the manufacturing and remanufacturing divisions
and induces the rst-best result. Yet, does transfer pricing still guarantee the
rst-best design and prot when the manufacturing division has full control
over the product design (remanufacturable or not)? If not, what mechanisms
can be designed to achieve that goal?
To examine these questions, we consider a decentralized rm with one
manufacturing division and one remanufacturing division. The rm sells
both their new and remanufactured products through a retailer. In the
decentralized rm, the manufacturing division can design new products to be
non-remanufacturable and produce them at a base cost. Alternatively, it can
design new products to be remanufacturable and produce them at a higher
production cost while the remanufacturing division can produce remanufac-
tured products at a lower cost than the base cost. Each division determines
the optimal wholesale price of its products to maximize its divisional prot,
as applicable. The retailer decides upon the retail prices of both products (if
applicable) after knowing the wholesale prices.
Our results reveal that, compared with the centralized rm, the manu-
facturing division of the decentralized rm is more inclined to \shut down"
the market for remanufacturable products by designing new products to be
non-remanufacturable. Furthermore, although the centralized rm may nd
it optimal to design new products to be remanufacturable and remanufacture
only part of returned products, it is never optimal for the decentralized rm
to do so. The decentralized rm will either choose a non-remanufacturable
product design or design products to be remanufacturable and remanufacture
all returned products. Our ndings also reveal that rm decentralization and
divisional conict could result in up to 50% loss in prots and sales.
Thus, we investigate transfer pricing, a single-parameter scheme to coor-
dinate manufacturing and remanufacturing operations that commonly exist
in practice (Toktay and Wei, 2011). We conclude that transfer pricing gen-
erally fails to induce the rst-best result because the participation constraint
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of both divisions (i.e., both divisions are better o under the scheme in
question) cannot be satised simultaneously. We further illustrate that under
certain circumstances, a two-part coordination scheme with a \transfer price"
and a \single xed payment" is required to motivate the manufacturing
division to optimally design new products and to maximize the economic
performance of the entire rm (i.e., achieve the rst-best outcome as of the
benchmark model). We then demonstrate that by implementing the two-part
coordination scheme, the decentralized rm can achieve the same total prot
and sales as the centralized rm. In addition, both this incentive can increase
the prot of both divisions. Interestingly, the per-unit transfer can ow from
the manufacturing division to the remanufacturing division in certain cases.
This result highlights the need for a more sophisticated (two-part) incentive
mechanism to ensure coordination between the two divisions as well as the
rst-best rm-wide prot. In addition, compared to the transfer pricing, the
two-part coordination scheme exhibits better robustness. Although the idea
of coordinating the supply chain using a two-part incentive scheme is not
new, in and of itself, our primary focus is to explore the impact of incentives
on optimal product design, product cannibalization, and the direction in
which xed and variable payments ow.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The literature review
is presented in Section 3.2. In Section 3.3, we specify our centralized and
decentralized models and examine the impact of decentralization on optimal
product architecture and pricing decisions. Then in Section 3.4, we discuss
the limitations of a single transfer pricing scheme to coordinate the two
divisions in a decentralized rm and then propose an inter-divisional incentive
scheme with an examination of its eectiveness in our setting. We conclude
with a summary of our ndings in Section 3.5. Proofs of propositions and
corollaries are provided in the online supplement.
3.2 Related Literature
This study is closely related to the literature on closed-loop supply chain
management, as comprehensively reviewed by Guide Jr and Van Wassenhove
(2009) and Souza (2013). There is a strand of papers that analyze prot
maximization models to study the optimal design, pricing and production
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decisions associated with remanufacturing. In particular, Atasu et al. (2008)
identied the major factors that aect the protability of remanufacturing for
a monopolist, which include cost savings from remanufacturing, the percent-
age of green consumers, the market growth rate, and consumer valuation
discounts for remanufactured products. Debo et al. (2005) found that in-
vestment in remanufacturability is driven by the high production costs of
a single-use product, low remanufacturing costs, and low additional costs
to make a single-use product remanufacturable. Thus, rms need to analyze
these factors prudently before deciding upon whether to design new products
to be remanufacturable or not. Pricing new and remanufactured products
is another critical issue in managing manufacturing and remanufacturing
operations because it has been proven to be an eective strategy to control
demand (Ferrer and Swaminathan 2006, 2010), segment the consumer market
(Debo et al. 2005, Atasu et al. 2008) and limit competition (Majumder and
Groenevelt 2001, Ferguson and Toktay 2006). A number of studies have also
focused on the production quantity decision that basically answers how much
can be remanufactured, which considers the availability of returned products
or the acquisition of used products ( Ostlin et al. 2009, Galbreth and Black-
burn 2010, Clottey et al. 2012) and how much should be remanufactured,
which considers the optimal number of products to be remanufactured (Ferrer
and Swaminathan 2006, Ferguson et al. 2011, Ozdemir et al. 2014). We
contribute to this literature by endogenizing a product design (i.e., whether
or not to design a product to be remanufactured), exploring the impacts
of divisional conict between a manufacturing division who designs and
produces new products and a remanufacturing division who remanufactures
used products and suggesting an inter-divisional coordination mechanism in
a dual-division rm context. In addition, in a similar spirit as Desai et al.
(2004), we consider the addition of a retailer in the distribution channel but
in the framework of a closed-loop supply chain.
Examining the coordination issue between manufacturing and remanufac-
turing operations is relatively new in the remanufacturing literature. As
mentioned in Section 3.1, there is a complicated interplay between the man-
ufacturing division and the remanufacturing division in a decentralized rm,
due to a lack of a common objective. Studies illustrate that contracts with a
transfer payment scheme can help to optimize prot performance so that
each entity's objective is consistent with that of the entire supply chain
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(Cachon, 2003). Research on coordination contracts is rich in economic
and accounting literature (see, Sengul et al. 2012, Ittner and Larcker 2001
for relevant reviews). Several recent avenues of work in the operations
management literature investigate coordination problems in a supply chain
setting. Jacobs and Subramanian (2012) studied the impact of collection and
recycling targets under an extended producer responsibility (EPR) program
and the impact of sharing responsibility for product recovery on prots in
a supply chain with a supplier and a manufacturer. They suggest contract
menus that can Pareto-improve the supply chain prots while social welfare
may or may not improve. Cachon and Lariviere (2005) proposed a revenue-
sharing contract with two parameters: the wholesale price the retailer pays
per unit and the retailer's share of the revenue generated by each unit. This
contract can coordinate a wider array of supply chains than buybacks do;
it can divide the resulting total prot arbitrarily. However, most previous
supply chain coordination studies focus on coordinating price/quantity de-
cisions. In contrast, our analysis extends theirs in that we also incorporate
the product design decision.
Although there is an extensive amount of literature on cooperative op-
timization in a serial supply chain with independent rms, few researchers
have investigated independent agents within the same company in a reman-
ufacturing setting. A notable exception is the paper by Toktay and Wei
(2011); they addressed the question of how to set a coordinating transfer
price to allocate the cost of input between a manufacturing division and a
remanufacturing division. They suggest that a portion of the initial pro-
duction cost should be assigned to the manufacturing division and that
the compensation from the remanufacturing division to the manufacturing
division should be a xed cost allocation. This chapter not only studies the
optimal pricing and inter-divisional coordination scheme for manufacturing
and remanufacturing operations but also considers both the produce design
and cannibalization eect. Firstly, the product design for remanufacturing is
endogenous to our model; that is, the centralized rm or the manufacturing
division in a decentralized rm decides whether or not to design its new
products to be remanufacturable. This setting enables us to dive deeper
into the impacts of divisional conict on remanufacturing operations, as
seen in the example of Caterpillar. If new products are designed to be
remanufacturable, then they incur a higher production cost, due to the
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additional resource consumption and design change. Secondly, unlike Toktay
and Wei (2011), we consider the case when product cannibalization exists
because new and remanufactured products are sold in the same market. In
other words, the demand of new and remanufactured products depends on the
availability and price of both new and remanufactured products. Therefore,
our model captures the demand reality in the majority of markets that have
access to both new and remanufactured products. Lastly, we consider a
supply chain with an independent retailer through which the rm sells new
and remanufactured products. The retail distribution is a common practice
in the remanufacturing industry.
Studies on remanufacturing with a prot-maximization approach have used
single-period, two-period or innite-horizon settings. In a two-period setting,
it is assumed that only new products are manufactured in the rst period.
In the second period, used products are collected for remanufacturing and
only remanufactured products (Toktay and Wei, 2011) or both new and
remanufactured products (Majumder and Groenevelt 2001, Ferguson and
Toktay 2006) are available in the consumer market. Other research considers
the multi-period and innite horizon time period (Debo et al. 2005, Ferrer
and Swaminathan 2006). The single-period model can be applied to the
cases in which similar products are introduced to the market repeatedly
(Savaskan et al., 2004) or when a product's life cycle has reached its maturity
stage, such that prices and recovery rates are stable (e.g., Savaskan et al.
2004, Zikopoulos and Tagaras 2007, Atasu and Souza 2013). Along with
the common assumption that remanufactured products have a one-period
lifetime and that the returned product cannot be inventoried, we model the
problem in such a way that products sold in the previous period can be
returned for remanufacturing and pricing/production decisions are constant
across periods.
3.3 The Models
3.3.1 Modeling Assumptions
The Firm. Consider a prot-maximizing rm with a manufacturing division
and a remanufacturing division. The manufacturing division (denoted as
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D1) designs and produces new products that are sold through the retailer;
the remanufacturing division (denoted as D2) remanufactures the returned
products and sells remanufactured products to the same retailer. D1 makes
design decision k at the beginning of the time horizon. If k = 0, then new
products are non-remanufacturable and can be produced at cost c1 > 0 per
unit by D1. In such a case, only new products are available in the market.
Therefore, the production quantity of the remanufactured products and the
divisional prot of D2 are both 0.
If k = 1, then new products are remanufacturable and are produced at
cost c1 +  per unit, where the additional cost  is non-negative, to reect
the increased complexity required to make new products remanufacturable
(Subramanian 2012). We assume c1 +  < 1, where 1 represents the upper
bound of consumer willingness-to-pay (WTP) for a new product, which
will be discussed later. D2 can remanufacture the used remanufacturable
products at cost c2  0 per unit. Note that if producing one unit of
remanufacturable product and one unit of remanufactured product costs no
less than producing two units of non-remanufacturable products (c1++c2 
2c1 or equivalently c2 +   c1), then the rm has no incentive to undertake
remanufacturing. To avoid such a trivial case, we assume c2 +  < c1. We
also assume that D1 has the production capacity to fulll any demand for
new products. However, D2 cannot remanufacture more than the past sales
of new products. For simplicity, used products can all be returned and
remanufactured. This assumption applies to products that require frequent
replacement or updates and are not subject to signicant wear and tear.
D1 and D2 decide the wholesale price w1 and w2 of new and remanufactured
products, respectively, where w1; w2 2 [0; 1] denote a consumer's WTP for a
new or remanufactured product, which is assumed to be no more than 1. In
a decentralized rm, each division maximizes its divisional prot because the
divisional manager's performance is usually measured based on the divisional
prot rather than on the total rm prot (Toktay and Wei 2011). A division
only makes productions if its divisional prot, the net of revenue and the
internal transfer (if it exists) minus the cost, is positive.
The Retailer. The retailer, denoted as R, sells both new and remanufac-
tured products and decides upon the retail prices p1 and p2 of the new and
remanufactured products, respectively, in order to maximize its own prot.
Retailers play an important role in the remanufactured-goods market and
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are more ecient in undertaking product collection activity in terms of the
return rate than the rm itself (Savaskan et al., 2004). Thus, we assume that
the retailer is in charge of collecting used products and that all used products
can be collected. A high collection rate can also be achieved through, but not
limited to, leasing (Desai and Purohit 1998, Agrawal et al. 2012) and trade-in
rebates (Ray et al. 2005, Oraiopoulos et al. 2012). Without loss of generality,
the cost of collecting and handling returned products are normalized to zero
for the retailer and all collected products will be returned to D2. These
assumptions help us focus our analysis on issues that are important to this
study.
Consumers. Customer WTP for a new product is heterogeneous and
uniformly distributed in the interval [0; 1]. We assume a consumer's WTP
to be independent of whether the product is remanufacturable or not, due to
the distinction between consumers' consideration of product sustainability
and conventional product characteristics (Galbreth and Ghosh, 2013). On
the other hand, as demonstrated in Guide Jr and Li (2010), a consumer's
WTP for a remanufactured product is generally less than her WTP for a new
product. Thus, we assume that if a consumer is willing to pay  for a new
product in the rst period, then her WTP for a remanufactured product
in the second period is   , where  2 (c2; 1) is the discount factor for
a remanufactured product. Note that remanufactured products cannot be
protable if   c2. Each customer purchases at most one new unit. A
consumer can choose between a new product and a remanufactured product,
if applicable, depending on which one provides more customer surplus (the
dierence between WTP and the price). Note that consumers who would
otherwise have a negative surplus do not purchase. In addition, the market
size is normalized to 1. Under the above assumptions, the inverse demand
functions for new and remanufactured products are (Desai and Purohit 1998;
Ferguson and Toktay 2006) as follows:
p1 (d1; d2) = 1  d1   d2; and (3.1)
p2 (d1; d2) = (1  d1   d2); (3.2)
where d1 and d2 are the demand for new and remanufactured products,
respectively, and d2  d1. If the new products are designed to be non-
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remanufacturable, then d1 = 1  p1 and d2  0. Note that we can formulate
retail prices as functions of d1 and d2, because (d1; d2) uniquely determines
(p1; p2), and vice versa. Therefore, the retailer's prot optimization problem
on wholesale prices p1 and p2 is equivalent to the prot problem on demand
d1 and d2 (see Section 3.3.2 for more detail). In all, our problem is dened
on the parameter space 
 = f(c1; c2; ; ) jc2 +  < c1 < 1   , c2 <  < 1,
0  c1; c2;   1g.
3.3.2 Benchmark: Centralized Scenario
In terms of the centralized scenario, we rst establish the rst-best bench-
mark by studying the centralized rm, the single decision maker for both the
manufacturing and remanufacturing operations. The supply chain model of
a centralized rm is illustrated in Figure 3.2(a). For the centralized scenario,
we use superscript C to denote the optimal solutions. Let kC and CF denote
the optimal design decision and the rm prot, respectively, and let wCi and
dCi denote Di's optimal wholesale price and sales quantity (i = 1; 2). The
centralized rm chooses product design k and wholesale prices w1 and w2.
Consequently, its problem is:
CF = max
w1;w2;k
d1 [w1   (c1 + k  )] + k  d2  (w2   c2)
s:t: 1  d1   k  d2  0 (3.3)
d1  k  d2  0 (3.4)
After knowing the wholesale prices and product design, the retailer R decides
upon retail price p1 and p2, as applicable, formulated as functions of d1 and
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Table 3.1: Optimal Solutions for the Centralized Scenario
Strategy kC wC1 w
C
2 d
C
1 d
C
2
R1 1 1+c1+2
c2+
2
1 c1  +c2
4(1 )
(c1+) c2
4(1 )
R2 1 w1 1+c1+++c22   w1 1 c1 + c24(1+3) dC1
NR 0 1+c12   1 c14  
*: w1 must satisfy w1 2
h
1+4 2+(c1++c2)(1+)
2(1+3) ;min
n
1++c1++c2
2 ; 1
oi
Strategy CF 
C
R
R1
(1 c1  +c2)2
8(1 ) +
( c2)2
8
CF
2
R2
(1 c1 + c2)2
8(1+3)
CF
2
NR
(1 c1)2
8
CF
2
d2 by (3.1)-(3.2). Thus, the retailer's problem is:
R = max
d1;d2
d1  [p1 (d1; d2)  w1] + k  d2  [p2 (d1; d2)  w2] (3.5)
subject to (3.3)-(3.4).
We solve the sequential decision problems by backward induction and
classify the rm's strategy into three categories: 1) NR denotes the strategy
that the rm chooses a non-remanufacturable product design (kC = 0); 2)
R1 denotes the strategy that the rm chooses a remanufacturable product
design (kC = 1), but the rm does not remanufacture all used products
(dC1 > d
C
2 ), and 3) R2 denotes the strategy that k
C = 1 and remanufactures
all used products (dC1 = d
C
2 ). The corresponding solutions for each strategy
are derived in the online supplement and summarized in Table 3.1.
Proposition 3.3.1 In a centralized rm,
(i) if   ( c2)(
p
1+3 1 )
2
, then
strategy R2 is optimal when c1  1  22 + (1+)c22 ;
strategy R1 is optimal when
p
(1 )(2+ 2c2)+c2 

< c1 <
1  2
2
+ (1+)c2
2
;
and strategy NR is optimal when c1 
p
(1 )(2+ 2c2)+c2 

.
(ii) if  >
( c2)(
p
1+3 1 )
2
, then
strategy R2 is optimal when c1  2++c2 ( c2 )
p
1+3
3
;
strategy NR is optimal when c1 <
2++c2 ( c2 )
p
1+3
3
;
and strategy R1 is not optimal.
Proposition 3.3.1 intuitively illustrates it is optimal for a centralized rm
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(c2 = 0:1 and  = 0:45)
Note. Shaded area is outside the bounds of discussion which require that c2+  <
c1 < 1   and  > c2.
to sell remanufacturable products when the cost of producing new products
c1 is relatively large, the cost of remanufacturing products c2 is relatively
small, the added-value of remanufacturing  is relatively large, and the
cost of a remanufacturable product design  is relatively small, keeping all
other parameters constant. We initially look at the eects of cost factors c1
and c2 on the product design. More specically, when a rm can produce
remanufactured products at low cost, it sells them at a low price to attract
consumers who would otherwise not purchase. However, some customers who
might have bought new products may instead purchase the remanufactured
products for a lower price, leading to product cannibalization. If c1 is small,
then the cost-savings from the producing remanufactured product over the
new product (c1   c2) is not signicant. In all, product cannibalization
dominates the cost-saving eect, resulting in lower total prots. For the
same reason, which is also consistent with Atasu et al. (2008), we nd that
the rm only remanufactures when the remanufacturing cost c2 is suciently
low. Next, we examine how the value-added from the remanufacturing
process aects the product design. To be specic, as  increases, customers
are willing to purchase remanufactured products at a higher price, which
makes remanufactured products more protable to produce. Hence, when 
is above a certain threshold, it is optimal for the rm to produce and sell
remanufactured products. Finally, when the cost of the remanufacturable
product design  is small, the additional cost of designing products to be
remanufacturable is less than the additional prot from selling the remanu-
factured products. Therefore, it is more lucrative to design new products to
be remanufacturable when  is small.
Figure 3.3(a) illustrates the optimal strategy of a centralized rm in the
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(c1; ) space for c2 = 0:1 and  = 0:45. Note that (c1; ) in the upper left
and right corner does not satisfy our assumption; hence, it is beyond the
scope of our discussion. In general, when the rm designs new products to
be remanufacturable, it chooses strategy R2 over R1 when c1 is relatively
large, c2 is relatively small and  is relatively large, keeping all other param-
eters constant. This is because the unit prot of selling one new product
decreases as c1 increases and the unit prot of selling one remanufactured
products increases as c2 decreases or as  increases, making it protable to
remanufacture as much as possible. As illustrated in Proposition 3.3.1(ii)
and Figure 3.3(a), it is not optimal for a rm to only remanufacture part of
the used products (strategy R1) when the cost of a remanufacturable product
design is not nominal ( >
( c2)(
p
1+3 1 )
2
). In particular, it can be shown
that
( c2)(
p
1+3 1 )
2
 1
24
. Thus, if  > 1
24
, the rm should either design
the new products to be non-remanufacturable (strategy NR) or design them
to be remanufacturable and remanufacture all return products (strategy R2)
for any c1 and . Furthermore, the following corollary species the condition
when strategy NR is a dominating strategy:
Corollary 3.3.2 If  > 0 or c2 > 0, then there exists a threshold for c1 ()
above (below) which strategy NR is optimal.
According to Corollary 3.3.2, only when there is no extra cost to make new
products remanufacturable ( = 0) and there is no cost to remanufacture
(c2 = 0) will the rm always design new products to be remanufacturable, ir-
respective of the value of c1 and . This is because at \zero cost" ( = c2 = 0),
selling remanufactured products becomes so protable that the loss in sales of
new products is easily compensated by the increase in sales of remanufactured
products. In fact, the rm is very likely to remanufacture as much as possible
(strategy R2) in such a case. To see this, based on Proposition 3.3.1, strategy
R2 is optimal when c1  1 2 and R1 is optimal when c1 < 1 2 , where 1 2 < 12
since  > 0. Nevertheless, as long as there is a cost to remanufacture or an
additional cost to make new products remanufacturable, it is not always
optimal for the rm to choose a remanufacturable product design.
In summary, a centralized rm chooses among three strategies: NR, R1 or
R2. A remanufacturable product design (R1 or R2) is optimal when the unit
production cost of new products (c1) is high, unit cost of remanufacturing
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(c2) is low, value-added from remanufacturing () is high and the cost of
making new products remanufacturable () is low.
3.3.3 Decentralized Scenario
We now consider a decentralized rm in which the manufacturing division
(D1) and remanufacturing division (D2) make decisions independently to
maximize their own divisional prots. The supply chain model with a decen-
tralized rm is illustrated in Figure 3.2(b). We use superscript D to denote
the optimal solutions in the decentralized case. Let D1 and 
D
2 denote D1's
and D2's optimal prot, respectively. D1 rst decides upon product design
k and the wholesale price w1 of the new products. D1's problem is:
D1 = max
w1;k
d1 (w1   c1   k  )
subject to (3.3)-(3.4). If k = 1, then D2 decides upon the wholesale price w2
of the remanufactured products and its problem is:
D2 = max
w2
d2  (w2   c2)
s:t: 1  d1   d2  0 (3.6)
d1  d2  0 (3.7)
If k = 0, then D2 has no production and its divisional prot is 0. Finally,
the retailer decides upon retailer prices based on problem (3.5).
We solve the sequential decision problems by backward induction, start-
ing with the retailer's problem, followed by D2's problem and nally D1's
problem. One may argue that the design decision is a strategic one and thus
should be determined before the pricing decision (that is, D1 rst decides
k, then D1 and D2 decide the price of their products simultaneously). We
acknowledge that dierent sequences of the game will result in quantitative
dierences. However, our numerical results indicate that qualitative results
concerning the eects of decentralization and inter-divisional incentive con-
tinue to hold.
The optimal solutions for the decentralized scenario are derived in Ap-
pendix B and summarized in Table 3.2. Let 
CRe and 

D
Re denote the set
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Table 3.2: Optimal Strategy and Solutions for the Decentralized Scenario
Strategy kD Condition wD1 w
D
2 d
D
1 d
D
2
R2-1 1 
D2 1
1+c1++ c2
2
1 c1 ++c2
4
1 c1 + c2
8(1+3) d
D
1
R2-2 1 
D2 2 1

2
 c2
4(1+3) d
D
1
NR 0 
DNR
1+c1
2   1 c14  
Strategy D1 
D
2 
D
R
R2-1 (1 c1 + c2)
2
16(1+3)
D1
2
(1 c1 ++c2)2
64(1+3)
R2-2 ( c2)(1 c1 )4(1+3)
( c2)2
8(1+3)
2
16(1+3)
NR (1 c1)
2
8   
D
1
2

D2 1 =

(c1; c2; ; )
 1+5++c2 (  c2)p2(1+3)1+6  c1  1      + c2

D2 2 = f(c1; c2; ; )
max1      + c2; 1+2+c2 p( c2)( 2 6 c2)1+3   c1
 1+2+c2+
p
( c2)( 2 6 c2)
1+3
&    c2
2(1+3)
o

DNR =

(c1; c2; ; )
(c1; c2; ; ) 2 
  
D2 1   
D2 1 	
of (c1; c2; ; ) such that a remanufacturable product design is optimal in
the centralized scenario (kC = 1) and the decentralized scenario (kD = 1),
respectively.
Proposition 3.3.3 For the decentralized rm,
(i) 
DRe  
CRe;
(ii) D1 +
D
2  CF , where the equality sign only holds when kC = 0; and
(iii) if (c1; c2; ; ) 2 
DRe, then dD1 = dD2 < dC1 , dD1 + dD2 < dC1 + dC2 .
Proposition 3.3.3(i) indicates that a remanufacturable product design is
less likely to be chosen in the decentralized scenario than in the central-
ized scenario. This is consistent with our intuition because although a
remanufacturable product design benets the remanufacturing division, it
not only cannibalizes the sales of new products (as is illustrated in part (iii)
of Proposition 3.3.3), but it also incurs an additional unit cost  to D1,
both adversely aecting D1's prot. Another reason is that in a centralized
rm, the design decision is optimized by comparing the rm's total prot
with and without a remanufacturable product design. On the contrary, in
a decentralized rm, the design decision is optimized by comparing D1's
prot with and without a remanufacturable product design. Note that the
rm's total prot without a remanufacturable product design in a centralized
scenario equals D1's prot without a remanufacturable product design in the
decentralized scenario while the rm's total prot with a remanufacturable
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product design is generally greater than D1's prot with a remanufacturable
product design. Thus, it is not dicult to see that a remanufacturable design
is less preferred in a decentralized rm than in a centralized rm.
Figure 3.3(b) illustrates the optimal strategy of a decentralized rm in
the (c1; ) space for c2 = 0:1 and  = 0:45. The rst observation is that
the area of NR is larger while the area of R2 is smaller in Figure 3.3(b)
than in Figure 3.3(a) for the same choice of parameters, indicating that
non-remanufacturing is more desirable to a decentralized rm than to a
centralized rm, which is consistent with Proposition 3.3.3(i). The second
observation, according to Proposition 3.3.3 and as depicted in Figure 3.3(b),
is that the optimal strategy does not include R1 (d1 > d2 > 0). This is
because when the supply of returned products (originally new products) is
not enough to meet the demand of remanufactured products, the retailer,
who intends to maximize the retail prot, may increase the supply of the
returned products (or equivalently, increase the demand of the originally new
products) by decreasing the retail price of the new products and increasing
the retail price of the remanufactured products, which, to some extent,
relieves the cannibalization toward D1's new product. This explains why in
the decentralized scenario, the remanufacturable product design is protable
for D1 only when the constraint d1  d2 is binding. However, in the case
when the supply of returned products is more than the demand of the
remanufactured products (d1 > d2), the retailer's pricing scheme does not
alleviate cannibalization. As a result, D1's prot with a remanufacturable
product design will be less than that of a non-remanufacturable product
design. The third observation is that, in the decentralized scenario, the
change in the optimal strategy with respect to c1 is not \monotone". To
see this, in the centralized scenario, the optimal strategy switches from
NR to R2 as c1 increases, while in the decentralized scenario, the optimal
strategy changes from NR to R2 and back to NR (Figure 3.3). This dierence
originates from the fact that when c1 is suciently high, the rm can still
generate enough prot from the remanufactured products by jointly pricing
the wholesale prices of the new and remanufactured products, such that
the demand for new products is not reduced signicantly. However, in the
decentralized scenario, D1 has to price w1 high enough to cover its high cost,
resulting in much less demand and a nominal prot. As a result, D1 nds it
more protable to choose a non-remanufacturable product design when c1 is
60
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0
20
40
60
80
100
Pr
of
it 
Lo
ss
 (%
)
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0
20
40
60
80
100
D
em
an
d 
Lo
ss
 (%
)
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
Ce
nt
ra
l.
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
c1
D
ec
en
tra
l.
NR R1 R2
NR R2−2
Figure 3.4: Centralized Firm vs. Decentralized Firm (c2=0.1,  = 0:45 and
 = 0:01)
relatively high.
Propositions 3.3.3(ii) and 3.3.3(iii) suggest that, even in the case when it is
optimal for the manufacturing division to choose a remanufacturable product
design, the total prot DF = 
D
1 + 
D
2 and total demand d
D
1 + d
D
2 of the
decentralized rm are both strictly less than that of the centralized rm. As
an outcome of decentralization, D1 increases w1 and D2 decreases w2 to max-
imize their own divisional prot, respectively, leading to a suboptimal prot
and sales for the rm. Figure 3.4 depicts the eects of decentralization on
total prot, total demand and the optimal strategy when c2 = 0:1,  = 0:45
and  = 0:01. The rst two subgures in Figure 3.4 provide the ratio of prot
loss (1  DF
CF
) and sales loss (1  dD1 +dD2
dC1 +d
C
2
) due to decentralization as c1 varies,
which can be as high as 51% and 46%, respectively. Such a drastic negative
decentralization eect usually occurs when the optimal strategy changes from
R2 to NR (see the last two subgures, which illustrates the optimal strategies
in the centralized and decentralized scenarios, respectively).
As illustrated in Proposition 3.3.3, cost ownership and product cannibal-
ization foil D1's remanufacturable product design, and thus, result in a lower
total prot than the rm-wide benchmark prot CF . Therefore, it is in
a decentralized rm's best interest to introduce a coordination mechanism
and to incentivize D1 to design new products to be remanufacturable. A
natural conjecture would be that the rm achieves coordination by making
D2 responsible for all or a portion of the cost associated with a remanu-
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facturable product design (). However, according to Propositions 3.3.3(ii)
and 3.3.3(iii), D1 + 
D
2 < 
C
F and d
D
1 = d
D
2 < d
C
1 both hold when  = 0.
Then what if more than  is allocated to the remanufacturing division? Does
transfer pricing enable the rm to achieve the rst-best prot? If so, can such
a coordination scheme induce the voluntary participation of both divisions?
We answer these questions in the next section.
3.4 Inter-Divisional Coordination
3.4.1 Transfer Pricing
A rm is organized into responsibility centers (divisions) and a well-established
\transfer pricing" is essential whenever goods or services are transferred
among the divisions. If the transfer price fails to reect the true value of
resources, it becomes dicult to fairly measure the divisional performance.
As a result, managers could make inappropriate decisions that reduce rm
value (Zimmerman, 2005). Thus, we rst consider a transfer pricing scheme
similar to Toktay and Wei (2011), in the sense that D2 has to pay a xed
amount  to D1 for each unit D1 produces, where  can be any real value and
is determined by the rm, who is a prot maximizer and is neutral toward
a non-remanufacturable and remanufacturable product design. Note that
 2 (0; ] represents the cost allocation scheme and  < 0 means that D1
pays a per-unit transfer to D2. In Toktay and Wei (2011), the manufacturing
division can only produce remanufacturable products and both divisions have
to follow the transfer pricing scheme, which, in reality, may not be in the best
interest of both divisions, and thus, such a coordination scheme is dicult to
implement in a decentralized rm. To this end, we propose a transfer pricing
scheme that distinguishes itself from Toktay and Wei's scheme in two ways:
1) D1 has the option of choosing a remanufacturable or non-remanufacturable
product design; and 2) D2 has the option of participating in the coordination
scheme. Thus, our transfer pricing scheme is essentially a voluntary scheme
and is more realistic in a decentralized rm.
Under our transfer pricing scheme, if D1 chooses a remanufacturable prod-
uct design, then D2 has the option to participate; that is denoted by j, where
j = 0 represents when D2 does not follow the coordination scheme, no matter
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whether it remanufactures or not (note if D2 remanufactures but does not
participate, then the problem is essentially equivalent to the decentralized
problem without the incentive discussed in Section 3.3.3). In addition, j = 1
represents when D2 follows the coordination scheme and remanufactures the
returned products. In the latter case, D2 pays a variable amount  to D1
for each unit D1 produces. Note that if D1 designs new products to be non-
remanufacturable (k = 0), then D2's prot is always 0 and hence no transfer
occurs. We use the superscript V to denote the optimal solutions in the
presence of the transfer pricing scheme. Given the transfer pricing scheme
and the region 
CRe, D1's problem becomes 
V
1 = max
w1;k
d1(w1 c1 k+j k)
subject to constraints (3.3)-(3.4). If k = 1, then D2's problem becomes
V2 = max
w2;j
d2  (w2   c2)   j  d1   subject to constraints (3.6)-(3.7). The
retailer's problem remains the same as formulated by (3.5).
Now, given the transfer pricing scheme, will both divisions voluntarily join
the coordination program? The success of such an inter-divisional coordi-
nation requires the prot of both divisions to be greater than when in the
absence of an incentive (the decentralized scenario in Section 3.3.3). That is,
V1  D1 and V2  D2 (referred to as \participation constraints") whenever
the coordination scheme exists, where V1 and 
V
2 denote D1 and D2's prots
with the option of design/coordination, respectively. Based on the numerical
results, we make the following observations.
Observation 1 Given (c1; c2; ; ) 2 
CR2, there exists a V such that the
rst-best optimal rm prot can be achieved (i.e., V1 + 
V
2 = 
C
F ) when
 = V . Moreover, V2 = 
D
2 , 
V
1 > 
D
2 , d
V
i = d
C
i (i = 1; 2) and 
V > 0.
Observation 1 reveals that under the transfer pricing scheme, the decen-
tralized rm can always achieve the optimal total prot and optimal sales
level of both new and remanufactured products (if applicable) as in the
centralized scenario when (c1; c2; ; ) 2 
CR2, where 
CR2 is a subset of 
CRe.
Recall that decentralization can result in a lower prot and fewer sales, as
stated in Propositions 3.3.3(ii) and (iii). Thus, the transfer pricing scheme
benets the rm in both aspects. Correspondingly, D2's prot is the same
as in the decentralized scenario without incentive and D1's prot increases
CF   V2   V1 > 0. In other words, in the equilibrium, D2's participation
constraint V2  D2 is always binding while D1's participation constraint
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V1  D1 is not binding. This nding can be explained by the fact that
D1 has an advantage over D2 in the sense that D1 decides on the product
design (to make the product remanufacturable or not) and can limit d2, the
production quantity of D2, by controlling its own production quantity d1. As
a result, D2 needs to incentivize D1 to choose the remanufacturable product
design and increase the production quantity of new products.
Proposition 3.4.1 Given the transfer pricing scheme, V1 + 
V
2 < 
C
F for
any  when (c1; c2; ; ) 2 
CR1.
Proposition 3.4.1 reveals that the transfer pricing does not always enable
the rm to achieve the optimal total prot. In particular, when (c1; c2; ; ) 2

CR1, the rm's total prot is always below the rst-best for any  . Note, in
the centralized scenario, the rm chooses strategy R1 when remanufacturing
is not suciently protable, so that it is irrational to remanufacture all
returned products. It is not hard to see that, ceteris paribus, D2 may not
have much of an incentive to compensate D1 to enhance D2's prot in the
decentralized scenario. To further evaluate the prot recovery performance
of an incentive scheme, especially when (c1; c2; ; ) 2 
CR1, we introduce the
notion of eectiveness (E), as dened by
E =
 
S1 +
S
2
   D1 +D2 
CF   (D1 +D2 )
 100%
where S refers to the incentive scheme under consideration. The denominator
of this ratio is the rm-level prot gap between the centralized scenario
and the decentralized scenario, while the numerator is the rm prot gap
between the scenario with the incentive scheme under consideration and the
decentralized scenario. By denition, E 2 [0; 100%]. Higher eectiveness
represents higher prot recovery, and thus, better performance of the given
incentive scheme. An incentive scheme that can induce the rst-best result
has E = 100% while an inactive incentive scheme has E = 0. Figure 3.5
illustrates the eectiveness of the transfer pricing scheme as transfer price 
varies. Figure 3.5(a) depicts the eectiveness under two sets of parameters
such that R1 is the optimal strategy in the centralized scenario while Figure
3.5(b) depicts the eectiveness under the two sets of parameters such that
R2 is the optimal strategy in the centralized scenario. As shown in Figure
3.5(b), there always exists a  such that the E = 100% can be achieved
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(b) c2=0.1, δ=0.5, η=0.02
c1=0.4: R2
c1=0.8: R2
Figure 3.5: Eectiveness of Transfer Pricing Scheme
if (c1; c2; ; ) 2 
CR2. Note from Figure 3.5(a), when (c1; c2; ; ) 2 
CR1,
the total rm prot may or may not increase as  varies. For example,
when c1 = 0:4; c2 = 0:1;  = 0:4 and  = 0:01 (the dashed line in Figure
3.5(a)),  induces an increase in the total prot and high eectiveness, but
the rm-wide benchmark prot CF is not attainable for any  ; when  is
too large, the potentially large cash outow prevents the remanufacturing
division from participating in the transfer pricing scheme; when  is too
small, the manufacturing division cannot benet from the transfer pricing
scheme, and hence, it will design new products to be non-remanufacturable.
Even worse, when c1 = 0:35; c2 = 0:1;  = 0:4 and  = 0:01 (the solid line in
Figure 3.5(a)), the transfer pricing scheme is not in eect in any case (i.e.,
E = 0). This observation suggests that we need to explore other coordination
schemes to overcome this problem.
3.4.2 Two-Part Coordination Scheme
Observation 1 shows that the rm-wide benchmark prot can always be
achieved under the single transfer pricing scheme for any (c1; c2; ; ) 2

CR2. Proposition 3.4.1, however, signies that given any (c1; c2; ; ) 2 
CR1,
the rst-best total prot is not ensured when divisional participation and
design decisions are both endogenous. This implies that, in addition to
implementing transfer pricing, the decentralized rm should also redistribute
the prot between the two divisions so that both divisions can benet from
the coordination. In this regard, we propose a two-part coordination scheme
as follows. The participation constraints and the transfer price  are dened
as in the single transfer pricing scheme. Besides  , D2 also pays D1 a xed
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Table 3.3: Comparison of Coordination Schemes
Scheme Transfer Pricing Fixed Lump-sum Two-part Scheme
Condition 
CR1 

C
R2 

C
R1 

C
R2 

C
R1 

C
R2
Achieve Opt.? No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Payer of opt n/a D2 n/a n/a D1 D1/D2
Payer of fopt n/a n/a n/a D2 D2 D1/D2
Robustness n/a Sensitive n/a Robust Sensitive
Sensitive w.r.t 
Robust w.r.t f
 opt(fopt): optimal (f) that induces the rst-best result.
amount f . f is determined by the rm and is independent of the sales
of new or remanufactured products. Note that f can be any real value,
where a negative f means that D1 pays a lump sum to D2. In addition, no
transfer, variable or xed, occurs should D1 design new products to be non-
remanufacturable. We use superscript T to denote the optimal solutions in
the presence of the two-part coordination scheme. As such, D1's problem is
T1 = max
w1;k
d1(w1 c1 k +j k )+k j f subject to constraints (3.3)-(3.4).
If k = 1, then D2's problem becomes T2 = max
w2;j
d2  (w2  c2)  j d1     j  f
subject to constraints (3.6)-(3.7).
Recall that the participation constraints are T1  D1 and T2  D2 .
However, the two-part coordination scheme allows for weaker \participation
constraints" T1+
T
2 > 
D
1 +
D
2 because the lump sum f reallocates the total
prot and is allowed to be any value, positive or negative. The comparison of
transfer pricing (), xed lump-sum scheme (f) and two-part scheme (; f)
is summarized in Table 3.3. We will discuss Table 3.3 in more detail below.
Proposition 3.4.2 In the presence of the two-part coordination scheme,
(i) T = c1+ 1
2
< 0, T1 = f
T > 0 and total transfer dT1  T + fT  0
when (c1; c2; ; ) 2 
CR1;
(ii) there exists some fT > 0 such that T = 0 when (c1; c2; ; ) 2 
CR2;
and
(iii) TF = 
C
F , 

T
Ri = 

C
Ri and d
T
i = d
C
i (i = 1; 2) for any (c1; c2; ; ).
Proposition 3.4.2 indicates that the benets of our proposed internal in-
centive to a decentralized rm are twofold. On the one hand, the incentive
can always enable the rm to achieve the optimal rm-wide prot and sales
level as in the centralized scenario for any parameter set (c1; c2; ; ). By
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contrast, as is illustrated in the rst row of Table 3.3, the single-parameter
scheme cannot guarantee the rst-best result. On the other hand, the internal
incentive motivates D1 to choose a remanufacturable product design as if
it were the planner in a centralized rm. Recall that new products are
designed to be remanufacturable in fewer cases due to decentralization, as
stated in Proposition 3.3.3(i). Therefore, the two-part coordination scheme
encourages the manufacturing division in a decentralized rm to choose a
remanufacturable product design.
Moreover, Proposition 3.4.2 has two interesting implications. First, one
would expect  to be positive, because D1, who determines design decision
k, has more \power" over D2, and thus, D2 would have to compensate D1 for
choosing a remanufacturable product design. However, when (c1; c2; ; ) 2

CR1, it is actually optimal for D1 to \compensate" D2 in the amount of 
T
for each new unit D1 produces (T < 0). Note that product cannibalization
is prominent when (c1; c2; ; ) 2 
CR1. Under such a circumstance, the per-
unit transfer T from D1 to D2 motivates D2 to raise the wholesale prices
of the remanufactured products (w2 =
(w1 )+c2
2
, as shown in the proof of
Proposition 3.4.2), and thus, alleviates the side eects of cannibalization on
the sales of new products, which is benecial to D1. Proposition 3.4.2(i)
highlights that if  is restricted to be non-negative, then the rst-best rm
prot cannot always be achieved. In particular, a xed lump-sum scheme
without a transfer price (i.e.,  = 0) generally fails to induce the rst-best
result, because f cannot aect the optimal wholesale prices. In addition, D2
has to pay D1 a lump sum fT > 0, because T1 = f
T when (c1; c2; ; ) 2

CR1. To determine f
T , recall that the participation constraint T1  D1 , or
equivalently fT  D1 , needs to be satised while D1  (1 c1)
2
8
> 0, according
to Table 3.2. Thus, D2 will have to make a xed transfer fT > 0 to motivate
D1 to voluntarily design new products to be remanufacturable. Also note
that wT1 + 
T = c1 +  and f
T  0 are consistent with the literature on
franchising that suggests selling at the marginal cost and charging franchise
fees to achieve channel coordination (Cachon and Lariviere 2005). In our
context, although D1 does not literally sell new products to D2, a portion of
D1's products will be collected by D2 and becomes D2's production input. In
some sense, D1 \sells" new products to D2, who later sells them in the form of
remanufactured products. Therefore, franchising theory can still be applied.
In particular, the total transfer should be positive so that the manufacturing
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division has the incentive to voluntarily choose a remanufacturable product
design.
As stated in Proposition 3.6(ii), the second implication is that a xed
lump sum is sucient to ensure a rm-wide benchmark prot and sales level
when c1 is relatively large (the same condition for R2 to be optimal in the
centralized scenario). To help explain this, recall that transfer price  serves
as an instrument to control product cannibalization. When (c1; c2; ; ) 2

CR2, however, D1 can also manipulate its production quantity d1 to restrict
D2's production quantity d2, which serves the same purpose as  , and thus, 
can be replaced. The total transfer T dT1 +fT , which equals fT when T = 0,
must be positive to induce D1's voluntary participation because T1  D1
needs to be satised. Note that the direction of  and f can be positive or
negative if the rm simultaneously employs both  and f to coordinate the
two divisions. Table 3.3 summarizes the direction of the variable and xed
payment under dierent schemes.
Similar to Figure 3.5, in Figure 3.6, we depict the eectiveness of the
two-part coordination scheme as transfer price  varies and f is optimized
given each  . When the set of parameters is such that R1 is optimal in
the benchmark setting (Figure 3.6(a)), 100% eectiveness can be achieved
at a particular point (T = c1+ 1
2
and f set to the corresponding optimal
quantity). In addition, according to Figure 3.5(a), when c1 = 0:40; c2 =
0:45;  = 0:5;  = 0:01, the eectiveness loss is more than 5% for any  under
the transfer pricing scheme. By contrast, Figure 3.6(a) indicates that, for
the same set of parameters, the two-part coordination scheme can help the
rm to control the eectiveness loss to less than 5% for a wide range of  ,
provided f is appropriately chosen. When the set of parameters is such that
R2 is optimal in the benchmark setting (Figure 3.6(b)), 100% eectiveness
can be achieved if  falls within a certain range. In the example of Figure
3.6(b),  must be no less than -0.57 (-0.18) when c2 = 0:1;  = 0:5;  = 0:02
and c1 = 0:4 (c1 = 0:8) to ensure 100% eectiveness. In fact, when  falls
into the above range, a multiple of f can induce the rst-best result. To
better capture such characteristics, in our context, a scheme is called robust
with respect to the scheme variable  (f) if the eectiveness only gradually
decreases when  (f) deviates from  opt (f opt) within a small neighborhood.
Otherwise, the scheme is sensitive with respect to that scheme variable. By
the above denition, we do not need to discuss the robustness of a scheme in
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(a) c2=0.1, δ=0.45, η=0.01
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Figure 3.6: The Eectiveness of Two-part Coordination Scheme with
Optimized f
the regions where the coordination scheme cannot induce the rst-best result
for any  or f . As shown in Table 3.3, a coordination scheme is generally
robust with respect to the xed lump-sum while being sensitive with respect
to the transfer price. This is because, for any f within a small neighborhood
of f opt, the participation constraints of both divisions are still satised while
the wholesale prices, demand, the rm prot remain unchanged. Thus, all
such f 's are associated with 100% eectiveness. In contrast to the xed lump
sum, the transfer pricing generally aects wholesale prices, demand and total
prot. Thus, a small deviation from  opt may result in less of a rm prot or
non-participation of one division.
In summary, we demonstrate that the two-part coordination scheme can
always result in the rm-wide benchmark prot. The primary reason for this
is that transfer pricing does not always work in the presence of participation
constraints, stemmed from rm decentralization and the manufacturing divi-
sion's control over product design. While there may be multiple mechanisms
by which two divisions can be coordinated, we have provided one scheme
which is simple and eective.
3.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, we seek out insights for rms who face divisional conict and
are concerned with the cannibalization from remanufactured products, as well
as for rms who wish to increase prots by coordinating their manufacturing
and remanufacturing operations. Motivated by examples from industry, we
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consider a rm consisting of a manufacturing division and a remanufacturing
division, and a retailer through whom the rm sells all of its products.
Given this construct, we explore the optimal strategy with respect to design
architecture and pricing in centralized and decentralized scenarios. We nd
that it is optimal for the centralized rm to undertake remanufacturing with
a high production cost of new products, a low remanufacturing cost, a high
value-added from remanufacturing, and a low cost of the remanufacturable
product design. However, the manufacturing division of the decentralized
rm would be more likely to choose a non-remanufacturing design to avoid
a potential increase in production cost and competition from the remanufac-
tured products. By comparing the two scenarios, we demonstrate that rm
decentralization and divisional conict reduce both prots and total sales;
in addition, they prevent the rm from oering a remanufacturable product
design. Therefore, it is to the rm's advantage to implement inter-divisional
coordination mechanism to improve overall performance.
Thus, we investigate several incentive mechanisms that coordinate a rm's
manufacturing and remanufacturing divisions. Motivated by Toktay and Wei
(2011), we rst examine the eectiveness of transfer pricing. We show that
transfer pricing cannot always induce the remanufacturable product design
or the rst-best prots because the participation constraints of the manufac-
turing and remanufacturing divisions cannot be satised simultaneously. In
fact, this occurs when it is optimal for a rm to remanufacture only a fraction
of the returned products in the centralized scenario. Thus, the decentralized
rm should not only use the transfer price to achieve the highest prot. To
probe deeper, we propose an inter-divisional coordination scheme, with a
transfer price for each unit the manufacturing division produces and a xed
lump sum payment that is independent of the sales of new or remanufactured
products. We prove that this two-part coordination scheme always enables
the rm to invariably achieve the rst-best total prot and sales level and
can eectively promote a remanufacturable product design. An interesting
nding is that the inter-divisional transfer is not always from the remanufac-
turing division to the manufacturing division. We illustrate that, in the case
when it is optimal to remanufacture only a fraction of the used products
in the centralized scenario, a two-parameter inter-divisional coordination
scheme with a per-unit transfer from the manufacturing division to the
remanufacturing division and a lump sum payment from the remanufacturing
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division to the manufacturing division is required to achieve the rst-best
outcome. However, in the case when remanufacturing is suciently protable
so that it is optimal to remanufacture all used products in the centralized
scenario, a one-parameter incentive with either a lump sum or a transfer
price paid by the remanufacturing division to the manufacturing division
is sucient. The reason is that product cannibalization can be managed
through production quantity control. Finally, we nd that the xed lump-
sum scheme performs more robustly than the transfer price.
Our results and discussions are based, in part, on the modeling stipulation
that the wholesale prices of new and remanufactured products must be no
more than the maximum customer WTP (i.e., w1; w2  1). Although this
assumption seems plausible, we nd that it is not always optimal for the rm
to price new products below the maximum customer WTP. We considered,
as a modeling extension, the case when wholesale prices are allowed to exceed
the maximum customer WTP. The most noticeable observation is that the
decentralized rm is more likely to choose a remanufacturable product design
without a price constraint than with a price constraint, which implies that
under certain circumstance, the manufacturing division can increase its prot
by designing new products to be remanufacturable and selling them to the
retailer at a price that is higher than the maximum customer WTPs. The
explanation is that, in some cases, selling remanufactured products is so
protable that the retailer is willing to adjust the retail price of new products
to be less than the maximum customer WTP (and bear the loss from the
new products) in order to guarantee enough returns for remanufacturing.
Essentially, the manufacturing division extracts prot from the retailer and
the remanufacturing division by optimally pricing new products, even if the
price is above the maximum customer WTP.
So far, our discussion is limited to the case of a rm selling all products
to its end-users through a retailer. In practice, some companies integrate
retailing (vertical integration) and sell both new and remanufactured prod-
ucts directly to their end-users. Therefore, we also study the role of a
retailer in a closed-loop supply chain by comparing the rm's optimal pricing,
product design for remanufacturing and protability with and without an
independent retailer. We nd that in the centralized scenario, the rm's prot
and the demand for new and remanufactured products (if applicable) doubles
when the rm integrates retailing because vertical integration completely
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eliminates double marginalization. By contrast, in the decentralized scenario,
vertical disintegration benets the rm in terms of both sales quantity and
prot and encourages the manufacturing division to undertake a remanufac-
turable product design, which is because the retailer's optimal pricing scheme
alleviates product cannibalization and the manufacturing division can extract
additional surplus from the retailer. Therefore, in the absence of an inde-
pendent retailer, the manufacturing division will always design new products
to be non-remanufacturable in order to avoid product cannibalization, the
production cost increase, and potential prot loss. In all, to maximize prot
and boost sales, the centralized rm should consider retail integration while
the decentralized rm should strategically disintegrate retailing.
In closing, we acknowledge that our discussion is restricted to the situation
of when all used products can be returned and remanufactured and when the
collection cost is negligible. Considering that lower return and remanufactur-
ing rates and a higher collection cost should lead to less of a cannibalization
risk for the decentralized rm, our model focuses on the most unfavorable
conditions for remanufacturing operations.
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CHAPTER 4
THE EFFECTS OF PATENT TERM
EXTENSION AND PHARMACEUTICAL
STEWARDSHIP PROGRAM ON GREEN
PHARMACY
\The future will be green, or not at all."
{ Jonathon Espie Porritt.
4.1 Introduction
The issue of potential environmental impact by pharmaceuticals has gained
increasing attention in the last two decades. Since the 1980s, a number of
studies have examined the origin, occurrence and consequence of pharma-
ceuticals and personal care products (PPCPs) in surface, subsurface, and
drinking waters (see reviews by Halling-Srensen et al. 1998, Daughton 2001
and Tong et al. 2011). For example, the studies by Kidd et al. (2007) and
Vajda et al. (2008) showed the feminization of male sh and female-biased sex
ratio as the result of freshwater exposure to synthetic estrogenic substances
(source of female sex hormones) in Ontario, Canada and Colorado, U.S.,
respectively. Another example is the veterinary use of the nonsteroidal anti-
inammatory drug diclofenac, which resulted in catastrophic decline of three
vulture species of Gyps in Southeast Asia (Oaks et al. 2004). Kolpin et al.
(2002) found that pharmaceuticals, hormones, and other organic wastewater
contaminants were present in over 80% of the streams sampled across the
United States. The occurrence of PPCPs as trace environmental pollutants
is primarily originated from consumer use and actions rather than leaks in the
manufacturing process (Daughton 2003a). The U.S. Centers for Medicare &
Medicaid Services (CMS) and the Department of Health and Human Services
(DHHS) estimate that $406.1 billion will be spent on prescription drugs in
2020 (CMS/DHHS 2014), among which 10 to 33 percent will be unused
(Grasso et al. 2009). Another survey by Trueman et al. (2010) suggested
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that the annual primary and community care prescription medicines wastage
in England costs about GB$300 million, accounting for 4% of the medication
cost.
The main causes for waste include, among other things, early recovery
before all dispensed medicines are taken, ineectiveness or unwanted side ef-
fects, prescription change by the physicians, non-adherence and non-compliance
with drug treatment. (Morgan 2001, Ruhoy and Daughton 2008, Trueman
et al. 2010). Unwanted pharmaceuticals can reach the environment when
disposed in the garbage, toilet or sink. In fact, in a study conducted by
Kotchen et al. (2009), 73.2% of 1005 households in the central coast of
California threw unused medications in the rubbish or ushed them down
the toilet or sink. Only 11% of the sampled households returned unused
medications to a pharmacy or dropped them o at a hazardous waste center.
With the deteriorating situation of eco-toxicity of pharmaceuticals and
mixtures of medicines, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (U.S.
EPA), the European Environment Agency (EEA), and many other orga-
nizations are advancing the practice of \green pharmacy" (Daughton 2003a,
2003c, EEA 2010). According to EEA, green pharmacy is the design of
pharmaceutical products and processes that eliminates or reduces the use
and generation of hazardous substances (EEA 2010). In other words, green
pharmacy focuses on the innovation of \benign by design" drugs while keep-
ing the safety and ecacy of the drug unaected by the innovation.
Pharmaceutical companies are now taking steps to pursue green phar-
macy. For instance, Schering-Plough Pharmaceuticals, LLC modied its
birth control products by using natural estrogens paired with a biodegradable
progesterone (Lubick, 2008). Major pharmaceutical companies, as well as
policymakers and scientists, are gathering to discuss how to make drugs more
environmentally friendly at conventions such as the International Conference
on Sustainable Pharmacy and the American Chemical Society's Green Insti-
tute Pharmaceutical Roundtable (Knoblauch 2009).
A major obstacle in achieving green pharmacy is the high R&D expense
of inventing green pharmaceuticals or redesigning existing products to be
greener by identifying or using biodegradable ingredients or agents. To
alleviate this, one possible incentive is to oer patent term extension to
pharmaceutical companies that formulate greener drugs. The award of a
patent allows an inventor to temporarily and exclusively use its invention,
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and the importance of patents is signicant to the pharmaceutical sector
(Manseld et al. 1981, Competition DG, 2009). Currently, pharmaceutical
companies may obtain patent extension with new formulation, new routes of
administration for known drugs, stereoselectivity or chiral switches, new uses,
xed-dose combinations, polymorphism (Kvesic 2008, Gupta et al. 2010).
But none of these reasons is related to green pharmacy. EEA, however, has
proposed the idea of implementing patent extension to encourage pharmaceu-
tical companies to develop substances with less environmental impact (EEA
2010). Given the ever-growing costs of drug development, such incentive
can encourage the consideration of degradable green drugs (Shah 2010),
foster stewardship programs that tie both environmental and human health
together (Daughton 2003b), and help make green pharmacy a part of the
company's strategic plan (Clark et al. 2010), especially for the innovative
company. In addition, the patent system not only helps to stimulate inno-
vation, but also encourages technical information disclosure (Merges 1988).
If patent extension can be awarded to advance green pharmacy, then green
technology can be easily and widely implemented after the patent expiration.
As highlighted above, patent incentives could stimulate pharmaceutical
companies to invest in green pharmacy. Thus, in this chapter, we answer
the following questions: Under what conditions can the implementation of
a pharmaceutical patent term extension induce green pharmacy? What are
the impacts of the patent term extension on environmental performance,
the availability of pharmaceutics, and the protability of the rms? What
is the optimal length of patent extension? To this end, we consider an
innovative company who collects monopoly prots for its patented medicine
and faces competition from a generic rival after the patent expires. Both
the innovative company and the generic company maximize their own prof-
its. Their products, if not appropriately disposed of, could exert negative
impact on the environment. Both rms can achieve green pharmacy and
thus reduce adverse environmental impact by investing a xed amount. In
the case when the innovative company obtains patent extension by investing
in green pharmacy, the generic rival can take a free-ride after the extended
patent expired. To determine the optimal extended patent term, we assume
that the regulator considers two stakeholders: the number of patients who
cannot aord the pharmaceutical products, and the potential contamination
of unwanted pharmaceuticals to the surface, subsurface, and drinking waters.
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We demonstrate that a patent term extension can encourage the innovative
company to invest in green pharmacy. In particular, the patent incentive is
eective when xed investment cost is low, the extended term of the patent
is long or competition intensity is high. In fact, the more competitive is
the market, the more is the innovative company willing to invest in green
pharmacy, even under shorter extended terms of the patent. As a result,
the regulator can induce green pharmacy with a short extended term when
market competition is intensive. Specically, the optimal extended term is
nite when the regulator is seeking the balance of the aordability of medicine
and the environmental protection; in general, a longer extended term is
needed to induce green pharmacy when the xed investment cost increases.
Nevertheless, we also show that implementing the patent term extension
can be suboptimal, especially when the regulator values the aordability of
medicines over environmental stewardship.
Another possible approach for the regulator to promote green pharmacy
is to impose a pharmaceutical take-back program. Similar to the product
stewardship programs for items such as electronics and beverage containers,
residents would be able to deliver their unused medicines to appropriate
entities for safe and eective disposal; and drug manufacturers would be
required to run and pay for the program. Pharmaceutical take-back pro-
grams exist in many countries, such as Canada (Health Products Stewardship
Association), Australia (Return Unwanted Medicines Project), and most
countries in Europe (EEA 2010). In the U.S., the Alameda County Safe
Drug Disposal Ordinance, rst adopted in June, 2012, is a rst-in-the-nation
pharmaceutical extended producer responsibility program, and was upheld
by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in September, 2014.
Heidi Sanborn of the California Product Stewardship Council pointed out
that shifting responsibility for drug waste to manufacturers could lead to
greener design in terms of \what it's made out of, how it works, (and) how
long it lasts" (Bartolone 2014).
Thus, in this chapter, we also address the following questions: which
environmental policy is more eective in inducing green pharmacy, the patent
term extension, the take-back regulation, or the combination of both? In-
tuitively, when both companies are subject to the take-back regulation and
the compliance cost associated with the take-back regulation is independent
of the choice of green pharmacy, pharmaceutical companies will neither go
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green nor bear all the compliance cost; some of the environmental cost will
eventually be transferred to the consumers. Furthermore, we demonstrate
that adding the take-back regulation on top of the patent term extension
can potentially reduce rm prot and generally require a longer extended
patent term. Yet, we also conclude that the combined policy outperforms the
patent term extension when the compliance cost is relatively small, the xed
investment cost and the collection rate are relatively large, the competition is
either nominal or suciently intensive, and the environmental issue is rather
urgent.
To address the issue that the take-back regulation alone cannot promote
green pharmacy, we propose a modied take-back policy such that com-
panies with green pharmacy pay a lower compliance cost per unit than if
without green pharmacy. Compared with the patent term extension that
can only motivate the innovative company to invest in green pharmacy, the
modied take-back regulation can sometimes encourage both companies to
invest. Also, the modied take-back regulation is better than the patent
extension when the competition intensity is relatively high. Last, when
implementing a combined policy of both patent term extension and take-
back regulation, using the modied cost structure is typically superior to the
traditional cost structure. Interestingly, under this modied combined policy,
the innovative company may nd it protable to go green without requesting
patent extension. The intuition here is that company is not obliged to reveal
the ingredients or process of green pharmacy, which alleviates competition
from the generics by exclusively enjoying the benets of green pharmacy it
invents. However, implementing only the patent term extension can generate
less social and environmental impact than a combined policy when the needs
of pharmaceuticals are compelling or when the compliance cost is relatively
large.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. We rst review related
literature in Section 4.2. In Section 4.3, we formally dene the green phar-
macy, patent term extension and pharmaceuticals take-back regulations, and
introduce some main assumptions. In Section 4.4, we study the patent
term extension by developing the decision model and establishing properties
of its optimal solution. Then, in Section 4.5, we explore implications of
the take-back regulation. In Section 4.6, we study how compliance cost
structure aects the optimal strategy of the pharmaceutical companies and
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the regulator. Section 4.7 concludes this chapter and discusses the scope
and limitation of this study. The proofs of propositions, lemmas, and the
corollary are provided in Appendix C.
4.2 Relation to Literature
Our study is related to three streams of literature. First, a fast-growing
stream of works in operations management addresses the issues related to
product take-back regulations (e.g., Toyasaki et al. 2011, Atasu and Subra-
manian 2012, Atasu et al. 2013, Gui et al. 2013). In particular, a number
of researchers studied how the take-back regulation aects product design
decisions of manufacturers (e.g., Zuidwijk and Krikke 2008, Plambeck and
Wang 2009, Esenduran and Kemahloglu-Ziya 2015). However, a pharmaceu-
tical stewardship program is dierent from traditional product stewardship
programs in several ways. First, the goal of a pharmaceutical stewardship
program is not only to reduce pharmaceuticals in the environment but to
reduce drug abuse and accidental poisoning as well. The second dierence is
that the reverse channel of pharmaceutical products is still strictly regulated,
especially for controlled substances. For example, the Disposal of Controlled
Substances Final Rule by the U. S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
stated that a person may not dispose pharmaceutical controlled substances
for a non-member of her household and that controlled substance can only be
returned to a DEA authorized collector (DEA 2014). The third dierence is
that a pharmaceutical stewardship program can hardly bring any economic
benet to the participating pharmaceutical companies because pharmaceuti-
cal products have almost no end-of-life value. In fact, such a program usually
requires that pharmaceutical products be safely disposed of through certied
incineration. As a result, regulations or incentives are needed to ensure
the implementation of a pharmaceuticals take-back program. We contribute
to this literature by extending the analysis of the take-back regulation to
pharmaceuticals.
The second stream of literature explores the interactions between patent,
price and innovation (e.g., Kitch 1977, Gilbert and Shapiro 1990, Jae 2000).
In the pharmaceutical industry, relevant studies surged after the Drug Price
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (known as the \Hatch-
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Waxman Act") was implemented (e.g., Grabowski and Vernon 1992, Bottazzi
et al. 2001, Lee 2003). In this study, we focus on the role of patent term
extension in the investment and development of environmentally friendly
pharmaceutical substances, as suggested by EEA (2010). We believe that no
study has been conducted to validate this proposal. Hence, there is a clear
need for research to analyze and compare the patent term extension with
other existing regulatory policy. In this study, we make the rst attempt and
obtain guidelines for choosing the optimal length of the patent extension.
Finally, our study is related to the literature that examines the choice of
the policy instruments and the eciency implication of regulatory policies
on the environment (e.g., Palmer and Walls 1997, Calcott and Walls 2000,
Walls 2006, Krass et al. 2013). Our study diers from theirs in several ways.
First, we consider patent term extension as a policy instrument to induce
environmentally friendly design, which has rarely been studied before. Patent
protection is critical to the pharmaceutical industry, and thus has a high
potential for realizing the goal of environmental protection. Second, in this
chapter, the availability of pharmaceuticals is an important consideration
for the regulators. Pharmaceuticals dier from other commodities in that
consumer surplus or producer surplus is not as crucial as the number of people
who cannot aord the drug. Therefore, we incorporate the aordability
rather than consumer surplus into the model of the regulator. Third, we also
propose a new compliance cost structure that relates the unit compliance cost
to the choice of green pharmacy. The traditional compliance cost structure
fails to promote sustainable product design because it is independent of the
greenness of products. We conclude that our proposed cost scheme typically
achieves better performance than the traditional one.
To the best of our knowledge, the only other study that employs oper-
ations approaches to analyze extended producer responsibility (EPR) for
pharmaceuticals is the working paper by Alev et al. (2013), who investigate
the eectiveness of EPR policies by considering the interactions between
doctors, patients, manufacturers and insurance companies; however, they do
not explore patent term extension as a regulatory tool nor do they examine
the role of green pharmacy in product design.
79
4.3 Green Pharmacy, Patent Term Extension, and
Take-back Regulation Dened
In this section, we dene the terms, notation, and assumptions that lay
the groundwork for our models. Specically, we rst formalize our no-
tions of green pharmacy, patent term extension, and take-back regulations.
Then, we specify several assumptions regarding the market segments, cost
structure, and the goals of pharmaceutical companies and regulator. Table
4.1 summarizes the technical notation and assumptions discussed in this
chapter. And Figure 4.1 illustrates the decisions of the innovative and generic
pharmaceutical companies under dierent policies.
4.3.1 Dening Green Pharmacy
Consistent with the concept proposed by the U.S. EPA and EEA (Daughton
2003a, 2003c, EEA 2010), we mean for green pharmacy to represent the
redesign of a pharmaceutical product such that the generation of hazardous
substances is reduced while the two fundamental traits of the pharmaceutical
product, i.e., safety and ecacy, remain unchanged. Thus, the environmental
impact of one unit of the green product per period is only  fraction of the
environmental impact of one unit of the non-green counterpart per period,
where  2 [0; 1) reects the degree of non-greenness. A small  denotes green
pharmacy that results in little environmental impact.
The denition of green pharmacy implicitly assumes that the customer de-
mand is independent of the greenness of pharmacy because the two essential
traits of the pharmaceutical product remain constant. Moreover, in reality,
customers have little access to the environmental hazard assessments of each
pharmaceutical product. One exception is the database of regional envi-
ronmental classication system for pharmaceuticals set up by the Stockholm
County Council, Sweden in 2003 (http://www.janusinfo.se/Beslutsstod/Miljo-
och-lakemedel/About-the-environment-and-pharmaceuticals/Environmentially-
classied-pharmaceuticals/). Unfortunately, such database is not available
in the global sense.
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4.3.2 Dening Patent and Patent Term Extension
In our model, the innovative company is granted a patent for a limited period
of time for its invention of the brand name drug, and the invention is subject
to public disclosure after the expiration of the patent. For simplicity, we do
not dierentiate \patent" with \exclusivity". For detailed dierence, readers
can refer to http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/
ucm079031.htm. Therefore, in our setting, the innovative company is the
monopoly, and the brand name drug is the only available drug in the market
as long as the patent protection is active. However, after the patent expires, a
generic company will immediately enter the market and produce the generic
version of the brand name drug based on the public disclosure.
The patent term extension is used restrictively in this chapter to refer to the
extended term of a granted patent for the development of green pharmacy by
the innovative company. According to our assumption, only the innovative
company may be granted patent term extension. The regulator has the
option of implementing patent term extension, which is known to both the
innovative and generic companies before they make decisions. If patent term
extension exists and the innovative company develops green pharmacy, then
the innovative company is granted an n-period patent extension. Thus,
within the extended n periods, the innovative company can still charge the
monopoly price. Note the generic company can obtain the ingredients of
green drug, free of charge, after the patent expires if the innovative company
develops a green drug and receives patent extension. However, we assume
that the generic company cannot obtain green pharmacy, free of charge, if
the innovative company develops a green drug without applying for patent
extension. We will relax this assumption and discuss its implication in the
conclusion section.
4.3.3 Dening Take-back Regulations
To encourage pharmaceutical companies to take responsibility for pharma-
ceutical waste, the regulator may consider adopting pharmaceuticals take-
back regulations. The pharmaceuticals take-back regulations require that
pharmaceutical producers create and nance a collection and disposal pro-
gram for unused/wasted medicines. Existing pharmaceutical companies pay
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for all administrative and operational expenses of running the program based
on their market share. In fact, collection and disposal operations are funded
in part by manufacturers based on prior year's sales volumes in France
(Wisconsin DNR 2012) and on market share in Canada (Product Stewardship
Institute 2011). In the presence of the take-back regulation, the compliance
cost for a pharmaceutical company is ct  d, where d is the sales of that
company.
4.3.4 Key Assumptions
Assumption 1: The regulator chooses environmental policy by weighting
two considerations: the non-aordability of pharmaceuticals (social impact)
and the generation of hazardous substances (environmental impact).
The regulator decides whether to implement an environmental policy by
taking two stakeholders into consideration. First, the number of patients
who cannot aord the pharmaceutical products. Expensive medicines could
jeopardize lives and result in adverse social impact. We assume that the social
impact associated with unaordable pharmaceutical products is e1(1 d1 d2)
per period, where the market size is normalized to 1; d1 and d2 are the sales
of the brand name and generic name drugs, respectively. Second, unused and
expired pharmaceuticals products that are not collected could contaminate
surface, subsurface, and drinking waters (Daughton 2003a). We assume that
  100% of sales will be unused, of which (1  )  100% can be collected
and safely disposed of if the take-back regulation exists, where ;  2 [0; 1].
Assume that environmental impact per period is E per unit of non-green
product (in monetary terms) and E per unit of green products (in monetary
terms). Thus, the total environmental impact of unsafe disposal per period is
l  e2d if the take-back regulation does not exist and le2d if the regulation
exists, where d is the sales of a pharmaceutical company, e2 = E , l = 1 if the
pharmaceutical product is green, and l = 0 if the pharmaceutical product
is not green. We acknowledge that collection and disposal of unused and
wasted medicine result in at least some greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions
(Wisconsin DNR 2012) and that active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs)
can be introduced to sewage as a result of excretion and bathing (Ruhoy and
Daughton 2008). However, we ignore these two impacts to help us focus on
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the two major stakeholders.
Assumption 2: The green pharmacy is achievable no earlier than T0, the
time when the original patent expires.
Both companies can obtain green pharmacy (and thus produce green drugs)
for a one-time R&D xed cost of A at T0 is assumed to be A. In practice, the
eective period of patent protection can hardly be more than 8 years because,
in general, manufacturers start applying for patent protection before they
perform clinical trials on a compound (Gassmann et al. 2008). Considering
that few manufacturers would want to develop greener version of the drug
before they can market and sell the original version, we assume that green
drugs become available at T0. As a result, we only need to consider the
cumulative payo for all periods after the original patent expires (referred to
hereafter as T0).
Assumption 3: The demand curve slopes down. Generic drugs can can-
nibalize the sales of brand name drugs but brand name awareness/brand
loyalty exists.
A number of empirical studies indicate that a 1 percent increase in the price
of prescription drugs will lead to a 0.15-0.33 percent decrease in the number
of prescriptions in the United Kingdom (O'Brien 1989, Lavers 1989). In
the presence of a cost-sharing prescription drug plan, the price elasticity of
demand is still negative though the absolute value decreases (Harris et al.
1990, Smith 1993). In addition, innovator brand loyalty in pharmaceuticals
has been observed and analyzed in many previous studies (Scherer and Ross
1990, Grabowski and Vernon 1992, Frank and Salkever 1992). This can be
explained by the fact that brand name companies spend more on advertise-
ments (Hurwitz and Caves 1988) and that patients have the experience or
perception of low risk and high ecacy of brand name medicines (Denoth
et al. 2011, Meredith 2003). The empirical study by Kjoenniksen et al. (2006)
found that 41% of the patients would not switch to generic drugs should they
have no personal economic incentives.
As a result, we assume that the pharmaceutical product market is cross-
price-sensitive. If a customer's willing-to-pay (wtp) for the brand name drug
is , then her wtp for the generic product is   , where  2 [0; 1) and
 is distributed uniformly between 0 and 1.  < 1 not only reects the
fact that patients are willing to pay more for brand name drugs, but also
captures the intensity of the market competition.  close to 0 represents no
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competition (brand name medicine dominates the market) while  close to
1 represents an extremely intensive competition. Assume that a customer
maximizes her customer surplus (wtp less the price) and makes a purchase
only if her customer surplus is positive. In the same spirit as Moorthy (1984),
the demand for the brand name and generic drug per period is d1 = 1  p1 p21 
and d2 =
p1 p2
(1 ) , respectively when both drugs are available in the market.
It is not hard to derive that before patent expiration, the monopoly demand
(demand for the brand name drug) per period is dm = 1  pm.
Assumption 4: The per unit cost to produce brand name drug or generic
drug is c0 = 0.
We normalize the manufacturing cost to zero because the unit production
cost usually has marginal impact on the pricing of drugs and, therefore, is
sometimes negligible. For example, a hepatitis C drug called Sovaldi is priced
at $84,000 but the manufacturing cost is only $150 (Jogalekar, 2014).
Assumption 5: The per unit compliance cost of the take-back regulations
ct is less than

2
and is independent of whether a company adopts green
pharmacy.
We restrict our discussion to the case when ct  2 for two reasons. First,
the administrative and operational expenses of running the program must be
within a reasonable and aordable range for both the innovative company
and the generic company. In particular, it is not protable for the generic
companies to enter the market when ct  . Second, this assumption allows
us to focus on the interior optimal solutions and to avoid discussing the
boundary condition.
4.4 Patent Term Extension and Model Solutions
Based on the terms, notations and assumptions introduced in Section 4.3, we
use this section to formulate the models of the pharmaceutical companies in
response to the given environmental policy (policy N or E), and the model
of the regulator given the optimal response of the companies.
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Figure 4.1: Decisions of Pharmaceutical Companies under Dierent policies
4.4.1 The Model of the Pharmaceutical Companies
4.4.1.1 Benchmark Model: No Regulatory Policy (Policy N)
Given policy N , the innovative company decides whether to pursue green
pharmacy and the price of its brand name drug p1 at time T0. The prot of
the innovative company is 1 = max
p1
1
1 r  1  p1+p21   p1   A if it goes green
(denoted as strategy G1) and 1 = max
p1
1
1 r  1  p1+p21   p1 if it does not
go green (denoted as strategy O). Meanwhile, the generic company decides
whether to invest in green pharmacy and the price of the generic drug p2.
The prot of the generic company is 2 = max
p2
1
1 r  p1 p2(1 )  p2   A if it goes
green (strategy G1) and 2 = max
p2
1
1 r  p1 p2(1 )  p2 if it does not go green
(strategy O). It is not hard to see that neither company has an incentive
to invest in green pharmacy under this policy. By solving the simultaneous
game, we have the following results:
Lemma 4.4.1 In the absence of the patent term extension (policy N), (O;O)
is the equilibrium. Moreover, N1 =
4(1 )
(1 r)(4 )2 , 
N
2 =
(1 )
(1 r)(4 )2 , p
N
1 =
2(1 )
4  ,
pN2 =
(1 )
4  , d
N
1 =
2
4  , and d
N
2 =
1
4  .
Lemma 4.4.1 is consistent with intuition because by choosing green phar-
macy, pharmaceutical companies incur a xed cost without any benets un-
der policy N . Thus, in the absence of any regulatory policy, pharmaceutical
companies will not invest to go green. Also, due to the brand loyalty, the
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innovative company can charge a higher price, sell more products and earn
greater prot than the generic company.
4.4.1.2 Patent Term Extension (Policy E)
Given policy E, the innovative company rst decides whether to pursue green
pharmacy at time T0. If the innovative company decides to go green (denoted
as strategy G0), then it chooses the monopoly price of its brand name drug
pm for the next n periods. After the extended patent expires (n periods
later, denoted as Tn), the generic company enters the markets. At time
Tn the innovative company decides p1 and the generic company decides p2
simultaneously. Therefore, the prot of the innovative company is 1 =
max
pm;p1
1 rn
1 r (1  pm) pm+ r
n
1 r  1  p1+p21  p1 A and the prot of generic company
is 2 = max
p2
rn
1 r  p1 p2(1 )  p2. Note, in this case, the generic company obtains
free access to the green technology after the extended patent term expires
(denoted as strategy F ). If the innovative company decides not to go green
(strategy O) and, therefore, is not qualied for patent term extension, then
the problem is essentially the same as that under policy N . Let AE =
(1 rn)(8+)
4(1 r)(4 )2 .
Lemma 4.4.2 In the presence of policy E,
(a) If A  AE, then (G0; F ) is the equilibrium. E1 = 16 8(1+r
n)+(1 rn)2
4(1 r)(4 )2  
A, E2 = r
nN2 , p
E
m =
1
2
, dEm =
1
2
; pEi = p
N
i and d
E
i = d
N
i for i = 1; 2;
(b) If A > AE, then (O;O) is the equilibrium. Ei = 
N
i , p
E
i = p
N
i , and
dEi = d
N
i for i = 1; 2.
Intuitively, Lemma 4.4.2 is true because the patent extension can only
benet the innovative company but not the generic company. Therefore, if
it is protable for the generic company to choose green pharmacy, it would
also be protable for the innovative company to do so and thus obtain the
patent. In such a case, the generic company can only enter the market at
time Tn but obtain green technology for free. Accordingly, either strategy
(O;O) or (G0; F ) can be the equilibrium.
Figure 4.2 illustrates the eects of exogenous parameters (xed investment
cost A, extended term of the patent n, and competition intensity ) on the
strategy equilibrium. The strategy space is separated by the solid lines when
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Figure 4.2: Equilibrium under Policy E (r = 0:8)
n = 2 and by the dashed lines when n = 6. First, when xed investment
cost A is suciently small, the innovative company chooses to invest in green
pharmacy to prolong the patent and monopoly; when A is suciently large,
the innovative company will not go green because the benet of extended
patent cannot justify the cost of investment. Second, a longer extended
term of the patent (larger n) makes investment in green pharmacy more
attractive for the innovative company because innovative company can charge
monopoly price and earns monopoly prot for a longer time. Last, a high
degree of competition intensity encourages investment in green pharmacy,
which is intuitive because green pharmacy allows the innovative company
to exclusively possess the market for an additional n periods. In a similar
vein, as the competition becomes more intensive, the innovative company is
willing to go green in order to take advantage of the patent extension even
with higher investment cost A or shorter extended term of the patent n.
4.4.2 The Model of the Regulator { Implement the Patent
Term Extension (E) or Not (N)?
To decide whether it is optimal for the regulator to implement the patent
term extension, we need to compare the resulting social and environmental
impacts under policy N with those under policy E. Recall that (O;O) is the
equilibrium for any A under policy N (see Lemma 4.4.1) and for A > AE
under policy E (see Lemma 4.4.2), which indicates that patent term extension
cannot induce green pharmacy and, therefore, does not change the social and
environmental impact when A > AE. Consequently, we only need to focus
on the case when A  AE.
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The regulator's objective is to minimize the negative social and environ-
mental impact, which can be modeled as
e1
1
k=1r
k 1 (1  d1;k   d2;k) + e21k=1rk 1
 
l1;kd1;k + 
l2;kd1;k

(4.1)
where d1;k(d2;k) are the sales of the brand (generic) name drugs during the
kth-period after the original patent expires; l1;k(l2;k) = 1 if the brand name
(generic) drug is green, and l1;k(l2;k) = 0 if otherwise. Denote impact ratio
as e = e1
e2
. A large impact ratio represents when the major concern of
the regulator is the social impact (non-aordability of medicines), and a
small impact ratio represents when the primary concern is the environmental
impact of medicine. Let eE =  + 6(1 )
(1 rn)(2+) .
Proposition 4.4.3 When A  AE, it is optimal for the regulator to imple-
ment the patent term extension if and only if e < eE.
Given A  AE, it is possible for the regulator to induce green pharmacy
by implementing policy E. However, Proposition 4.4.3 establishes that the
regulator should only do so when the environment protection requires close
attention (e < eE). This is because patent extension can reduce the avail-
ability of medicines and, consequently, should not be implemented when the
social impact is the primary concern of the regulator (e  eE). Note that
eE decreases in  and . In other words, given e, the regulator is less likely
to implement patent extension when  and  are relatively large. First,
the regulator has little incentive to carry out patent term extension if green
pharmacy only alleviates environmental impact by a small margin (i.e., large
). Second, given the fact that more patients are willing to buy generic drugs
when  is relatively large, the regulator will be conservative in implementing
the patent extension because such incentive may result in the situation that
more patients cannot aord the medicine. Figure 4.3 further illustrates the
results of Proposition 4.4.3. In Figure 4.3, (G0; F )
+ represents when the
patent term extension can induce green pharmacy and it is optimal for the
regulator to implement the incentive of patent term extension, while (G0; F )
 
represents when the patent term extension can induce green pharmacy but
the regulator should not further encourage monopoly after the original patent
expires. (O;O) represents when the incentive has no impact on the social
and environmental welfare because no company will go green.
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If the regulator decides to implement the patent term extension, what
is the optimal n? According to Proposition 4.4.3, everything else being
equal, n increases as eE decreases, which is intuitive because when e is small,
the regulator is more determined to induce green pharmacy by providing
longer extending patent term. Let nE denote the optimal extension of the
term. Given that the regulator optimizes the decision of whether or not to
implement the patent term extension, Proposition 4.4.4 provides the optimal
extended patent term nE. Note nE = 0 represents the situation when it is
not optimal for the regulator to provide the incentive in the form of patent
term extension.
Proposition 4.4.4 If the regulator implements policy E, then
(a) nE = logr
h
1  4A(4 )2(1 r)
(8+)
i
when   e <  + 3(1 )(8+)
2A(1 r)(2+)(4 )2 and
A < (8+)
4(1 r)(4 )2 ;
(b) nE =1 when e <  and A < (8+)
4(1 r)(4 )2 ;
(c) nE = 0 when e   + 3(1 )(+8)
2A(1 r)(2+)(4 )2 or A  (8+)4(1 r)(4 )2 .
According to Proposition 4.4.4(a), if  < e <  + 3(1 )(8+)
2A(1 r)(2+)(4 )2 and
A < (8+)
4(4 )2(1 r) , then the optimal extension term n
E is nite. It is not hard
to show that nE increases in A and decreases in . As the one-time xed R&D
investment amount increases (large A), the regulator should provide more
incentive to induce green pharmacy. As customers becomes more interested
in generic drugs (large ), the innovative company is more motivated to take
advantage of the patent extension by choosing green pharmacy, which means
that the regulator can induce green pharmacy with a smaller n.
The optimal extension term nE is not always nite. On the one hand, if
the regulator places more emphasis on the environmental issues (relatively
small e) and the xed investment A is relatively small, then the regulator
would set the extended term to be as long as possible because by doing
so, the innovative company will choose green pharmacy and the total sales
volume is less than if the market is competitive. On the other hand, if the
social issues is the top priority (relatively large e) or if the xed investment
A is suciently large, then it is not in the best interest of the regulator to
implement the patent term extension because the policy either signicantly
impairs aordability of drugs (when e is suciently large) or fails to induce
green pharmacy (when A is suciently large).
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Figure 4.3: Optimal Regulatory Policy: Policy N or E
r = 0:8, and (L) n = 2,  = 0:5 and  = 0:6; (M) A = 0:1,  = 0:5 and n = 2; (R)
A = 0:1,  = 0:5 and  = 0:6.
4.5 The Role of Take-back Regulations
In the previous section, we demonstrated that the patent term extension
fails to encourage companies to invest in green pharmacy when A  AE, no
matter how long the extended patent term n is. Therefore, in this section,
we consider another regulatory policy, take-back regulation, and evaluate its
impact on company strategy in Section 4.5.1. Intuitively, pharmaceutical
companies will not choose green pharmacy because the compliance cost
associated with the take-back regulation is usually independent of the choice
of green pharmacy. Thus, in Section 4.5.2, we compare the patent term
extension with and without the presence of the take-back regulation, and
discuss the optimal policy, optimal extended term and the resulting overall
social and environmental performance.
4.5.1 Pharmaceutical Take-back Regulations (Policy T )
As mentioned earlier, pharmaceutical take-back programs can help to reduce
environmental pollution by collecting and incinerating unwanted medicines.
However, it is unclear whether pharmaceutical take-back programs can in-
duce green pharmacy. One central issue in implementing this policy is
deciding how to pay for the cost of running the take-back program. In
the countries where the cost is nanced by all participating pharmaceutical
companies, a common cost allocation scheme is based on the market size.
Thus, we model the problem as follows: In the presence of the take-back
regulation, each company has to pay the compliance cost ct per unit of sales.
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The innovative company will invest in green pharmacy only if its prot of
going green (T1 = max
p1
1
1 r  1  p1+p21   (p1   ct)   A) is higher than its
prot of not going green (T1 = max
p1
1
1 r  1  p1+p21   (p1   ct)). Similarly, the
generic company will invest in green pharmacy only if its prot of going green
(T2 = max
p2
1
1 r  1  p1+p21   (p2   ct) A) is higher than its prot of not going
green (T2 = max
p2
1
1 r  p1 p2(1 )  (p2   ct)). It is not hard to see that neither
company would invest because there is no nancial benet of going green.
As a result, we have T1 =
(1 )(2 ct)2
(1 r)(4 )2 , 
T
2 =
(1 )( 2ct)2
(1 r)(4 )2 , p
T
1 =
2(1 )+3ct
4  ,
pT2 =
(1 )+ct(2+)
4  , d
T
1 =
2 ct
4  , and d
T
2 =
 2ct
(4 ) . Furthermore, compared with
the benchmark (Lemma 4.4.1 in Section 4.4.1.1), both companies charge
higher prices under policy T ; consequently, they sell fewer products and
earn lower prot due to the compliance cost associated with the take-back
regulation. These results indicate that by only implementing the take-back
regulation, pharmaceutical companies will neither go green nor will they
bear all the clean-up cost; consumers will inevitably absorb some of the
compliance costs. The outcome is also consistent with the existing literature
on environmental economics which state that producer take-back regulation
may not promote environmentally-friendly product designs (e.g., Walls 2006).
From the perspective of the regulator, the take-back regulation has both
environmental and social impacts. On the one hand, the increased prices
means a low level of aordability because it prevents customers with low
willingness-to-pay from obtaining the medicines. On the other hand, phar-
maceutical stewardship program reduces the environmental impact because
a fraction of unwanted medicines will be collected and safely disposed of and
the sales volume (dT1 + d
T
2 ) decreases. Thus, the regulator should consider
choosing the take-back-only policy when the environmental concern is acute,
the compliance cost is suciently low, and the recovery rate is suciently
high (e <  + 3(1 )
ct(2+)
). Figure 4.4 depicts the above results.
4.5.2 Patent Term Extension and Take-back Regulations
(Policy ET )
Section 4.5.1 highlights that the take-back regulation alone cannot induce
companies to pursue green pharmacy. We now examine the take-back regu-
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Figure 4.4: Optimal Regulatory Policy: Policy N or T
(L)  = 0:6 and  = 0:5 ; (M) ct = 0:05 and  = 0:5; (R) ct = 0:05 and  = 0:6.
lation in conjunction with the patent term extension? The research question
we ask is how would the optimal extended patent term be aected when both
policies are implemented?
To answer the above question, we rst specify our models: the innovative
company decides whether to invest at time T0. If the innovative company
plans to invest, then it decides the monopoly price pm for the next n periods.
At time Tn, the generic company enters the market; the innovative company
decides p1 and the generic company decides p2 simultaneously. Therefore, the
prot of the innovative company is ET1 = max
pm;p1
1 rn
1 r  (1  pm)  (pm   ct) +
rn
1 r  1  p1+p21   (p1   ct)   A and the prot of generic company is ET2 =
max
p2
rn
1 r  p1 p2(1 )  (p2   ct). Note, in this case, the generic company can obtain
free access to the green pharmacy after Tn. If the innovative company decides
not to invest and, therefore, does not obtain patent term extension, then
the problem is essentially the same as that under policy T . Let AET =
1 rn
1 r
h
(1 ct)2
4
  (2 ct)2(1 )
(4 )2
i
. Similar to Lemma 4.4.2, we have
Lemma 4.5.1 In the presence of policy ET ,
(a) If A  AET , then (G0; F ) is the equilibrium. ET1 = (2 ct)
2(1 )rn
(4 )2(1 r) +
(1 ct)2(1 rn)
4(1 r)   A, ET2 = (1 )( 2ct)
2rn
(4 )2(1 r) . Moreover, p
ET
m =
1+ct
2
dETm =
1 ct
2
;
pETi = p
T
i and d
ET
i = d
T
i for i = 1; 2;
(b) If A > AET , then (O;O) is the equilibrium. ETi = 
T
i , p
ET
i = p
T
i , and
dETi = d
T
i for i = 1; 2.
(c) ETi  Ei for i = 1; 2.
It is not hard to show that, everything else being equal, the threshold of A
below which the innovative company will go green is lower under policy ET
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than under policy E (AET  AE) when ct  2 . This is because the decrease
in demand due to the compliance cost has a greater impact (in terms of prot
reduction) on the innovative company's monopoly prot than on its prot
under the competition, which makes patent term extension less attractive.
In addition, as Lemma 4.5.1 states, in the presence of patent term extension,
both companies have less prot with the take-back regulation than without
it.
Nevertheless, policy ET can induce green pharmacy in cases where policy
T can never achieve it; also, policy ET can result in less negative impact
than policy E in some cases. Recall that the regulator aims to minimize the
following social and environmental impacts
e1
1
k=1r
k 1 (1  d1;k   d2;k) + te21k=1rk 1
 
l1;kd1;k + 
l2;kd1;k

where t = 1 if the take-back regulation exists and t = 0 if otherwise;
d1;k; d2;k; l1;k; l2;k are dened in Section 4.4.2. Given the choice of implement-
ing both the patent term extension and the take-back regulation (policy ET )
or nothing (policy N), which one is the better strategy for the regulator? If
implementing both regulations, what is the optimal extended patent term?
Letting euET =
(2+)(1 )[c2t(12 4+2) 2ct(8+2)+(8+)]
2A(4 )2(1 r)[3 ct(+2)]+3ct[c2t (12 4+2) 2ct(8+2)+(8+)]
, Proposi-
tion 4.5.2 species the optimal extended patent term nET .
Proposition 4.5.2 If the regulator implements policy ET , then
(a) nET = logr
h
1  4A(4 )2(1 r)
(8+) 2ct(8+2)+c2t (12 4+2)
i
when   e < max f+
2(1 )(2+)
3
;  + euETg and A <
(8+) 2ct(8+2)+c2t(12 4+2)
4(4 )2(1 r) ;
(b) nET =1 when e <  and A < (8+) 2ct(8+
2)+c2t(12 4+2)
4(1 r)(4 )2 ;
(c) nET = 0 when e  max
n
 + 2(1 )(2+)
3
;  + euET
o
or A >
(8+) 2ct(8+2)+c2t(12 4+2)
4(1 r)(4 )2 .
Similar to Proposition 4.4.4, Proposition 4.5.2 reveals that the optimal
extension term nET is nite when the environmental and social impacts are
to be balanced. By comparing Propositions 4.4.4 with 4.5.2, we have the
following corollary:
Corollary 4.5.3 nET  nE when A < (8+) 2ct(8+
2)+c2t(12 4+2)
4(1 r)(4 )2 and  <
e < min
n
 + 3(1 )(8+)
2A(1 r)(2+)(4 )2 ;max
n
 + 2(1 )(2+)
3
;  + euET
oo
.
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Figure 4.5: Optimal Length of Patent Extension and Total Impacts under
Dierent Policies
A = 0:1;  = 0:5; r = 0:8;  = 0:5. (L) ct = 0:05;  = 0:6; (M) ct = 0:05; e = 2; (R)
 = 0:6; e = 2.
According to Corollary 4.5.3 and Figure 4.5, the optimal patent term
extension is longer under policy ET than under policy E when nE and nET
are both nite, which means that more incentive must be provided to induce
green pharmacy with the take-back regulation than without such regulation.
This is because the innovative company's monopoly prot is reduced from 1
4
to (1 c1)
2
4
per period due to the take-back regulation. Therefore, everything
else being equal, in order to encourage green pharmacy, the regulation has
to oer a longer patent term extension under policy ET .
In terms of the total impact, numerical results indicate that adding the
take-back regulation to the existing patent term extension could increase
or decrease the total impact, depending on the system parameters. First
of all, if the regulator aims to reduce the environmental impact (small e),
then in most cases, it is optimal for the regulator to adopt policy ET rather
than policy E because the take-back regulation helps to further reduce the
environmental impact. If the social impact is the main concern (large e),
then the regulator should only implement E rather than policy ET because
the take-back regulation increases the price of pharmaceutical products and
reduces the aordability of medicines. Second, when e is relatively small,
policy ET is more likely to outperform policy E as A increases. When A is
relatively large, companies have little motivation to invest in green pharmacy,
which means that policy ET (E) is essentially policy T (N). Thus, the
analysis in Section 4.5.1 follows. Third, adding the take-back regulation to
the existing patent term extension could decrease the total impact when the
94
compliance cost ct is relatively small. This is because policy ET with small
ct encourages safe disposal but merely changes the social impact. Fourth, it
is generally optimal for the regulator to adopt policy ET rather than policy
E when  is suciently small or suciently large. When  is suciently
small, the patent extension regulation can hardly induce green pharmacy
because the innovative company dominates the market. In fact, nE and nET
generally equal zero in such a case. However, the take-back regulation can
help achieve a lower environmental impact by collecting some of the unused
pharmaceutical products. When  is suciently large, the regulator can
induce green pharmacy with small n because innovative company wants to
take advantage of the patent term extension in face of erce competition. As
a result, the environmental impact is reduced while the social impact does not
signicantly increase. Last, the total impact is typically lower under policy
ET than under policy E when  is relatively small, which is intuitive because
smaller  means a higher fraction of unused products can be safely disposed
of. Overall, similar to Section 4.5.1, we conclude that the environmental
impact is generally reduced because of the decreased sales and safe disposal;
however, the negative social impact is usually exaggerated due to the higher
price and the low level of aordability. In addition, policy ET excels policy
E when A is relatively large, when e, ct, and  are relatively small, and when
 is either suciently small or suciently large.
4.6 Eects of Green Pharmacy on the Compliance
Cost
According to Section 4.5.1, the take-back regulation alone will not induce
green pharmacy because the program does not provide nancial incentive to
the pharmaceutical company for engaging in green technology. This result
relies on the assumption that the compliance cost is independent of whether
a company adopts green pharmacy. In this section, we consider the case that
the compliance cost of the take-back regulation is related to the greenness of
the pharmaceutical products: companies without green pharmacy have the
base compliance cost ct per unit; however, companies with green pharmacy
have lower compliance cost   ct per unit, where  is the degree of non-
greenness as we discussed before. This is a reasonable assumption because
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a more green design (smaller ) should receive more discount than a less
green design (larger ). We rst evaluate the impact of the take-back
regulation on the strategies of the two companies, and on the overall social
and environmental performance in Section 4.6.1. Next, we compare the
proposed scheme with the regulatory policies analyzed before and present
the results in Section 4.6.2. To avoid discussing the boundary solutions, we
assume that ct  (1 )2   .
4.6.1 The Modied Take-back Regulation (Policy T )
4.6.1.1 The Model of the Pharmaceutical Companies
Given policy T , the innovative company decides whether to invest in green
pharmacy and the price p1 at time T0. The prot of the innovative company
is 
T
1 = max
p1
1
1 r  1  p1+p21  (p1     ct) A if it goes green and 
T
1 = max
p1
1
1 r 
1  p1+p2
1   (p1   ct) if it does not go green. Meanwhile, the generic company
decides whether to go green and p2. The prot of the generic company is

T
2 = max
p2
1
1 r  p1 p2(1 )  (p2     ct)   A if it goes green and 
T
2 = max
p2
1
1 r 
p1 p2
(1 )  (p2   ct) if it does not go green. Note under this policy, when one
company decides to go green, the other company cannot free-ride because the
former company has no obligation to disclose its green technology. Let A
T
1 =
(1 )(2 )ct[2(1 ) ct(2 +(2 3))]
(1 r)(1 )(4 )2 and A
T
2 =
(1 )(2 )ct[4(1 ) ct((2 ) )]
(1 r)(1 )(4 )2 .
Lemma 4.6.1 In the presence of policy T ,
(a) If A  A T1 , then (G1; G1) is the equilibrium.  T1 = (1 )(2 ct)
2
(1 r)(4 )2   A,

T
2 =
(1 )( 2ct)2
(1 r)(4 )2   A, p
T
1 =
2(1 )+3ct
4  , p
T
2 =
(1 )+ct(2+)
4  , d
T
1 =
2 ct
4  ,
and d
T
2 =
 2ct
(4 ) ;
(b) If A
T
1  A  A T2 , then (G1; O) is the equilibrium.  T1 = [2(1 )+ct(1 (2 ))]
2
(1 r)(1 )(4 )2  
A, 
T
2 =
[(1 ) ct(2  )]2
(1 r)(1 )(4 )2 , p
T
1 =
2(1 )+ct(1+2)
4  , p
T
2 =
(1 )+ct(2+)
4  , d
T
1 =
2(1 ) ct(2 )
(4 )(1 ) , and d
T
2 =
(1 ) ct(2  )
(4 )(1 ) ;
(c) If A > A
T
2 , then (O;O) is the equilibrium. 
T
1 =
(1 )(2 ct)2
(1 r)(4 )2 , 
T
2 =
(1 )( 2ct)2
(1 r)(4 )2 , p
T
1 =
2(1 )+3ct
4  , p
T
2 =
(1 )+ct(2+)
4  , d
T
1 =
2 ct
4  , and d
T
2 =
 2ct
(4 ) .
Compared with the take-back regulation in Section 4.5.1, the modied
take-back regulation can induce green pharmacy. In fact, under certain
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circumstances, both companies will invest to obtain green pharmacy. More-
over, according to Lemma 4.6.1, if it is protable for the generic company
to invest in green pharmacy, then it is also protable for the innovative
company to invest. This is because the innovation company usually generates
higher prot and demand than the generic company due to the brand loyalty
advantage. Therefore, if green pharmacy allows the generic company to lower
unit cost while maintain or increase its prot, then the green pharmacy will
benet the innovative company to a greater extent. Consequently, strategy
(O;G1) cannot be an equilibrium.
Figure 4.6 illustrates the eects of exogenous parameters (xed investment
cost A, base compliance cost ct, degree of non-greenness , and competition
intensity ) on the strategy equilibrium. The strategy space is separated
by the solid lines when  = 0:3 and separated by the dashed lines when
 = 0:5. First, when xed investment cost A is suciently small or the
base compliance cost ct is suciently large, both companies choose to invest
in green pharmacy to reduce the compliance cost; when A is suciently
large or ct is suciently small, no company would go green because the
compliance cost saving cannot cover the cost of investment. Second, a high
degree of non-greenness  is associated with less compliance cost saving of
going green. Thus, a large  discourages green pharmacy. Last, when A
is suciently small, higher competition intensity  can generally induce the
generic company to go green because in such a case, the company has to
compete on price by reducing the cost; note the innovative company always
goes green with a very small A. Interestingly, when A is relatively large, the
innovative company chooses green pharmacy only when competition intensity
 is either suciently low or suciently high. Little competitive rivalry
allows the innovative company to earn great prot by exclusively enjoying
the low compliance cost; a suciently high competition intensity drives the
innovative company to lower the compliance cost by going green.
4.6.1.2 The Model of the Regulator: Implement the Modied Take-back
Regulation ( T ) or Not (N)?
Given the choice of implementing the modied take-back regulation or noth-
ing, Proposition 4.6.2 provides the guideline for the optimal regulatory policy.
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Figure 4.6: Equilibrium under Policy T
(L) ct = 0:05, r = 0:8; (R)  = 0:6, r = 0:8. ct  (1 )2   based on our assumption
Proposition 4.6.2 Given a parameter set (A;; ct; ; ; r), there exists e
T
such that it is optimal for the regulator to implement policy T if and only if
e < e
T .
Figure 4.7 depicts how exogenous parameters aect the optimal regulatory
decision. (S1; S2)
+ represents when it is optimal for the regulator to imple-
ment the modied take-back regulation, where (S1; S2) is the resulting strat-
egy choice by the two rms; (S1; S2)
  represents when the regulator should
not implement the modied take-back regulation and if it does, (S1; S2) is
the strategy equilibrium.
One observation from Figure 4.7 is that keeping other parameters constant,
e
T increases in . This can be explained by two reasons. On the one hand,
more patients switch from the brand name drug to the generic drug when 
increases, while the generic company is less likely to adopt green pharmacy
than the innovative company (see Lemma 4.6.1). On the other hand, the
total number of medicine sold in each period increases in , which imposes
more pressures on the environment. For both changes, the regulator is more
likely to implement the take-back regulation. Thus, along with the discussion
in Section 4.4.2, the regulator should implement the modied take-back
regulation rather than the patent extension when  is relatively large.
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Figure 4.7: Optimal Regulatory Policy: Policy N or T
r = 0:8,  = 0:5,  = 0:5. (L) ct = 0:05 and  = 0:6; (M) ct = 0:05 and A = 0:1;
(R)  = 0:6 and A = 0:1. Note ct  (1 )2   based on our assumption.
4.6.2 Patent Term Extension and Modied Take-back
Regulation (Policy ET )
In Section 4.6.1.1, we have shown that the strategy equilibrium can only
be (G1; G1), (G1; O) or (O;O) in the presence of the modied take-back
regulation. What is the strategy equilibrium if the regulatory policy is
the combination of the patent term extension and the modied take-back
regulation (policy ET )? It is not hard to conclude that strategy equilibrium
becomes either (G0; F ), (G1; O) or (O;O).
We make three observations regarding policy ET . First, given n and a
parameter set (A;; ct; ; ; r), if (G1; G1) is the equilibrium under policy
T , then (G0; F ) is the equilibrium under policy ET . This result is intuitive
because the innovative company can reduce both competition and compliance
cost by choosing green pharmacy and obtaining patent term extension under
policy ET . Second, interestingly, strategy (G1; O) can be an equilibrium
for some (A;; ct; ; ; r; n), meaning that under certain conditions, the in-
novative company would not extend the patent so that the company has
no obligation to reveal the ingredients or process of green pharmacy and
thus can exclusively enjoy the benets of green pharmacy it invests. By
contrast, if the innovative company obtains patent extension, then after the
extended patent expires, the generic company will enter the market with
lower compliance cost without investment, which intensies the competition.
(G1; O) is an equilibrium when A is large enough such that it is not protable
for the generic company to go green but is still small enough for the innovative
company to go green. Third, if (G1; O) is the equilibrium under policy T , then
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either (G0; F ) or (G1; O) is the equilibrium under policy ET ; if (O;O) is the
equilibrium under policy T , then either (G0; F ) or (O;O) is the equilibrium
under policy ET . By adding the patent term extension to the modied take-
back regulation, the regulatory policy is more like to induce green pharmacy.
However, it is still not clear whether policy ET can lower the social and
environmental impacts. To answer this question, similar to Section 4.5.2,
we can dene and evaluate the optimal solutions to the problem of the
regulator. Figure 4.8 illustrates the overall impact and the optimal patent
term extension under dierent policies. Based on the numerical results,
we have the following observations. First, if the regulator aims to reduce
the environmental impact (suciently small e), then it is generally optimal
for the regulator to adopt policy ET rather than policy E or ET because
policy ET helps to further reduce the environmental impact as compared to
policy E, and results in lower sale volume as compared to policy ET . If the
social impact is the primary concern (suciently large e), then the regulator
should only implement E rather than policy ET or ET because the take-
back regulation further increases the price of pharmaceutical products and
reduces the aordability of medicines. In fact, the optimal extended term is
zero for any of these three policy when e is suciently large. If the regulator is
seeking the balance between social and environmental impacts, then policy
ET is generally the best policy among the three. Second, policy ET is
more likely to outperform policies E and ET when  is relatively small. A
smaller  means that the pharmaceutical products are much greener and that
companies can have lower compliance cost per unit. As a result, the regulator
has more incentive to induce green pharmacy and the innovative company is
more willing to invest in green pharmacy to achieve lower cost under policy
ET as compared to policies E and ET . When  is relatively large, the
regulator prefers the take-back regulation to the patent term extension in
achieving lower environmental impact, making ET a better policy than E
or ET . Third, in general, policy ET is optimal when ct is relatively small,
and policy E is optimal when ct is relatively large. This is because with
small low compliance cost ct, policy ET can best reduce the environmental
impact while control the social impact by choosing relatively small n among
all three policies. However, policies ET and ET signicantly increases the
negative social impact when ct is relatively large. Fourth, it is generally
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optimal for the regulator to adopt policy ET , especially when  is small.
Similar to the analysis in Section 4.5.2, when  is suciently small, on the one
hand, unless n is suciently large, the patent extension regulation can hardly
induce green pharmacy because the brand name product already dominates
the market; on the other hand, the take-back regulation can help achieve a
lower environmental impact by having some of the unused pharmaceutical
products safely disposed. Thus, the regulator can collect unused products
and induce green pharmacy with smaller n under policy ET than under
other policies. Last, the total impact is generally lower under policy ET
than under policy E or ET when  is relatively small because a relatively
high proportion of unused products can be safely disposed of under policy
ET with small . Overall, policy ET is more favorable than policies E and
ET , especially when , ct, , and  are relatively small. However, policy ET
can excel policies E and ET when e is relatively small and  is relatively
large; policy E can excel polices ET and ET when e and ct are relatively
large.
4.7 Conclusion
Unused pharmaceuticals are disposed of unsafely in increasingly large vol-
umes every year. The eco-toxicity arising from unused pharmaceuticals
has drawn considerable attention of policy makers, such as the EPA in the
U.S and EEA in Europe, who are now advocating the concept of \green
pharmacy". The key element of green pharmacy is \benign by design", which
aims to eliminate or reduce the use and generation of hazardous substances.
However, the major obstacles to the achievement of green pharmacy are
high R&D expenses and the lack of incentives and regulations. One pos-
sible incentive, as proposed by EEA, is to oer a patent term extension
to pharmaceutical companies that formulate greener drugs. Such incen-
tive can encourage both the development of degradable green drugs and
technical information disclosure. Yet, it is still unclear how eective the
pharmaceutical patent term extension is in inducing green pharmacy and
the implication of patent term extension for the social and environmental
impacts. Toward that end, we consider an innovative company who collects
monopoly prots for its patented medicine and faces competition from a
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generic rival after the patent expires. Each company can achieve green
pharmacy by investing a xed amount. However, the generic rival can acquire
green pharmacy, free of charge, after the expiry of the extended patent that
is granted to the innovative company for its development of green pharmacy.
Both the social impact (the aordability of pharmaceutical products) and
environmental impact (contamination of unwanted pharmaceuticals in the
environment) are considered by the regulator when determining the optimal
extended patent term. We demonstrate that in the presence of the patent
term extension, the innovative company will invest in green pharmacy when
the xed investment cost is low, the extended term of the patent is long
and the competition intensity is high. However, patent term extension can
result in a lack of aordability. As a result, the regulator should implement
the patent extension only with a suciently high level of environmental
concern. Specically, the optimal extended term is nite when the regulator
is seeking the balance of controlling both social and environmental impacts;
the extended term should increase as the xed investment cost increases or
the market competition becomes less competitive.
Pharmaceutical stewardship program is another possible approach to pro-
moting green pharmacy. However, pharmaceutical companies will not choose
green pharmacy in the presence of the take-back regulation because the unit
compliance cost is typically independent of the choice of green pharmacy;
worse still, companies will raise the price so that the consumers partly pay the
cost incurred due to the pharmaceutical stewardship program. Nevertheless,
we conclude that implementing both the take-back regulation and the patent
term extension dominates the single policy of the patent term extension
when the compliance cost is relatively small, the xed investment cost and
the collection rate are relatively large, the competition is either nominal
or suciently intensive, and the environmental issue is relatively urgent.
In addition, we propose a modied take-back regulation such that the unit
compliance cost is lower for companies with green pharmacy than without
green pharmacy. Such regulation can encourage both companies to invest in
green pharmacy and is better than the patent extension when the competition
intensity is relatively high. Numerical results indicate that the modied take-
back regulation is generally superior to the traditional take-back regulation
when the regulator considers adding the take-back regulation to the patent
term extension. An interesting observation is that the innovative company
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would sometimes go green without requesting patent extension under the
modied joint policy. The reason is that the generic company cannot take
a free-ride after the patent expires, which helps the innovative company to
lessen the competition from the generics. However, a single policy of patent
term extension can still outperform a combined policy when the needs of
pharmaceuticals are compelling or when the compliance cost is relatively
large.
We note that our results are based in part on the assumption that a
company can obtain green pharmacy either by its R&D investment or by
waiting for the technical disclosure of its competitor after patent expires.
Nevertheless, we also consider, as a modeling extension, the possibility that
it takes suciently short time for the generic company to duplicate an
unpatented green technology without enabling disclosure. For this extension,
we nd that the previous analysis for policies N and E remains unchanged.
However, this extension can change the equilibria under policy T or T .
Assuming that when the innovative or generic company invests in green
technology, the probability that the green technology is hard to duplicate
is p, and the probability that it is easy to duplicate is 1   p. We consider
p < 1 because p = 1 represents the case we have already discussed before.
We nd that, in general, our qualitative results and insights continue to
apply. However, compared with Lemma 4.6.1, (G1; G1) is less likely to be
the equilibrium while (O;O) is more likely to be the equilibrium. This is
because companies are hesitant to invest in green pharmacy when facing
a potential imitation risk by its competitor and a potential opportunity of
free-ride. Interestingly, when p is suciently small, the equilibria are not
unique under certain circumstance: the fact that (G1; O) and (O;G1) are
both equilibria indicates that it is protable for a company to take a free
ride if its competitor invests in green pharmacy while it is still protable
to invest if its competitor does not. From the perspective of the regulator,
implementing policy T or T can be more eective with p < 1 than p = 1
because the possibility of easy duplication of green pharmacy could lead to
the reduction in environmental impact.
In closing, we acknowledge the following limitations of our model. First,
it implicitly assumes that the GHG emissions associated with the collection
and disposal of unused and wasted medicine are nominal, and the APIs
introduced to sewage as a result of excretion are negligible. In fact, these
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impacts can sometimes be remarkable. For example, Bound and Voulvoulis
(2005) estimated that a total of 34% of metabolic products was excreted
in active forms though \active" may not necessarily be interpreted as \eco-
toxic". In principle, the relaxation of these two assumptions will lead to
a greater emphasis by the regulator on the promotion of green pharmacy
because green pharmacy reduces the requirement for collection and lowers
the risk of eco-toxicity caused by excretion or bathing. Second, the demand
of pharmaceuticals is assumed to be price-sensitive, which generally holds for
over-the-counter products. For prescribed medicines, recommendations by
the doctors and the third-party payment make the price elasticity of demand
relatively small, which can favor the small innovations (Ganuza et al. 2009).
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Table 4.1: Model Notation
Decision Variables of the Pharmaceutical Companies
pm; dm the monopoly price and demand of brand name drugs,
respectively, before the patent expires
p1(p2); d1(d2) the price and demand of brand name drugs (generic drugs),
respectively, after the patent expires
S1(S2) the strategies of the innovative (generic) company, where
S1 2 fG0; G1; Og and S2 2 fF;G1; Og
G0: the strategy of investing green pharmacy and obtaining
patent extension
G1: the strategy of investing green pharmacy but not
gaining patent extension
O: the strategy of not going green
F : the strategy of going green for free after patent expires
Decision Variables of the Regulator
Sr the environmental policy implemented by the regulator,
where Sr 2 fN;E; T;ETg
Policy N : no environmental policy
Policy E: patent term extension
Policy T : take-back regulation
Policy ET : patent term extension and take-back regulation
n the length of extended term
Parameters
 degree of non-greenness
A one-time xed R&D investment in green pharmacy
ct base compliance cost of the take-back regulation per unit
 valuation factor of generic drugs
e1 social impact of unaordable medicine per person per period
(in monetary terms)
e2 environmental impact per unit per period (in monetary terms)
e impact ratio. e = e1
e2
 proportion of unwanted drugs that are unsafely disposed
(without being taken back)
r discount factor
T0 the time when the original patent expires
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Figure 4.8: Optimal Length of Patent Extension and Total Impacts under
Dierent Policies
(1st Row) A = 0:1, ct = 0:05,  = 0:6,  = 0:5, r = 0:8; (2
nd Row) A = 0:1,
ct = 0:05, e = 2,  = 0:5, r = 0:8; (3
rd Row) A = 0:1,  = 0:6, e = 2,  = 0:5,
r = 0:8. (1st Col.)  = 0:3; (2nd Col.)  = 0:7. Note ct  (1 )2   based on our
assumption.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
\There is no Plan B because we do not have a Planet B."
{ Ban Ki-moon.
In 2014, U.S. EPA published the third edition of Climate Change Indicators
in the United States. According to the report, average U.S. and global
temperatures are rising, snow and rainfall patterns are changing, extreme
weather and climate events are increasing, ragweed pollen season and growing
season for crops are lengthening, and the oceans are becoming more acidic.
Scientic evidence shows that many of these climate changes are linked to the
increase in greenhouse gases emissions as a result of human activities (U.S.
EPA 2014). To reduce the greenhouse gasses emissions, a large number of
research endeavors have been made in the past several decades; however,
more eorts are needed to help us live sustainable lives and save our planet.
Eco-friendly design has been one of the key topics studied in sustainable
operations management. Growing research attention has been shifting from
an end-of-pipe-control approach to a benign-by-design approach (Angell and
Klassen 1999). Eco-friendly design is motivated by the potential economic
benets, stringent environmental legislation, and growing public awareness,
among others. In the remanufacturing industry, Design for the Environment
(DfE) has proven to be a key to the success of product recovery operations.
DfE helps bring full potential of product recovery into play in the context
of dierent rm or market structures. DfE is also equally applied to the
products that have little end-of-life value. It enables companies to use
fewer harmful components during manufacturing and to minimize pollutant
releases to the environment after disposal.
This dissertation discusses the mechanisms to promote DfE and the conse-
quences of implementing DfE, as illustrated in Figure 5.1. DfE is not always
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Figure 5.1: Research Focus of This Dissertation
a natural choice by the producers and sometimes external incentives or regu-
lations are needed to induce DfE. Two regulatory policies are analyzed in the
setting of the pharmaceutical industry: patent extension and take-back reg-
ulation. Another approach to achieving DfE is through inter-organizational
coordination. This dissertation examines the eectiveness of imposing single-
parameter schemes (transfer price or xed lump sum transfer) and two-part
tari to pursue DfE.
DfE facilitates product end-of-life recovery and can reduce adverse envi-
ronmental impacts. However, DfE can also increase the production cost and
result in higher product prices. Understanding the impact of design decisions
on prot, people, and planet is critical in analyzing DfE. Therefore, in this
dissertation, a rm or a division maximizes its prot by deciding product
design and prices; demand can be characterized by consumer's vertical dif-
ferentiation and price; and decisions made by rms and consumers inuence
the environmental impact.
This dissertation makes the following contributions: It extends the analysis
of take-back regulation to pharmaceuticals and makes the rst attempt to val-
idate the proposal of implementing patent extension in achieving DfE. It also
extends supply chain coordination studies by incorporating DfE decisions. In
addition, the study develops guidelines for optimal pricing to companies that
embrace the idea of DfE. To probe deeper into the consequences of DfE, this
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dissertation denes and evaluates dierent stakeholders and environmental
measures, and it relates environmental stewardship to other outcomes such
as prot, revenue and social welfare.
There are still many open questions regarding the promotion, implemen-
tation, and consequences of DfE. The work presented in this dissertation can
be extended in several ways.
One line of future research might be to study DfE in the context of
service operations. The current DfE tools are mainly applied to physical
merchandises, such as heavy-duty and o-road equipment, motor vehicle
parts, IT products and medical devices. However, a recent transition is from
selling physical products to oering a service-based package (Corbett and
Klassen 2006). Researchers have demonstrated that the adoption of green
practices is related to better rm performance in some service industries (e.g.,
Goodman 2000, Kassinis and Soteriou 2003). Unfortunately, little attention
has been paid to the DfE approach for service systems and the examination of
potential economic and environmental benets of DfE in the service industry.
Another direction for future research is to develop and evaluate a more
comprehensive DfE that deals with the recovery of heterogeneous end-of-life
products of the same generation and the upgradeability of a product over
multiple generations. Optimizing the design of a product portfolio can oer
more practical applications than an all-in-one approach; however, considering
a product portfolio design can potentially increase the complexity of the
target system. Thus, a comprehensive DfE analysis along with large-scale
optimization methods, such as a hierarchical approach or a decomposition
approach, need to be developed in the future.
Additionally, data-driven analysis that encodes system parameters is an-
other potential to advance the study of DfE. Encouraged by emerging big
data applications, researchers can build more sophisticated models in which
dynamics and uncertainty embedded in DfE can be addressed in a joint
manner. For example, the demand or the willingness-to-pay for an eco-
friendly product can be estimated using a data-driven tool before the product
is launched or reintroduced. Another application of data-driven analysis
techniques is DEA-based energy and environmental eciency measurement
and monitoring (Zhou et al. 2008). The DEA models and its extensions can
be employed to analyze the environmental performance of DfE.
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The topic of DfE in the pharmaceutical industry is relatively new in the
eld of operations management. Many other operational questions related
to pharmaceutical stewardship remain unanswered. For example, what is
the best approach to collect unwanted medical products: the mail-back
program, the permanent disposal program, or the periodically scheduled
collection program? The method of collection may signicantly inuence the
participation rate, the ease of operations, cost, and greenhouse gas emissions.
Another question is how to allocate cost and resources (e.g., reverse logistics
networks) when collecting unused and expired medical products? The collec-
tion and disposal costs are sometimes funded in part by manufacturers based
on prior year's sales volumes (e.g., in France and Canada). However, such
an allocation mechanism does not consider the synergies inherent in resource
sharing among participating companies. Thus, it is critical to develop a cost
allocation mechanism that not only induces resource sharing in the collective
system, but also maximizes cost eciency or increases return rate.
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APPENDIX A
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 2
APPENDIX A.1 PROOF OF PROPOSITIONS
Proof of Proposition 2.3.1. Part (i) follows directly from the constraint
that the manufacturer cannot remanufacture more products than returned
products as follows: dor+dnr  dnn+dnr ) dor  dnn. Thus, dor > 0 implies
that dnn > 0.
Part (ii) is by contradiction. From Table 2.1, dnr > 0 ) 9 1 such that
Snr (1)  Snn (1), 1  p2 pr r and Snr (1)  Sor (1), 1  p1 s. Thus,
the existence of 1 requires that p1 s  p2 pr r . Note p1 s =
p2 pr
 r ) dnr = 0.
Thus, dnr > 0 requires that p1   s < p2 pr r . Similarly, don > 0 ) 9 2 such
that Son (2)  Snn (2), 2  p1   s and Son (2)  Sor (2), 2  p2 pr r .
Thus, the existence of 2 requires that
p2 pr
 r  p1 s, which is a contradiction.
To prove part (iii), we use Table 2.2(a) because dnr = dor = 0, by
assumption. Assume dnn > 0. If don = 0, then dnu = 0 only when
p2
    p11+  0; if dnu = 0, then don = 0 only when p1   p2  0. Therefore,
after some algebra, we must have p1  p2   1+ p1, which is impossible if
p1 6= 0 or p2 6= 0 because  >  1+ > 0. 
Proof of Proposition 2.3.2. Part (i). In both cases, customers either
buy the only oered product or do not purchase. We rst consider when the
oered product is available only in the second period. The object function can
be written as 00010 = maxp2 (p2   c0)  don subject to don > 0; p2  0. Since
dnr = dor = 0, s = 0 and don = 1  p2 . It is easy to show that p2 = +c02 and
00010 =
( c0)2
4
when c0 <  and 

00010 = 0 (no production) when c0  .
Similarly, when the oered new product is available only in the rst period.
It is straightforward to show that p1 =
1++c0
2
and 00100 =
(1+ c0)2
4(1+)
when
c0 < 1 +  and 

00100 = 0 (no production) when c0  1 + .
When c0 < , we must have c0 < 1+ because  < 1+. Thus, 

00100 > 0
whenever 00010 > 0. Moreover, 

00010 =
( c0)2
4
> 00100 =
(1+ c0)2
4(1+)
only
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when  (1 + ) > c20, which is impossible as c0 < ; c0 < 1+ . When c0  ,
00010 = 0 and 

00100  0. Therefore, the statement follows.
Part (ii). We rst solve the manufacturer's problem when M=(0,0,1,1,0):
01010 = max
p1;p2
(p1   c0)  dnu + (p2   c0)  don
s:t dnn = 0
dnu; don > 0
p1; p2  0
Since dnr = dor = 0, s = 0. Note dnn = 0 if
p2
   1. The problem can be
further expressed as
00110 = max
p1;p2
(p1   c0) 

1  p1   p2
1 +    

+ (p2   c0) 

p1   p2
1 +      
p2


s:t:
p2
     1  0 (A.1)
1  p1   p2
1 +     > 0;
p1   p2
1 +      
p2

> 0 (A.2)
p1  0; p2  0 (A.3)
Consider the relaxed problem where (A.2) is replaced by 1  p1 p2
1+   0; p1 p21+  
p2

 0 and denote the corresponding optimal prot as ~00110. Thus, the
Lagrangian function of the relaxed problem can be written as
L = (p1   c0) 

1  p1   p2
1 +    

+ (p2   c0) 

p1   p2
1 +      
p2


+1

p2
     1

+ 2

1  p1   p2
1 +    

+ 3

p1   p2
1 +      
p2


Based on the KKT conditions, we obtain two KKT points:
Case 1: if a  2(1+)
1+ c0 , then p

1 =
( )(1+)

and p2 =     and ~00110 =
[( )(1+) c0]
2
. Note when c0  ( )(1+) , the prot is negative and hence we
assume no production. We can further prove that ~00110  00100 = (1+ c0)
2
4(1+)
when c0 <
( )(1+)

and 2 <  < 1 + .
Case 2: if a < 2(1+)
1+ c0 , then p

1 =
1++c0
2
and p2 =
(1++c0)
2(1+)
and ~00110 =
(1+ c0)2
4(1+)
. In such a case ~00110 = 

00100.
The proposition thus follows because 00110  ~00110.
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APPENDIX A.2 DERIVATIONS OF CS (k) AND SW (k)
Derivation of CS (k). Given dnn; dnr; dnu; don; dor, rst consider the case
in which k = 1. Let 1 = 1   dnn; 2 = 1   dnr; 3 = 2   dnu; 2 =
3   don; 5 = 4   dor. Then, by denition of consumer surplus, CS (k = 1)
can be expressed as follows:
CS (k = 1) =
Z 1
1
 (1 + )  (p1 + p2   s) d +
Z 1
2
 (1 + r)  (p1 + pr   s) d
+
Z 2
3
 (1 + )  p1d +
Z 3
4
(  p2) d +
Z 4
5
(r   pr) d
=
(1  21) (1 + )
2
  (p1 + p2   s) (1  1) + (
2
1   22) (1 + r)
2
  (p1 + pr   s) (1   2) + (
2
2   23) (1 + )
2
  p1 (2   3)
+
(23   24)
2
  p2 (3   4) + (
2
4   25) r
2
  pr (4   5)
Next, for the case in which k = 0, let 1 = 1 dnn; 2 = 1 dnu; 3 = 2 don.
Then
CS (k = 0) =
Z 1
1
 (1 + )  (p1 + p2) d +
Z 1
2
 (1 + )  p1d
+
Z 2
3
(  p2) d
=
(1  21) (1 + )
2
  (p1 + p2) (1  1) + (
2
1   22) (1 + )
2
 p1 (1   2) + (
2
2   23)
2
  p2 (2   3)
Derivation of SW (k). Given dnn; dnr; dnu; don; dor, rst consider the case in
which k = 1. Let 1 = 1 dnn; 2 = 1 dnr; 3 = 2 dnu; 2 = 3 don; 5 =
4   dor. Then SW (k = 1) is dened as the sum of manufacturer prot and
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consumer surplus as follows:
SW (k = 1) =
Z 1
1
 (1 + ) d +
Z 1
2
 (1 + r) d +
Z 2
3
 (1 + ) d
+
Z 3
4
d +
Z 4
5
rd
=
(1  21) (1 + )
2
+
(21   22) (1 + r)
2
+
(22   23) (1 + )
2
+
(23   24)
2
+
(24   25) r
2
Similarly, for the case in which k = 0, let 1 = 1   dnn; 2 = 1   dnu; 3 =
2   don. Then
SW (k = 0) =
Z 1
1
 (1 + ) d +
Z 1
2
 (1 + ) d +
Z 2
3
d
=
(1  21) (1 + )
2
+
(21   22) (1 + )
2
+
(22   23)
2
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APPENDIX B
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 3
Proofs are restricted to the parameter space 
 and w1; w2 2 [0; 1] (referred
to as \the assumption"), as described in detail in Section 3.3.1. Prot
maximizing problems are solved using the method of Lagrange multipliers
unless stated otherwise.
Proof of Proposition 3.3.1 and the Optimal Solution. Firstly, given
w1, w2 (if applicable) and k, we solve the retailer's optimization problem
(3.5) subject to constraints (3.3)-(3.4). Table B.1 summarizes the retailer's
optimal strategy.
Secondly, we solve the rm's optimization problem. Let superscript NR
(R) denote the optimal solution when k = 0 (k = 1). If k = 0, then
NRF = max
w1
1 w1
2
 (w1   c1) s.t. 0  d1 = 1 w12  1. One can show that
wNR1 =
1+c1
2
, NRF =
(1 c1)2
8
and NRR =
(1 c1)2
16
. Note that a centralized rm
can always make new products non-remanufacturable so that its prot is at
least NRF . If k = 1, then 
R
F = max
w1;w2
d1 [w1   (c1 + )] + d2 (w2   c2), where
d1 and d2 are given in Table B.1 and w1; w2 2 [0; 1]. Note that it is not
optimal for the rm to undertake remanufacturing when w2 > w1 because
given such (w1; w2), a remanufacturable product design will not increase sale
but only increase the cost. Therefore, we restrict our discussion to case 1
and case 3 in Table B.1 when k = 1.
Case 1: Solve 1F = max
w1;w2
1  w1+w2
2(1 ) [w1   (c1 + )] + w1 w22(1 ) (w2   c2) s.t.
Table B.1: The Retailer's Opt. Strategy in the Centralized or Decentralized
Scenario
Case Condition d1 d2
1 k = 1 & max
n
(2w1 1+)
1+ ; 0
o
 w2  w1 1  w1+w22(1 ) w1 w22(1 )
2 k = 0 or k = 1 & w2 > w1
1 w1
2 0
3 k = 1 & 0  w2  (2w1 1+)1+ 1+ w1 w22(1+3) 1+ w1 w22(1+3)
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max
n
(2w1 1+)
1+
; 0
o
 w2  w1 and 0  w1  1. We obtain the following
solution:
(1-1) if c2

    c1  1  22 + (1+)c22 , then w1 = 1+c1+2 , w2 = c2+2 ,
1 1F =
[(1 c1 ) ( c2)]2
8(1 ) +
( c2)2
8
.
(1-2) if c1  c2   , then w1 = 1+c1+2 , w2 = (1+c1+)2 , 1 2F = (1 c1 )
2
8
<
NRF . This subcase is dominated by strategy NR.
(1-3) if c1  1  22 + (1+)c22 , then w1 = 1   (1+)[(1 c1 )+( c2)]2(1+3) , w2 =
(c1+c2+2+)
1+3
, 1 3F =
(1+ c1 c2 )2
8(1+3)
.
Case 3: Solve 3F = max
w1;w2
1+ w1 w2
2(1+3)
[w1   (c1 + )] + 1+ w1 w22(1+3) (w2   c2)
s.t. 0  w2  (2w1 1+)1+ and 0  w1  1,. We obtain the following solution
under the assumption:
(3) If 1+4 
2+(c1++c2)(1+)
2(1+3)
 w1  minf1; 1+c1+++c22 g, then w2 = 12(1 +
+ c1+ c2+ ) w1, 3F = (1+ c1 c2 )
2
8(1+3)
. Note that (1-3) is a special case of
(3). In addition, (3) indicates that for any c1; c2; ;  under the assumption,
a centralized rm can always make new products remanufacturable so that
its prot is at least 3F by choosing a proper w1 and w2.
Lastly, kC , wC1 and w
C
2 can be determined by comparing rm prots in
dierent cases. One can show that 1 1F  3F for any c1; c2; ;  satisfying
the assumption. Also, 1 1F > 
NR
F , c1 <  
p
(1 )(2+ 2c2) c2+

or c1 >p
(1 )(2+ 2c2)+c2 

. Recall that (1-1) is valid only when c2

    c1 
1  2
2
+ (1+)c2
2
and note that  
p
(1 )(2+ 2c2) c2+

 c2

   and c2

   p
(1 )(2+ 2c2)+c2 

when c2  . Thus, 1 1F  maxf3F ;NRF g whenp
(1 )(2+ 2c2)+c2 

 c1  1  22 + (1+)c22 , which is the condition when
R1 is optimal. Similarly, we can derive the conditions for R2 and NR to
be optimal, respectively, which are illustrated in Table 3.1 and Proposition
3.3.1. In fact, (1-1) and (3) represent strategy R1 and R2, respectively. 
Proof of Corollary 3.3.2. Recall that c1 2 [c2 + ; 1  ] under the
assumption.
If  >
( c2)(
p
1+3 1 )
2
, then NR is not optimal when 2++c2 ( c2 )
p
1+3
3

c2 + , or equivalently c2 +   1 
p
1+3
3
 0. This is attainable only when
 = c2 =  = 0. This case is eliminated because  > 0.
If   ( c2)(
p
1+3 1 )
2
, then NR is not optimal when
p
(1 )(2+ 2c2)+c2 


c2 + . Combining the two constraints, NR cannot be optimal when (i)
c2(1 )
1+
   minf ( c2)(
p
1+3 1 )
2
;
(1+c2)(1 ) (1 )
q
( 3c22+2c2+)
(3+)
g.
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Table B.2: D2's Optimal Strategy in the Decentralized Scenario when k = 1
Case Condition d1 d2 w2
A c2  w1  2(1 )3  + (1+)c2(3 ) 12   (2 )w1 c24(1 ) w1 c24(1 ) w1+c22
B 1+4 
2+(1+)c2
1+5  w1  1 1+ w1 c24(1+3) d1 1+ w12
C 2(1 )+(1+)c2(3 )  w1  12   (1+)( c2)1+5 1 w12(1+) d1 (2w1 1+)1+
(1+c2)(1 ) (1 )
p
(+2c2 3c22)
(3+)
 c2(1 )
1+
requires that  = c2 = 1 or c2 = 0;
or (ii) maxf c2(1 )
1+
;
(1+c2)(1 )+(1 )
p
(+2c2 3c22)
(3+)
g    ( c2)(
p
1+3 1 )
2
.
(1+c2)(1 )+(1 )
p
(+2c2 3c22)
(3+)
 ( c2)(
p
1+3 1 )
2
requires that  = c2 = 0 or
 = c2 = 1 since   c2.
In both case (i) and (ii),  = 0. Also,  > 0 and c2 < 1)c2 =  = 0. 
Proof of Proposition 3.3.3 and the Optimal Solution. To prove part
(i)-(ii), we rst solve the sequential game with backward induction.
Firstly, we solve the retailer's problem. The retailer's problem is the
same in the centralized and decentralized scenarios. Thus, the solution is
illustrated in Table B.1.
Secondly, we solve D2's problem. If k = 0, then D2 makes no production
and NR2 = 0. Given w1, if k = 1, we need to solve D2's problem 

2 =
max
w2
d2 (w2   c2) and then D1's problem. Note that D2 will remanufacture
only if 2  0, which implies that w2  c2 must hold. Similar to the
centralized scenario, it is not optimal for D1 to choose k = 1 if w2  w1.
Thus, we only need to consider two cases given in Table B.1: Case 1 (2 =
max
w2c2
w1 w2
2(1 ) (w2   c2) s.t. max
n
(2w1 1+)
1+
; 0
o
 w2  w1) and Case 3
(2 = max
w2c2
1+ w1 w2
2(1+3)
(w2   c2) s.t. 0  w2  (2w1 1+)1+ ). In a similar
fashion to the proof of Proposition 3.3.1, we obtain D2's strategy, which is
summarized in Table B.2:
Thirdly, we solve D1's problem. If k = 0, then D1 sets wNR1 =
1+c1
2
.
Consequently, dNR1 =
1 c1
4
, NR1 =
(1 c1)2
8
. Note that D1 can always choose
k = 0 and earn at least NR1 . If k = 1, then 
R
1 = max
w1C1
d1 (w1   C1), where
d1 is given in Table B.2 and C1 = c1 + . Note that D1 will not choose a
remanufacturable product design if 1 < 0, which implies that w1  C1 must
hold. Thus, we consider the following three cases:
Case A ( c2

 w1  2(1 )3  + (1+)c2(3 ) ): 1 = maxw1C1
2(1 ) (2 )w1+c2
4(1 ) (w1   C1)
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(A1) if c2(4 3) 2(1 )
(2 )  C1 
c2(4  2)+2(1 )2
(3 )(2 ) , then w

1 =
C1(2 )+2(1 )+c2
2(2 ) ,
A11 =
[2(1 ) C1(2 )+c2]2
16(2 )(1 ) .
(A2) if
c2(4  2)+2(1 )2
(3 )(2 )  C1  2(1 )+c2(1+)(3 ) , then w1 = 2(1 )+c2(1+)(3 ) ,
A21 =
( c2)[2 2 C1(3 )]
2(3 )2 +
( c2)c2(1+)
2(3 )22 .
(A3) if C1  c2(4 3) 2(1 )(2 ) , then w1 = c2 , A31 = ( c2)(c2 C1)22 , d1 =  c22
and d2 = 0. This case is dominated by strategy NR because 
A3
1 < 
NR
1 .
Case B (1+4 
2+(1+)c2
1+5
 w1  1): 1 = max
w1C1
1+ w1 c2
4(1+3)
(w1   C1)
(B1) if 1+2 7
2+(3+7)c2
1+5
 C1  1    + c2, then w1 = 1+C1+ c22 , B11 =
(1 C1+ c2)2
16(1+3)
.
(B2) if C1  1+2 72+(3+7)c21+5 , then w1 = 1+4 
2+c2(1+)
1+5
, B21 =
( c2)
2(1+5)2
[1+
4   2   C1 (1 + 5) + c2 (1 + )].
(B3) if C1  1   + c2, then w1 = 1, B31 = ( c2)(1 C1)4(1+3) .
Case C (2(1 )
3  +
(1+)c2
(3 )  w1  1+4 
2+(1+)c2
1+5
): 1 = max
w1C1
1 w1
2(1+)
(w1   C1)
(C1) if (1 3)+2c2(1+)
(3 )  C1  1+3 2
2+2c2(1+)
1+5
, then w1 =
1+C1
2
, C11 =
(1 C1)2
8(1+)
.
(C2) if 1+3 2
2+2c2(1+)
1+5
 C1  1+4 2+c2(1+)1+5 , then w1 = 1+4 
2+(1+)c2
1+5
,
C21 = 
B2
1 .
(C3) if C1  (1 3)+2c2(1+)(3 ) , then w1 = 2(1 )+(1+)c2(3 ) , C31 = ( c2)2(3 )22f[2 
2   C1(3  )] + c2(1 + )g.
Lastly, we obtain D1's strategy by comparing prots across all cases, which
is illustrated in Table 3.2. The two sets of solution associated with strategy
R2 in Table 3.2 correspond to (B1) and (B3), respectively. Specically,

DRe is the set of (c1; c2; ; ) such that
1+5++c2 (  c2)
p
2(1+3)
1+6
 c1 
1       + c2 or maxf1       + c2; 1+2+c2 
p
( c2)( 2 6 c2)
1+3
g  c1 
1+2+c2+
p
( c2)( 2 6 c2)
1+3
and    c2
2(1+3)
.
To prove Part (i) and (ii), recall that for any given (c1; c2; ; ), a centralized
rm always has the option of choosing k = 0 so that its prot is at least
NRF =
(1 c1)2
8
, and has the option of choosing k = 1 so that its prot is at
least 3F =
(1 c1 + c2)2
8(1+3)
(see the proof of Proposition 3.3.1). Thus, CF 
max
n
(1 c1)2
8
;3F
o
, where CF = 
NR
F holds if and only if k
C = 0, and CF >
max
n
(1 c1)2
8
;3F
o
if and only if strategy R1 is optimal. In a decentralized
rm, D1 always has the option of choosing k = 0 (strategy NR) and therefore
D1 =
(1 c1)2
8
and D2 = 0. Thus, for the same (c1; c2; ; ),
(1 c1)2
8
 D1 +
118
D2  max
n
(1 c1)2
8
; 3(1 c1 + c2)
2
32(1+3)
; ( c2)[2(1 c1 )+ c2]
8(1+3)
o
(see the above proof
of Proposition 3.3.3), where D1 + 
D
2 =
(1 c1)2
8
, kD = 0. One can show
that max
n
3(1 c1 + c2)2
32(1+3)
; ( c2)[2(1 c1 )+ c2]
8(1+3)
o
< (1 c1 + c2)
2
8(1+3)
because 1 
c1    > 0 and    c2  0. Thus, D1 + D2  CF for 8 (c1; c2; ; ) 2 
.
Specically, D1 +
D
2 = 
C
F , D1 +D2 = (1 c1)
2
8
= CF , kC = kD = 0.
Next, we prove 
DRe  
CRe by showing that (c1; c2; ; ) 2 
DRe ) (c1; c2; ; ) 2

CRe. For 8 (c1; c2; ; ) 2 
DRe, either D1 + D2 = 3(1 c1 + c2)
2
32(1+3)
> (1 c1)
2
8
or
D1 + 
D
2 =
( c2)[2(1 c1 )+ c2]
8(1+3)
> (1 c1)
2
8
must hold. For the same choice of
(c1; c2; ; ), the centralized rm's prot satises 
C
F  (1 c1 + c2)
2
8(1+3)
if k = 1
and CF =
(1 c1)2
8
if k = 0. One can show that given the above (c1; c2; ; ) 2

CRe,
(1 c1 + c2)2
8(1+3)
> max
n
3(1 c1 + c2)2
32(1+3)
; ( c2)[2(1 c1 )+ c2]
8(1+3)
o
> (1 c1)
2
8
.
Therefore, kC = 1, or equivalently, (c1; c2; ; ) 2 
CRe.
Part (iii). 
DRe  
CRe ) if (c1; c2; ; ) is such that kD = 1, then kC = 1 for
the same (c1; c2; ; ). Also, according to Table 3.2, d
D
1 = d
D
2 when k
D = 1.
Therefore, to show dD1 = d
D
2 < d
C
1 , we only need to compare
 
dD1 1; d
D
1 2

=
1 c1 + c2
8(1+3)
;  c2
4(1+3)

with
 
dC1 1; d
C
1 2

=

1 c1  +c2
4(1 ) ;
1 c1 + c2
4(1+3)

. One
can show that max

dD1 1; d
D
1 2
	
< dC1 2 because 1  c1    > 0 and    c2 
0. Also, max

dD1 1; d
D
1 2
	
< dC1 1 when c1 <
1  2
2
+ (1+)c2
2
(a necessary
condition for dC1 = d
C
1 1). Hence, d
D
1 < d
C
1 .
Similarly, to show dD1 +d
D
2 < d
C
1 +d
C
2 , we only need to compare d
D
1 1+d
D
2 1 =
1 c1 + c2
8(1+3)
+ 1 c1 + c2
8(1+3)
= 1 c1 + c2
4(1+3)
and dD1 2+ d
D
2 2 =
 c2
4(1+3)
+  c2
4(1+3)
=
 c2
2(1+3)
with dC1 1 + d
C
2 1 =
1 c1  +c2
4(1 ) +
(c1+) c2
4(1 ) =
 c2
4
and dC1 2 + d
C
2 2 =
1 c1 + c2
4(1+3)
+ 1 c1 + c2
4(1+3)
= 1 c1 + c2
2(1+3)
. One can show that maxfdD1 1 +
dD2 1; d
D
1 2+ d
D
2 2g < dC1 2+ dC2 2 because 1  c1   > 0 and   c2  0. Also,
maxfdD1 1+dD2 1; dD1 2+dD2 2g < dC1 1+dC2 1 when 1+2 7
2+(3+7)c2
1+5
   c1 (a
necessary condition for dD1 = d
D
1 1 and d
D
2 = d
D
2 1). Hence, d
D
1 +d
D
2 < d
C
1 +d
C
2 .
The remaining results are directly obtained from Table 3.2. 
Proof of Proposition 3.4.2: Firstly, we solve the retailer's problem. Table
B.1 illustrated the optimal solution.
Secondly, we solve D2's problem. If k = 0, then D2 makes no production
and NR2 = 0. If k = 1 and D2 chooses j = 0, then the problem is essentially
the same as in the decentralized scenario. Thus, in the following analysis,
we only need to solve D2's problem 2 = max
w2
d2 (w2   c2)   d1   f when
k = 1 and j = 1, where d1 and d2 are given in Table B.1. Note that f is
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xed. Thus we rst solve 2 = max
w2
d2 (w2   c2)  d1 and assume that f is
such that 2  D2 .
Case 1 (max
n
(2w1 1+)
1+
; 0
o
 w2  w1): 2 = max
w2
w1 w2
2(1 ) (w2   c2)  
1  w1+w2
2(1 ) 
(1-1) if max

c2

  ;    c2

	  w1  2(1 ) (1+)3  + (1+)c2(3 ) , then w2 =
(w1 )+c2
2
, 1 12 =
[w1+(2 ) c2]2
8(1 )   (+ c2)2 and d1 11 = 2(1 ) (2 )w1 +c24(1 )
and d1 12 =
(w1+) c2
4(1 ) .
(1-2) if max
n
2(1 ) (1+)
3  +
c2(1+)
(3 ) ;
1 
2
o
 w1  1, then
1 22 =
(1 w1)[2w1 (1 ) (1+) c2(1+)]
2(1+)2
, w2 =
(2w1 1+)
1+
and d1 21 = d
1 2
2 =
1 w1
2(1+)
.
(1-3) if 0  w1  min

1 
2
;    c2

	
, then w2 = 0, 
1 3
2 =
(w1+ 1) c2w1
2(1 )
and d1 31 =
1 w1 
2(1 ) and
d1 32 =
w1
2(1 ) .
(1-4) if 0  w1  min

c2

  ; 1	, then w2 = w1 and d2 = 0. This subcase
is dominated by strategy NR because the participation constraints cannot be
satised.
Case 3 (0  w2  (2w1 1+)1+ ): 2 = maxw2
1+ w1 w2
2(1+3)
(w2   c2   )
(3-1) if max
n
0; 1+4 
2+(1+)(+c2)
1+5
o
 w1  min f1; 1 +  +  + c2g, then
w2 =
1++ w1+c2
2
, 3 12 =
(1+  w1 c2)2
8(1+3)
and d3 11 = d
3 1
2 =
1+  w1 c2
4(1+3)
.
(3-2) if 1 
2
 w1  min
n
1; 1+4 
2+(1+)(+c2)
1+5
o
, then w2 =
(2w1 1+)
1+
,
3 22 =
(1 w1)[2w1 (1 ) (1+) c2(1+)]
2(1+)2
and d3 21 = d
3 2
2 =
1 w1
2(1+)
.
(3-3) if max

1 
2
; 1 +  +  + c2
	  w1  1, then w2 = 0, 3 32 = w1  12(1+3) (+
c2) and d
3 3
1 =
d3 32 =
1+ w1
2(1+3)
.
Thirdly, we solve for w1 and  . Note that the optimal demand of new
(remanufactured) products under the incentive scheme equals the optimal
demand of new (remanufactured) products in the centralized scenario if
the incentive scheme can result in the rst-best solution. Based on this
result, we solve w1 and  jointly by equating d
i
1 = d
C
1 and
di2 = d
C
2 , where
i =1-1, 1-2, 1-3, 3-1, 3-2 or 3-3 and
 
dC1 ; d
C
2

is from Table 3.1. For ex-
ample, we compare (3-2) with strategy R2 in the centralized scenario: By
solving 1 w1
2(1+)
= 1 (c1+)+( c2)
4(1+3)
, we have w1 =
1+4 2+(1+)(c1++c2)
2(1+3)
, w2 =
(c1++2+c2)
1+3
and 1 +

2 =
(1+ c1 c2 )2
8(1+3)
. To satisfy the condition of (3-2),
that is, 1 
2
 w1  minf1; 1+4 
2+(1+)(+c2)
1+5
g, we must have  2   c2 
c1 +   minf1 +    c2; 1+4 2+2(1+3)+c2(1+)1+5 g, which can be further
simplied to c1 +   1+4 2+2(1+3)+c2(1+)1+5 because  2   c2 < 0 and
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1 +    c2 > 1. In a similar fashion, we obtain the following cases:
(A1) If k = 1 and c2

 c1 +   1 2 + (1+)c22 , then wA11 = 1+(c1+)2 ,
wA12 =
+c2
2
, A1 = c1+ 1
2
, A11 = f , 
A1
2 =
(1 c1  +c2)2
8(1 ) +
( c2)2
8
 f , A11 +
A12 =
(1 c1  +c2)2
8(1 ) +
( c2)2
8
, dA11 =
1 (c1+) ( c2)
4(1 ) , and d
A1
2 =
(c1+) c2
4(1 ) .
(A2) If k = 1 and 1 4 
2 2(1+3)
3  +
c2(2+)(1+)
(3 )  c1 + , then wA21 =
1+4 2+(1+)(c1++c2)
2(1+3)
, wA22 =
1+4 2+(1+)(c1++c2)
2(1+3)
,
A21 =
(1 c1 + c2)[1+4 2 (1+5)(c1+)+2(1+3)+c2(1+)]
8(1+3)2
+ f ,
A22 =
(1 c1 + c2)[(c1++2) c2(1+2) (1+3)]
4(1+3)2
 f , A21 +A22 = (1+ c1 c2 )
2
8(1+3)
,
and dA21 = d
A2
2 =
1 (c1+)+( c2)
4(1+3)
.
(A3) If k = 1 and c1 +   1+4 2+2(1+3)+c2(1+)1+5 , then wA31 = wA21 ,
wA32 = w
A2
2 , 
A3
1 = 
A2
1 , 
A3
2 = 
A2
2 , 
A3
1 + 
A3
2 =
(1+ c1 c2 )2
8(1+3)
, and
dA31 = d
A3
2 =
1 (c1+)+( c2)
4(1+3)
.
(A4) If k = 1 and maxf; 1+4 2+2(1+3)+c2(1+)
1+5
g  c1 +   minf1 +
; 1 +  + 2 + c2g, then wA41 = c1 +     , wA42 = 1 c1 ++c22 +  , A41 = f ,
A42 =
(1+ c1 c2 )2
8(1+3)
  f , A41 + A42 = (1+ c1 c2 )
2
8(1+3)
, and dA41 = d
A4
2 =
1 (c1+)+( c2)
4(1+3)
.
(A5) If k = 1 and 1 +  + 2 + c2  c1 +   1      c2, then wA51 =
1+(c1+)++c2
2
, wA42 = 0, 
A5
1 =
(1 c1 + c2)(1 c1 ++2+c2)
8(1+3)
+ f , A52 =
 (1 c1 + c2)(+c2)
4(1+3)
  f , A51 + A52 = (1+ c1 c2 )
2
8(1+3)
, and dA51 = d
A5
2 =
1 (c1+)+( c2)
4(1+3)
.
(A6) If k = 0, then wA61 =
1+c1
2
, A61 =
(1 c1)2
8
, and dA61 =
1 c1
4
.
Note that the above cases are not exclusive. However, similar to the prot
comparison procedure mentioned in the proof of Proposition 3.3.1, we can
derive the optimal strategy and the corresponding conditions (illustrated in
Table 3.1) except the value of w1 and w

2 when strategy R2 is optimal. Thus,
we have proven part (iii) of Proposition 3.4.2.
Proposition 3.4.2(i): if (c1; c2; ; ) 2 
CR1, then the optimal  is directly
derived from (A1) in the proof of Proposition 3.4.2. Recall that the participa-
tion constraint for D1 is T1 > 
D
1 , where 
D
1  (1 c1)
2
8
. Thus, fT > (1 c1)
2
8
>
0. Given that c1 
p
(1 )(2+ 2c2)+c2 

and
p
(1 )(2+ 2c2)+c2 

 c2

  
when   c2, we have c1  c2   , or equivalently, c2  ( + c1). One can
show that dT1  T + fT  [2(1 c1 )+]8  0. Thus, fT > 0 because T < 0
and dT1 > 0.
Proposition 3.4.2(ii): if (c1; c2; ; ) 2 
CR2 and  = 0, then (A2)-(A4)
121
Table B.3: The Retailer's Optimal Strategy (w1; w2  0)
Case Cond. d1 d2
1 k = 1 & max
n
(2w1 1+)
1+ ; 0
o
 w2  w1 1  w1+w22(1 ) w1 w22(1 )
2 k = 1 & w2  w1 & w1  1 or k = 0 & w1  1 1 w12 0
3 k = 1 & 0  w2  min
n
(2w1 1+)
1+ ; 1 +    w1
o
1+ w1 w2
2(1+3)
1+ w1 w2
2(1+3)
Case R
1
w22 2w1w2+(1+w21 2w1(1 ) )
4(1 )
2 (1 w1)
2
4
3 (1 w1 w2+)
2
4(1+3)
constitute the optimal solutions when R2 is optimal. That is, one of the
three cases is associated with the optimal solution and the corresponding
(; f) enables the rm to achieve the rst-best prot. Letting  = 0 and
given that 1 +  + c2  1 and c1 +  2 [0; 1], the condition for (A2)-(A4)
can be simplied to 1 4 
2
3  +
c2(2+)(1+)
(3 )  c1 + , c1 +   1+4 
2+c2(1+)
1+5
and 1+4 
2+c2(1+)
1+5
 c1 + , respectively. Next, we show that fT > 0 for
all three cases. Note that the participation constraint for D1 is T1 > 
D
1 ,
where D1  (1 c1)
2
8
. If (A4) is associated with the optimal solution, then
T1 = f
T > (1 c1)
2
8
> 0 holds when  = 0. Similarly, if (A2) or (A3)
is associated with the optimal solution, then T1 >
(1 c1)2
8
should also hold.
One can show that fT > T1   (1 c1)
2
8
= 1
8(1+3)2
f(1+5)(1 c1)2 (1+5)(1 
c1 )2+(1 c1)2(1+5)+[2(1 c1) +c2]2+4( c2)+( c2)2g > 0
when  = 0. 
Proof of Proposition 3.4.1: This can be directly derived from Proposition
3.4.2(i): In order to achieve the rst-best rm prot CF , 
V = c1+ 1
2
must
hold. Otherwise, one of the following three cases would happen: 1) kV = 0
and hence V1 =
(1 c1)2
8
;V2 = 0; 2) k
V = 1 but D2 opts out (j = 0) and
hence Vi = 
D
i (i = 1; 2); 3) k
V = 1 and j = 1 but V1 + 
V
2 < 
C
F
according to Proposition 3.4.2(i). In each case, V1 + 
V
2 < 
C
F will always
hold. However, if V = c1+ 1
2
, then V1 = 0, which violates the participation
constraint according to Proposition 3.4.2(i). 
Model Extension 1: No upper limit on wholesale prices
1.1. The Centralized Scenario: Similar to the proof of Proposition 3.3.1,
we obtain the retailer's optimal strategy (see Table B.3) and the rm's opti-
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Table B.4: D2's Optimal Strategy in the Decentralized Scenario
(w1; w2  0)
Case Cond. d1 d2 w2
1 c2  w1  2(1 )3  + (1+)c2(3 ) 12   (2 )w1 c24(1 ) w1 c24(1 ) w1+c22
2 2(1 )+(1+)c2(3 )  w1  1  (1+)( c2)1+5 1 w12(1+) d1 (2w1 1+)1+
3 1+4 
2+(1+)c2
1+5  w1  1 +    c2 1+ w1 c24(1+3) d1 1+ w12
Table B.5: Optimal Strategy and Solutions in the Decentralized Scenario
(w1; w2  0)
Strategy Cond. wD1 w
D
2 d
D
1 d
D
2
R2 (*) 1+c1++ c22
1 c1 ++c2
4
1 c1 + c2
8(1+3) d
D
1
NR otherwise 1+c12   1 c14  
Strategy D1 
D
2 
D
R
R2 (1 c1 + c2)
2
16(1+3)
D1
2
D1
4
NR (1 c1)
2
8   
D
1
2
(*) c1  1+5++c2 (  c2)
p
2(1+3)
1+6
mal strategy. One can show that Proposition 3.3.1 and the optimal solution
(see Table 3.1) still hold, except that when R2 is optimal, w1 must satisfy
1+4 2+(c1++c2)(1+)
2(1+3)
 w1  1++c1++c22 , which is a relaxed condition, as
compared to the constraint on w1 in the benchmark model.
1.2. The Decentralized Scenario: Again, we obtain the equilibrium so-
lutions by solving the problem backward. Similar to the proof of Proposition
3.3.3, one can derive the optimal strategy of the retailer (see Table B.3), of
D2 (see Table B.4) and of D1 (see Table B.5).
Based on Table B.5, one can show the part (i)-(iii) of Proposition 3.3.3
still hold when there are no upper limits on w1 and w2.
1.3. The Two-part Coordination Scheme: Similar to the proof of
Proposition 3.4.2, one can show that the optimal strategies and the corre-
sponding conditions are the same with and without the upper limits on w1
and w2 except the value of w

1 and w

2 when strategy R2 is optimal.
Model Extension 2: No Retailer
2.1. The Centralized Scenario without the Retailer: If k = 0, then
p1 = 1   d1. The rm's problem is NRF = max
d1
d1  (1  d1   c1) s.t. 0 
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Table B.6: Optimal Solutions in the Centralized Scenario (No Retailer,
w1; w2 2 [0; 1])
Strategy Cond. kC pC1 p
C
2
R1 (*) 1 1+c1+2
c2+
2
R2 (**) 1 1+4 
2+(c1++c2)(1+)
2(1+3)
(c1+c2+2+)
1+3
NR o.w. 0 1+c12  
Strategy dC1 d
C
2 
C
F
R1
1 c1  +c2
2(1 )
(c1+) c2
2(1 )
(1 c1  +c2)2
4(1 ) +
( c2)2
4
R2
1+ c1  c2
2(1+3) d
C
1
(1 c1 + c2)2
4(1+3)
NR
1 c1
2   (1 c1)
2
4
(*) and (**) correspond to the condition when R1 and R2 are optimal based on
Proposition 3.3.1, respectively.
d1  1. Thus, we have dNR1 = 1 c12 , pNR1 = 1+c12 and NRF = (1 c1)
2
4
. If
k = 1, then p1 = 1  d1  d2 and p2 = (1  d1  d2). The rm's problem is
F = maxd1;d2 d1(1 d1 d2 c1 )+d2[(1 d1 d2) c2] s.t. d1 d2  0,
1   d1   d2  0 and d1; d2  0. Similar to the proof of Proposition 3.3.1,
we derive the condition when each strategy is optimal and summarize the
results in Table B.6.
2.2. The Decentralized Scenario without the Retailer: In this sce-
nario, D1 decides kD and p1 2 [0; 1], and D2 decides p2 2 [0; 1]. Note
that here we cannot formulate retail prices using (3.1)-(3.2) of the paper
because neither division can exclusively determines the sales of new or re-
manufactured products when kD = 1. By simultaneously solving p1 =
1   d1   d2 and p2 = (1   d1   d2), we obtain d1 = 1  p1+p21  and
d2 =
p1 p2
(1 ) . d1  d2 ) p2  (2p1 1+)1+ . Also note that if p2 < (2p1 1+)1+ ,
then D2 can always increase p2 to
(2p1 1+)
1+
so that D2's prot and sales
of remanufactured products both increase. Hence, it is not optimal for D2
to price remanufactured products at p2 <
(2p1 1+)
1+
. Meanwhile, d2  0 )
p2  p1. Thus, in the decentralized scenario without vertical integration,
D1's prot is NR1 = max
p1
(1   p1)  (p1   c1) s.t. c1  p1  1 when
k = 0 and RE1 = max
p1
1  p1+p2
1  (p1   c1   ) s.t. c1 +   p1  1 when
k = 1. Thus, D1 optimal prot is D1 = maxfNR1 ;RE1 g; the optimal
design decision kD = 0, NR1  RE1 . Given k = 1 and p1, D2's problem is
D2 = max
p2
p1 p2
(1 ) (p2   c2) s.t. maxfc2; (2p1 1+)1+ g  p2  p1. D2's optimal
strategy is illustrated in Table B.7:
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Table B.7: D2's Optimal Strategy in the Decentralized Scenario (No
Retailer, w1, w22 [0; 1])
Case Cond. d1 d2 p2
1 k = 1 & c2  p1  2(1 )3  + (1+)c2(3 ) 2(1 ) (2 )p1+c22(1 ) p1 c22(1 ) p1+c22
2 k = 1 & 2(1 )3  +
(1+)c2
(3 )  p1  1 1 p11+ 1 p11+ (2p1 1+)1+
3 k = 1 & p1  c2 or k = 0 1 c12    
Next, we solve D1's problem. If k = 0, then d1 = 1  p1 and D1's problem
is NR1 = max
p1
(1 p1)  (p1   c1) s.t. c1  p1  1. Thus, we have dNR1 = 1 c12 ,
pNR1 =
1+c1
2
and NR1 =
(1 c1)2
4
. If k = 1, then D1's problem is 1 =
max
p1
d1 (p1   c1   ) s.t. c1 +   p1  1, where d1 and the constraints are
given in Table B.7. One can show that it is not optimal for D1 to set p1  c2
when k = 1. Hence, we only need to consider case 1 and 2 in Table B.7.
Case 1 ( c2

 p1  2(1 )3  + (1+)c2(3 ) ). D1's problem is 1 = maxw1
2(1 ) (2 )p1+c2
2(1 )
(p1   c1   ) s.t. maxf c2 ; c1 + g  p1  2(1 )3  + (1+)c2(3 ) .
(1-1) if c2(4 3) 2(1 )
(2 )  c1+  
c2(4  2)+2(1 )2
(3 )(2 ) , then p

1 =
1
2(2 ) [(c1+
)(2 )+2 (1  )+c2], 1 11 = [2(1 ) (c1+)(2 )+c2]
2
8(2 )(1 ) , d1 =
2(1 ) (c1+)(2 )+c2
4(1 )
, d2 =
[2(1 )+(c1+)(2 )] c2(4 3)
4(2 )(1 ) . However, 
1 1
1  NR1 = (1 c1)
2
4
when
c2(4 3) 2(1 )
(2 )  c1 + . To see this, note that 1 11  NR1 is equivalent
to c1 
p
2(1 )(2 )[(1 )+2 c2]+c2(2 ) (2 )2
(2 ) . Also, 
1 1
1 is valid when
c2(4 3) 2(1 )
(2 )  c1 +  or equivalently, c1  c2(4 3) 2(1 )(2 )   . How-
ever, @
@
[ c2(4 3) 2(1 )
(2 )      1(2 ) (
p
2 (1  ) (2  )[(1   ) + 2   c2] +
c2(2   )   (2   )2)] =
p
2(1 )(2 )+2(1 )

> 0 while c2(4 3) 2(1 )
(2 )     
(
p
2(1 )(2 )[(1 )+2 c2]+c2(2 ) (2 )2
(2 ) )j=0 =
[
p
2(1 )(2 ) 2(1 )]( c2)
(2 )  0.
Therefore, 1 11  NR1 is true when c2(4 3) 2(1 )(2 )  c1 + , which means
this subcase is dominated by strategy NR.
(1-2) if
c2(4  2)+2(1 )2
(3 )(2 )  c1+  2(1 )+c2(1+)(3 ) , then p1 = 2(1 )+c2(1+)(3 ) ,
1 21 =
( c2)[2 2 (c1+)(3 )]
(3 )2 +
( c2)c2(1+)
(3 )22 and d1 = d2 =
 c2
(3 ) . Note
that (i) 1 21  1 11 when
c2(4  2)+2(1 )2
(3 )(2 )  c1 +   2(1 )+c2(1+)(3 ) ;
(ii) 1 11  NR1 when c2(4 3) 2(1 )(2 )  c1 +  and (iii) c2(4 3) 2(1 )(2 ) 
c2(4  2)+2(1 )2
(3 )(2 ) is always true since c2  . Therefore, this subcase is
dominated by strategy NR.
(1-3) if c1 +   c2(4 3) 2(1 )(2 ) , then p1 = c2 , 1 31 = ( c2)[c2 (c1+)]2 ,
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d1 =
 c2

and d2 = 0. This case is dominated by strategy NR since d2 = 0.
Case 2 (2(1 )
3  +
(1+)c2
(3 )  p1  1). D1's problem is 1 = maxp1
1 p1
1+
(p1   C1)
s.t. maxfC1; 2(1 )3  + (1+)c2(3 ) g  p1  1, where C1 = c1 + .
(2-1) p1 =
1+C1
2
; 2 11 =
(1 C1)2
4(1+)
; d1 = d2 =
1 C1
2(1+)
when C1  (1 3)+2c2(1+)(3 ) .
However, this subcase is dominated by NR because 2 11 =
(1 C1)2
4(1+)
 (1 c1)2
4
=
NR1 .
(2-2) p1 =
2(1 )+(1+)c2
(3 ) ; 

1 =
2c2(1+) 32+ C1(3 )
(3 )(+1) ; 
2 2
1 =
( c2)
(3 )22f[2 
2   C1(3   )] + c2(1 + )g; d1 = d2 =  c2(3 ) when C1  (1 3)+2c2(1+)(3 ) .
However, this subcase is dominated by NR because (1 c1)
2
4(1+)
 (1 C1)2
4(1+)

( c2)f[2(1 ) C1(3 )]+c2(1+)g
(3 )22 .
In all, it is not optimal for D1 to choose a remanufacturable design.
2.3. Two-Part Coordination Scheme without the Retailer: Again,
we use backward induction, starting with D2's prot maximization problem.
If k = 0, then D2's prot is NR2 = 0. If k = 1, then D2's problem is
2 = max
p2
p1 p2
(1 ) (p2   c2)   1  p1+p21      f s.t. maxf0; (2p1 1+)1+ g  p2 
p1. Given that f is xed, we can rst solve the following problem: ^2 =
max
p2
p1 p2
(1 ) (p2   c2)  1  p1+p21    s.t. maxf0; (2p1 1+)1+ g  p2  p1.
Case 1: p2 =
(p1 )+c2
2
, 12 =
[p1+(2 ) c2]2
4(1 )   (+ c2) , d1 = 1  (2 )p1+ c22(1 ) ,
d2 =
(p1+) c2
2(1 ) when max

c2

  ;    c2

	  p1  2(1 ) (1+)3  + (1+)c2(3 ) .
Case 2: p2 =
(2p1 1+)
1+
, 2 =
[(2+)+(3 )p1+ 2] c2(1+)
(1 2) , 
3
2 =
(1 p1)
(1+)2
[2p1 
(1   )   (1 + )   c2(1 + )], d1 = d2 = 1 p11+ when max
n
2(1 ) (1+)
3  +
c2(1+)
(3 ) ;
1 
2
	  p1  1.
Case 3: If p2 = 0 and p1  1   , then 52 = (p1+ 1) c2p11  , d1 = 1 p1 1 
and d2 =
p1
1  . This case dominates when 0  p1  min

1 
2
;    c2

	
.
To achieve the rst-best solutions, we need to solve for p1 and  by
comparing (d1; d2) in each of the above cases with those in Table B.6. Thus,
we have
(A1) If k = 1 and c2

 c1 +   1 2 + (1+)c22 , then pA11 = 1+(c1+)2 ,
pA12 =
+c2
2
, A1 = c1+ 1
2
, A11 = f , 
A1
2 =
(1 c1  +c2)2
4(1 ) +
( c2)2
4
  f , A11 +
A12 =
(1 c1  +c2)2
4(1 ) +
( c2)2
4
, dA11 =
1 (c1+) ( c2)
2(1 ) , and d
A1
2 =
(c1+) c2
2(1 ) .
(A2) If k = 1 and 1 4 
2 2(1+3)
3  +
c2(2+)(1+)
(3 )  c1 + , then pA21 =
1+4 2+(1+)(c1++c2)
2(1+3)
, pA22 =
(c1++2+c2)
1+3
, A21 =
(1 c1 + c2)
4(1+3)2
[1 + 4   2  
(1 + 5)(c1 + ) + 2(1 + 3) + c2(1 + )] + f , 
A2
2 =
(1 c1 + c2)
4(1+3)2
[(c1 +
 + 2)   c2(1 + 2)   (1 + 3)]   f , A21 + A22 = (1+ c1 c2 )
2
4(1+3)
, and
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dA21 = d
A2
2 =
1 (c1+)+( c2)
2(1+3)
.
(A3) If k = 0, then wA31 =
1+c1
2
, A31 =
(1 c1)2
4
, and dA31 =
1 c1
2
.
Similar to the proof of Proposition 3.4.2, we can derive the optimal strate-
gies and the corresponding conditions, which is represented by Table B.6
except dierent p1 and p

2 for strategy R2 because the solution in that case
is not unique.
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APPENDIX C
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 4
Proof of Lemma 4.4.1. In the absence of the patent term extension and
take-back regulation, neither company can benet from the green pharmacy
investment. Thus, the prot of the innovative company is N1 = 
N
1 (O;O) =
max
p1
1
1 r  1  p1+p21  p1, where (; ) represents the strategy pair. By taking the
rst derivative of RHS with respect to p1 and setting it to 0, we obtain p1 =
1 +p2
2
. Similarly, the prot of the generic company is N2 = 
N
2 (O;O) =
max
p2
1
1 r  p1 p2(1 )  p2 and p2 = p12 . By solving p1 = 1 +p22 and p2 = p12 , one
can show that pN1 =
2(1 )
4  , p
N
2 =
(1 )
4  , 
N
1 =
4(1 )
(1 r)(4 )2 , 
N
2 =
(1 )2
(1 r)(4 )2 ,
dN1 =
1  p1+p2
1  =
2
4  , and d
N
2 =
p1 p2
(1 ) =

4  . Note our assumptions ensure
that there is no boundary solution. 
Proof of Lemma 4.4.2. In the absence of the patent term extension,
the generic company cannot benet from the green pharmacy investment
because the patent extension does not apply to the rm. If the innovative
company decides not to go green, then the solution is essentially the same
as under policy N . Therefore, E1 (O;O) = 
N
1 (O;O). If the innovative
company obtains green pharmacy and hence the patent term extension, then
the prot of the innovative company is E1 (G0; F ) = max
pm;p1
1 rn
1 r  (1  pm) pm+
rn
1 r  1  p1+p21  p1 A while the prot of the generic company is E2 (G0; F ) =
max
p2
rn
1 r  p1 p2(1 )  p2. Similar to the proof of Lemma 4.4.1, we obtain pEm = 12 ,
dEm = 1  pEm = 12 , pEi , dEi and Ei (i = 1; 2) as stated in Lemma 4.4.2(i). In
addition, one can show that E1 (G0; F )  E1 (O;O) if and only if A  AE.
The remaining statement follows. 
Proof of Proposition 4.4.3. Based on Lemma 4.4.1 and Equation 4.1, the
total impact under policy N is TIN = e 1
1 r (1  24    14  ) + 11 r ( 24  + 14  )
when A  AE. Similarly, the total impact under policy E is TIE = e1 rn
1 r (1 
1
2
) + e r
n
1 r (1   24    14  ) + 1 r
n
1 r 
1
2
+ r
n
1 r(
2
4  +
1
4  ). It is optimal for the
regulator to implement the patent term extension if and only if TIE < TIN ,
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or equivalently, e < eE. 
Proof of Proposition 4.4.4. 1) According to Lemma 4.4.2, (G0; F ) is the
equilibrium when A  AE or equivalently, rn  1  4A(1 r)(4 )2
(8+)
. It is not hard
to see that (i) if 1   4A(1 r)(4 )2
(8+)
 0, or equivalently A  (8+)
4(1 r)(4 )2 , then
(O;O) is the equilibrium and therefore nE = 0; and (ii) if 1  4A(1 r)(4 )2
(8+)
> 0,
or equivalently A < (8+)
4(1 r)(4 )2 , then r
n  1   4A(1 r)(4 )2
(8+)
if and only if
n  logr
h
1  4A(1 r)(4 )2
(8+)
i
.
2) Based on Proposition 4.4.3, given A  AE, it is optimal to implement
the patent term extension when e < eE, or equivalently, rn  1   6(1 )
(2+)(e )
when e <  and rn  1   6(1 )
(2+)(e ) when e > . Note if e < , then r
n 
1  6(1 )
(2+)(e ) holds for any n because 1  6(1 )(2+)(e )  1 and r 2 (0; 1); if e > ,
then rn  1   6(1 )
(2+)(e ) holds if and only if
6(1 )
(2+)(e ) > 1 or
6(1 )
(2+)(e ) < 1
and n < logr
h
1  6(1 )
(2+)(e )
i
, which holds if and only if  < e <  + 6(1 )
2+
or e >  + 6(1 )
2+
and n < logr
h
1  6(1 )
(2+)(e )
i
.
Combining 1) with 2), we have (G0; F ) is the equilibrium when (i) n 
logr
h
1  4A(1 r)(4 )2
(8+)
i
, A < (8+)
4(1 r)(4 )2 , and e <  +
6(1 )
2+
, or (ii)
logr
h
1  4A(1 r)(4 )2
(8+)
i
 n < logr
h
1  6(1 )
(2+)(e )
i
, A < (8+)
4(1 r)(4 )2 and e >
+ 6(1 )
2+
. One can show that if A < (8+)
4(1 r)(4 )2 and e > +
6(1 )
2+
, then 0 <
logr
h
1  4A(1 r)(4 )2
(8+)
i
< logr
h
1  6(1 )
(2+)(e )
i
when e < + 3(1 )(+8)
2A(1 r)(2+)(4 )2 .
Also, + 6(1 )
2+
 + 3(1 )(+8)
2A(1 r)(+2)(4 )2 when A <
(8+)
4(1 r)(4 )2 .
Moreover, the total impact TIE decreases in n when e <  and increases
in n when e > . Thus, nE = 1 when e <  and A < (8+)
4(1 r)(4 )2 ; n
E =
logr
h
1  4A(1 r)(4 )2
(8+)
i
when  < e <  + 3(1 )(+8)
2A(1 r)(2+)(4 )2 ; and n
E = 0
otherwise. 
Proof of Lemma 4.5.1. If the innovative company does not go green
and hence does not obtain patent term extension under policy ET , then the
problem is essentially the same as under policy T . In particular, ET1 (O;O) =
(1 )(2 ct)2
(1 r)(4 )2 . If the innovative company chooses green pharmacy, then we
simultaneously solve ET1 (G0; F ) = max
pm;p1
1 rn
1 r  (1  pm)  (pm   ct) + r
n
1 r 
1  p1+p2
1   (p1   ct) A and ET2 (G0; F ) = maxp2
rn
1 r  p1 p2(1 )  (p2   ct). Similar
to the proof of Lemma 4.4.1, one can show that ET1 (G0; F ) =
(2 ct)2(1 )rn
(4 )2(1 r) +
(1 ct)2(1 rn)
4(1 r)   A. Due to the fact that ET1 (G0; F )  ET1 (O;O) if and only
if A  1 rn
1 r
h
(1 ct)2
4
  (2 ct)2(1 )
(4 )2
i
, the remaining part of the statements then
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follows. 
Proof of Proposition 4.5.2. Similar to the proof of Proposition 4.4.4, one
can show Proposition 4.5.2. 
Proof of Corollary 4.5.3. According to according to Proposition 4.4.4(a),
nE = logr
h
1  4A(4 )2(1 r)
(8+)
i
when   e <  + 3(1 )(8+)
2A(1 r)(2+)(4 )2 and A <
(8+)
4(1 r)(4 )2 . In addition, n
ET = logr[1   4A(4 )2(1 r)(8+) 2ct(8+2)+c2t (2 4+12) ] when
  e < max
n
 + 2(1 )(2+)
3
;  + euET
o
andA <
(8+) 2ct(8+2)+c2t(12 4+2)
4(4 )2(1 r) ,
according to Proposition 4.5.2(a). Note
(8+) 2ct(8+2)+c2t(12 4+2)
4(4 )2(1 r)  (8+)4(1 r)(4 )2
when  > 2ct. One can show that
4A(4 )2(1 r)
(8+)
 4A(4 )2(1 r)
(8+) 2ct(8+2)+c2t (2 4+12)
when  > 2ct. Thus, the statement follows. 
Proof of Lemma 4.6.1. In the presence of the modied take-back reg-
ulation (policy T ), the four possible strategy pairs are (G1; G1), (G1; O),
(O;O) and (O;G1). Similar to the proof of the benchmark model and
4.4.2, we rst obtain the solutions for each strategy pair. (1) Given strategy
(G1; G1), 
T
1 (G1; G1) = max
p1
1
1 r  1  p1+p21  (p1     ct) A and 
T
2 (G1; G1) =
max
p2
1
1 r  1  p1+p21   (p2     ct) A, which give us the solution as stated in
Proposition 4.6.1(a); (2) Given strategy (G1; O), 
T
1 (G1; O) =
1
1 r  1  p1+p21  
(p1     ct) A;  T2 (G1; O) = max
p2
1
1 r  p1 p2(1 ) (p2   ct), which give us the solu-
tion as stated in Proposition 4.6.1(b); (3) Given strategy (O;O), 
T
1 (O;O) =
max
p1
1
1 r  1  p1+p21  (p1   ct) and 
T
2 (O;O) = max
p2
1
1 r  p1 p2(1 ) (p2   ct), which
give us the solution as stated in Proposition 4.6.1(c); (4) Given strategy
(O;G1), 
T
1 (O;G1) = max
p1
1
1 r  1  p1+p21   (p1   ct) and 
T
2 (O;G1) =
1
1 r 
1  p1+p2
1   (p2     ct)   A. By solving the simultaneous game, we have

T
1 (O;G1) =
[2(1 ) ct(2  )]2
(1 r)(1 )(4 )2 ,
T T2 (O;G1) =
[(1 ) ct((2 ) )]2
(1 r)(1 )(4 )2 , p
T
1 (O;G1) =
2(1 )+(2  )
4  , p
T
2 (O;G1) =
(1 )+ct(2+)
4  , d
T
1 (O;G1) =
2(1 ) ct(2  )
(1 )(4 )2 , and
d
T
2 (O;G1) =
(1 ) ct((2 )+)
(1 )(4 )2 .
To obtain the equilibrium, we next derive the optimal strategy of one
company given the strategy of the other. Given that the generic company
chooses strategy O, the innovative company chooses strategyG1 over strategy
O i T1 (G1; O)  T1 (O;O) i A  B1 = (1 )ct(2 )[4(1 ) ct((2 ) )](1 r)(1 )(4 )2 .
Given that the generic company chooses strategy G1, the innovative company
chooses strategy G1 over strategy O i 
T
1 (G1; G1)  T1 (O;G1) i A 
B2

= (1 )ct(2 )[4(1 ) ct(2  )]
(1 r)(1 )(4 )2 . Note one can show that B1  B2 when
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ct  (1 )2   . Thus, the innovative company always chooses strategy O if
A  B1 and always chooses strategy G1 if A  B2. Otherwise, its strategy
depends on the strategy of the generic company.
Given that the innovative company chooses strategy O, the generic com-
pany chooses strategy G1 over strategy O i 
T
2 (O;G1)  T2 (O;O) i
A  B3 = (1 )ct(2 )[2(1 ) ct((2 ) 3+2)](1 r)(1 )(4 )2 . Given that the innovative com-
pany chooses strategy G1, the generic company chooses strategy G1 over
strategy O if and only if T2 (G1; G1)  T2 (G1; O), if and only if A  B4 =
(1 )ct(2 )[2(1 ) ct((2 3) +2)]
(1 r)(1 )(4 )2 . Note one can show that B3  B4 when
ct  (1 )2   . Thus, the generic company always chooses strategy O if A  B3
and always chooses strategy U1 if A  B4. Otherwise, its strategy depends
on the strategy of the innovative company.
Also note that B2  B3, and therefore B1  B2  B3  B4. By jointly
considering the best response of both companies, it is not hard to show that
the equilibrium is (G1; G1) if A  B4, (G1; O) if B4  A  B2, and (O;O) if
A  B1. Letting A T1 = B4 and A T2 = B1, we proved the lemma. 
Proof of Proposition 4.6.2. To prove the proposition, we only need to
compare the total impacts under policy T with those under policy N . For ex-
ample, according to Lemma 4.6.1, we have d
T
1 =
2 ct
4  , and d
T
2 =
 2ct
(4 ) when
A  A T1 . Thus, the total impact under policy T is TI T = e 11 r [1   2 ct4   
 2ct
(4 ) ] + 
1
1 r [
2 ct
4     2ct(4 ) ] when A  A
T
1 . Meanwhile, the total impact
under policy N is TIN = e 1
1 r (1  24    14  )+ 11 r ( 24  + 14  ) for any system
parameter set. Therefore, when A  A T1 , policy T is better than policy N if
and only if TI
T < TIN , or equivalently, e <  + 3(1 )
ct(2+)
. Similarly, we can
show that when A
T
1  A  A T2 and e <  + (1 )(3  2)+(1 )ct(2  )ct(1 )(2+)
or when A > A
T
2 and e <  +
3(1 )
ct(+2)
, policy T is better than policy N . The
remaining part of the statements follows. 
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